Kant’s Theory of Progress by McCloughan, Meade
1Kant’s Theory of Progress
M. J. B. McCloughan
University College London
Submitted for the Degree of PhD in Philosophy
at the University of London
2003
2Abstract
My topic is Kant’s theory of historical progress.  My approach is primarily textual and 
contextual.  I analyse in some detail Kant’s three most important essays on the topic: 
‘Idea for a Universal History’, the third part of ‘Theory and Practice’ and the second 
part of The Conflict of the Faculties.  I devote particular attention to the Kant-Herder 
debate about progress, but also discuss Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Hegel and others.
In presenting, on Kant’s behalf, a strong case for his theory of progress, I address the 
main objections which have been put to it.  These are: (i) historical teleology is 
incoherent (history can’t have a goal because there is no intentional actor functioning at 
the historical level); (ii) historical teleology undermines morality (if things are getting 
better anyway, why do I have to try to make them better?); (iii) progress involves 
‘chronological unfairness’ (if things are getting better, doesn’t this mean that earlier 
generations get a raw deal?); (iv) progress consigns the species to ‘spurious infinity’ 
(isn’t endless improvement endlessly unsatisfactory?); (v) progress amounts to 
pernicious homogenization (doesn’t the elimination of traditional practices and values 
impoverish our world?); (vi) the idea of progress is just ‘secularized’ religion (and 
should be rejected accordingly).
In relation to (vi), I consider the Löwith-Blumenberg debate, and draw some general 
conclusions about the issue of ‘secularization’.  In relating these to Kant, I argue for the 
following position:  (a) his theory of progress is more than merely secularized religion; 
(b) to the extent that it can be described in terms of the secularization thesis, this reflects 
his ‘critical’ endeavour to rationalize Christianity; (c) in any case, the idea of progress 
by no means exhausts the rational potential of religion, and so should not be seen as 
intended to replace the latter.
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4Note on Citations and Translations
Kant
All quotations from and references to passages in Kant’s works are located by 
parenthetical citations of the volume and page number in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 
edited by the Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences, except for citations 
from the Critique of Pure Reason, which are located by the customary use of the 
pagination of the first (“A”) and second (“B”) editions.  
All Kant’s works referred to are listed below, in alphabetical order, along with: the year 
(or years) of publication or, with posthumously published writings, the year (or years) 
of composition; the volume and pages in Kants Gesammelte Schriften; the translation 
used (full details provided in the bibliography); a short title (if applicable).
‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ [1784] (8:33-42), trans. Mary 
Gregor, Practical Philosophy, pp. 17-22.
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1798] (7:117-334), trans. Mary Gregor.
‘On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But Is of No Use in Practice’ 
[1793] (8:273-313), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy, pp. 279-309 
(‘Theory and Practice’).  References to the Third Part will also include the 
paragraph number, e.g. ¶3.
The Conflict of the Faculties [1798] (7:1-116), trans. Mary Gregor and Robert Anchor, 
Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 239-327.  The Second Part (7:77-94) will 
be referred to as ‘An Old Question’, the shortened form of its sub-title (cf. p. 
122).  References to ‘An Old Question’ will also give the section number, e.g. 
§3, with §C referring to the Conclusion.
‘Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History’ [1786] (8:107-23), trans. H. B. 
Nisbet, Kant: Political Writings, pp. 221-34 (‘Conjectures’).
Critique of Judgment [1790] (5:167-484), trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, 
Critique of the Power of Judgment (third Critique).
Critique of Practical Reason [1788] (5:1-163), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical 
Philosophy, pp. 139-271 (second Critique).
Critique of Pure Reason [1781, 1787] (3:1-552, 4:1-252), trans. Paul Guyer and Allen 
Wood (first Critique).
‘The End of All Things’ [1794] (8:327-39), trans. Allen Wood, Religion and Rational 
Theology, pp. 221-31 (‘End’).
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [1785] (4:385-463), trans. Mary Gregor, 
Practical Philosophy, pp. 43-108 (Groundwork).
‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ [1784] (8:15-31), trans. H. 
B. Nisbet, Kant: Political Writings, pp. 41-53 (‘Idea’).  References will also give 
where relevant the Proposition number, e.g. #3.
‘Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion’ [1783-86] (28:993-1126), trans. 
Allen Wood, Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 341-451.
The Metaphysics of Morals [1797] (6:203-493), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical 
Philosophy, pp. 363-603.
5‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’ [1791] (8:255-71), trans. 
George di Giovanni, Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 24-37 (‘Theodicy’).
Toward Perpetual Peace [1795] (8:341-86), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy, 
pp. 317-351 (Perpetual Peace).
Religion with the Boundaries of Mere Reason [1793, 1794] (6:1-202), trans. George di 
Giovanni, Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 39-215 (Religion).
‘Reviews of Herder’s “Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity” ’ [1785] 
(8:43-66), trans. H. B. Nisbet, Kant: Political Writings, pp. 201-20 (‘Reviews’).
Letters to and from Kant are referred to by sender, addressee, date and volume and page 
number in Gesammelte Schriften.  All translations are taken from Correspondence, 
trans. Arnulf Zweig.
Kant’s Handschriftliche Nachlaß is referred to by Reflection number (e.g. R6456) and 
volume and page number in Gesammelte Schriften.  All translations are taken from 
Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770, trans. David Walford.
Herder
All quotations from and references to passages in Herder’s works are located by 
parenthetical citations of the volume and page number in Herders Werke, edited by 
Ulrich Gaier, Martin Bollacher and others, preceded by a page reference to the 
translation used, using the following key:
B J. G. Herder on Social and Political Culture, trans. and ed. F. M. Barnard.
Bu Against Pure Reason: Writings on Religion, Language and History, trans. and 
ed. Marcia Bunge.
C Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, trans. T. Churchill.
Cr German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: Winckelmann, Lessing, Hamann, 
Herder, Schiller and Goethe, ed. H. B. Nisbet, trans. Joyce P. Crick.
F Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. Michael Forster.
All Herder’s works referred to are listed below, in alphabetical order, along with: the 
year (or years) of publication; the volume and pages in Herders Werke; the translation 
used (full details provided in the bibliography); a short title (if applicable).
‘Extract from a Correspondence on Ossian and the songs of ancient peoples’ [1773] 
(2:447-497), trans. in Cr, pp. 154-161 (abridged) (‘Ossian’).
Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity [1784–1791] (6:11-898), excerpts 
trans. in B, pp. 255-326, Bu, pp. 48-58 and C, pp. 3-398 (Ideas).  References to 
Ideas will also give book and chapter numbers, e.g. XV.3.
‘Journal of My Voyage in the Year 1769’ (9/ii:9-126), excerpts trans. in B, pp. 63-113.
‘Shakespeare’ [1773] (2:498-521), trans. in Cr, pp. 161-76.
This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity [1774] (4:9-107), 
trans. in F, pp. 272-358 (This Too).
Herder’s letters are referred to by addressee, date and page number in Briefe: 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 5, eds. Wilhelm Dobbeck and Günter Arnold.
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Introduction
My primary aim in this thesis is to expound Kant’s theory of progress.  By progress I 
mean historical progress.  One might suppose that this would go without saying, were it 
not for the fact that much of Kant’s thought about progress is concerned instead with the 
progress of the individual, in particular as this features in his argument for the 
postulation of the immortality of the soul.  I will at times have occasion to refer to this 
other theory of progress and consider its relation to my topic.  Indeed, it would have 
been possible (and no doubt interesting) to treat the two accounts of progress in tandem, 
as making up what one could then call the full theory of progress.  Such an approach, 
though, would have meant less concentration on the historical dimension, and for this 
reason I chose not to proceed in that manner.
Kant did not write a major work on the philosophy of history.  His endeavours in this 
field took the form of short articles and passages in larger works.  The diversity of these 
texts (and their contexts) along with the apparently peripheral status of their subject-
matter within the critical system makes the task of reconstructing Kant’s philosophical 
history an interestingly complicated one.  This situation itself suggests two distinct 
approaches which the interpreter could take.  One would involve trying to reconstruct 
the theory of historical progress within the armature of Kant’s philosophy as a whole, 
demonstrating its consistency (or otherwise) with the critical system.  (For example, as 
part of the full theory of progress mentioned above.)  The other direction would be to 
attend to the specificities of the particular texts, seeking to understand them in their 
polemical and intertextual contexts.  The first approach will tend to privilege those 
passages in Kant’s major works which touch on his philosophical history, in particular 
the Critique of Judgment, whereas the second will be best suited to the shorter articles in 
which Kant articulated his theory of historical progress.  Of course, neither strategy is 
self-sufficient: each will need to engage with the material from the perspective of the 
other to at least some degree.
The project of reconstructing Kant’s philosophical history within the critical system 
is of great value; however, from the point of view of one with a particular interest in the 
specific issue of historical progress, it is somewhat unsatisfactory.  This is because the 
issue of progress inevitably gets submerged by the consideration of more general 
philosophical matters.  I have therefore endeavoured to adopt a more focussed, 
‘horizontal’ approach to investigating Kant’s theory of progress.  Accordingly, I focus 
on the three texts which most directly address the topic of historical progress: ‘Idea for a 
7Universal History’ (1784), the third part of the ‘Theory and Practice’ essay (1793); and 
the second part of The Conflict of the Faculties (1798), a sequence which covers nearly 
the entire span of Kant’s ‘critical period’.  These texts warrant careful reading, a degree 
of attention which the more reconstructive strategy is usually unable to provide.  They 
deserve it both because they are artfully composed and because they were written as 
interventions in debates about the idea of progress.  This approach therefore enables me 
to see Kant in dialogue with his contemporaries, in particular with the critics of the idea 
of progress.  The most notable of these is J. G. Herder, Kant’s one-time protégé and 
subsequent philosophical adversary.  As we shall see, everything Kant wrote on 
philosophical history in the 1780’s was concerned more or less explicitly with him.  
One notable critic of the idea of progress who will not feature to the extent that his 
reputation in this regard might suggest is warranted is J.-J. Rousseau.  The reason for 
this will become apparent in Chapter Three.  For now, all I should say is that a quite 
different thesis would have been written had I attended to the Rousseau-Kant relation to 
the extent that it no doubt deserves.
In both attending to these debates and also more generally I have sought to present, 
on Kant’s behalf, a strong case for his theory of progress.  This has involved addressing 
some of the main objections which have been put to it.  The particular criticisms I 
consider are: (i) historical teleology is incoherent (history can’t have a goal because 
there is no intentional actor functioning at the historical level); (ii) historical teleology 
undermines morality (if things are getting better anyway, why do I have to try to make 
them better?); (iii) progress involves ‘chronological unfairness’ (if things are getting 
better, doesn’t this mean that earlier generations get a raw deal?); (iv) progress consigns 
the species to ‘spurious infinity’ (isn’t endless improvement endlessly unsatisfactory?); 
(v) progress amounts to pernicious homogenization (doesn’t the elimination of 
traditional practices and values impoverish our world?); (vi) the idea of progress is just 
‘secularized’ religion (and should be rejected accordingly).
I have devoted attention to other elements of Kant’s philosophy.  This has been 
necessary in order both to understand Kant’s theory of progress and to elaborate 
responses on his behalf to criticisms of it.  To that extent, therefore, my more contextual 
approach to the material does at times overlap with the project of reconstructing the 
theory of progress within the critical system.  I have tried not to linger unduly on this 
aspect of my project, though the reader might possibly think at times (particularly in 
Chapter Two) unsuccessfully so.
8The aspiration to provide a defence of Kant’s theory of progress is itself significantly 
frustrated by my desire to attend to the details of Kant’s own presentation of that theory.  
This is because Kant himself would ultimately want to defend his position on the issue 
of progress by referring back to more fundamental philosophical commitments.  
Conversely, his critics’ objections to his progressivism need to be seen in the end as 
themselves based upon deeper disagreements with his philosophy.  An important 
example of an issue which subtends some of the disputes about progress is the character 
of human rationality, about which in particular Kant and Herder have very different 
conceptions.  I have therefore pushed the arguments as far as I can within the domain of 
the philosophy of history: as and when the nominal boundary marking off this area from 
more general philosophical issues is touched, I have simply indicated this.
At the same time, I consider that Kant’s philosophical history benefits from not being 
locked too tightly into the critical system as a whole.  Kant evidently held that historical 
progress was one way in which the rift between nature and freedom, or reality and 
reason, could be overcome.  However, given the radical manner in which Kant 
construes that rift, the critics of his theory of progress, from Hegel to Yovel, have 
charged it with attempting the impossible.  According to them, the dualism cuts too 
deeply to allow the kind of synthesis Kant wants.  I find this line of criticism 
convincing, but have resisted interpreting Kant’s theory of progress in a more 
thoroughly reconstructive way partly in order to avoid having to engage with it.   I 
should make it clear that this strategy is not a matter of simply disregarding an objection 
to which Kant’s theory is vulnerable, but is instead motivated by the belief that the 
theory considered in its own right is not as afflicted by the problem of dualism as Hegel 
and others suppose.  No doubt this approach is somewhat artificial – the theory of 
progress is not an autonomous entity within Kant’s philosophy – but it does enable us to 
see the strengths (and weaknesses) of that theory in its own terms.
There are nine chapters, arranged in chronological order.  The first chapter looks at 
Herder’s 1774 critique of Enlightenment progressivism.  Chapters Two to Six deal with 
the theory of progress Kant presented in ‘Idea for a Universal History’ and Herder’s 
response to it.  In Chapters Seven and Eight I move into the 1790’s, focusing on 
‘Theory and Practice’ and The Conflict of the Faculties respectively.  The ninth and 
final chapter will examine the claim that the idea of progress in general and Kant’s 
version in particular merely amount to a ‘secularization’ of religious beliefs, looking in 
9particular at the work of two twentieth-century philosophers, Karl Löwith and Hans 
Blumenberg.
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Chapter One: Herder
J. G. Herder (1744-1803), pupil of, later polemicist against Kant, is frequently and not 
inaccurately invoked as a critic of ‘the Enlightenment’.1  In this chapter I will outline 
and assess the force and range of Herder’s objections to notions of historical progress as 
developed in the long essay This Too a Philosophy of History.  In later chapters we will 
see how this critique was subsequently applied by Herder to Kant’s philosophical 
history.
The full (and lengthy) title of Herder’s 1774 tract – This Too a Philosophy of History 
for the Formation of Humanity: a Contribution to the Many Contributions of the 
Century – expresses at the outset the author’s ironical weariness in the face of the 
profusion of Enlightenment philosophical historiography.  Herder is adding to the pile, 
not though with yet another work of the same character, but with a critical rejoinder to 
the presumptions and prejudices he finds to be rife in the mainstream.  It is here that he 
first and most forcibly develops those ideas subsequently described by the term 
‘historicism’.2  Quite what this label means in respect of Herder will become clearer in 
due course, but the key thought is that of the necessary plurality and transience of forms 
of human culture and society.  Different historical and environmental circumstances call 
forth correspondingly different human cultures, which, by virtue of their own character 
and dynamic, rise, fall and transform those circumstances in turn.  There can then be no 
such thing as an ideal form of society, nor can all societies be made intelligible by 
means of some extrinsic criteria.  Herder points up the problems that result for 
contemporary ‘universal’ historians, who attempt to encapsulate all of human history in 
their narratives.  The effort, attention and empathy (Einfühlung – a word created by 
Herder)3 required in order to understand just one culture are immense.  If this is hard to 
achieve, how much more difficult it would be to comprehend all cultures. What usually 
happens is that one culture is taken as the model and the rest misinterpreted accordingly.  
One important example of this strategy is classicism, which takes certain ancient 
                                                
1 Notably by Isaiah Berlin, ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’.  I share some of the current unease about 
referring to ‘the Enlightenment’, but it is apposite in this context: Herder evidently does see himself 
opposing a dominant contemporary intellectual tradition, and does advert critically to Aufklärung.
2 Cf. Meinecke, Historism [sic].  (‘Historism’ is also the term used by the translator of Koselleck’s 
Futures Past, presumably likewise to avoid confusion with Popperian ‘historicism’.  The preferable 
strategy would be to reject Popper’s usage.)  Beiser discusses historicism briefly in Enlightenment, 
Revolution and Romanticism, pp. 6-7.  A particular good recent account of historicism, with reference 
to Hegel, is to be found in Forster, Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit.
3 Meinecke, Historism, p. 297.
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Mediterranean cultures as privileged exemplars, understanding and evaluating all others 
in relation to them.
The form of homogenized universal history Herder is most concerned with involves 
prioritizing the present local cultural form.4  Though, of course, every culture, on his 
account, does this to at least some extent – that is, focuses in on itself – what is 
distinctive here is the pseudo-objective endeavour to grade all other cultures and 
peoples accordingly.  So he writes ‘the universal, philosophical, human-friendly tone of 
our century grants to each distant nation, each oldest age, in the world “our own ideal” 
in virtue and happiness’ (F 297 / 4:40).  The charge Herder raises against what he takes 
to be the dominant conception of Enlightenment is that it is guilty of what we can 
(infelicitously) term ‘presentism’ (understanding geographical-ethnic presumptuousness
to be included in this).5  This general presumption can take many forms.  This Too a 
Philosophy of History explicitly distinguishes two main ones (F 298-299 / 4:40-41), but 
also describes a third, hybrid form.
The first strand in Enlightenment philosophy of history which manifests ‘presentism’ 
is what I will call positive progressivism.  This involves taking contemporary values and 
attributing them to all other societies and peoples.  Just as the present century sees 
Europeans striving to realize a particular ideal of virtue and happiness, so too all other 
human beings have striven to realize those very same ideals.  This interpretation of 
history does not just apply ‘enlightened’ values to all other cultures; it supposes that 
these values were also recognized in them, however vaguely, and that human history 
consequently represents a collective and cumulative endeavour to achieve their 
realization, the ‘universally progressing improvement of the world’ (F 298 / 4:40).  For 
Herder, this is clearly false.  Human societies all have their own, divergent but equally 
human, standards of virtue and happiness, and are all able to live up to them (though 
they can fail in this).  The claims that history reveals humanity to be engaged in one 
common endeavour in which it can be seen to make progress are thus nothing more than 
‘novels [Romane]’ (F 298 / 4:40), one which only takes shape with the invention, 
                                                
4 Though classicism often takes this form as well: the present age is privileged, along with the classical 
one, as that in which a return or revival is possible, if not already being achieved.
5 This prejudice has also been described as ‘cultural arrogance’ (Berlin, ‘Herder and the 
Enlightenment’, p. 171), ‘anachronism’ (Berlin, ‘Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European 
Thought’, p. 85) and ‘ethnocentrism’ (Beiser, The Fate of Reason, pp. 143, 349 n. 49).  I prefer 
presentism, as this conveys the historicality of the presumption (which ‘cultural arrogance’ and 
‘ethnocentrism’ do not), along with its self-reference (which ‘anachronism’ fails to capture –
classicism can be anachronistic without privileging the present).  (The term is recognized in the new 
Oxford English Dictionary.)
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embellishment and suppression of facts.  Positive progressivism thus amounts to 
stretching, generalizing the local form of culture – ‘Enlightenment’ – such that it 
extends to humanity as a whole, past as well as present, there as well as here.
Whom did Herder have in mind?  He makes reference to various philosophically-
minded eighteenth-century historians throughout his text, but the one who most clearly 
fits the bill in this respect is the Swiss writer Isaak Iselin (1728-1782), author of 
Versuch philosophischer Mutmassungen über die Geschichte der Menschheit (1764).6
This work, in its author’s words, described ‘the progress of mankind from external 
simplicity to an increasingly higher degree of light and well-being’.7  Iselin was 
characterized by Christoph Meiners in 1786 as one of the first exponents of properly 
philosophical history.8   In our own time, Peter Reill has emphasized Iselin’s 
representativeness.9
The second expression of presentism Herder highlights is a form of historical 
scepticism, whereby the study of the past shows that ‘vices and virtues, like climes, 
change, perfections arise and perish like a springtime of leaves, human ethics and 
inclinations fly away, turn over, like leaves of fate – no plan!, no progress!, eternal 
revolution – weaving and undoing! – Penelope-work!’ (F 298 / 4:40). This position 
shares with progressivism the privileging of the European present - its exponent 
‘considers our century’s civil administration the non plus ultra of humanity’ and loves 
to ‘rave about our century’s light’ (F 307 / 4:51) – but does not delude itself into 
thinking that the process of enlightenment can be retrospectively attributed to all of the 
human past.  In its attentiveness to the heterogeneity displayed in history, it is closer to 
Herder’s own standpoint; however, it always tends to engage with the past 
unsympathetically, seeking ‘to reduce whole centuries to barbarism, miserable state 
authority, superstition and stupidity, lack of ethics and tastelessness’ (F 307 / 4:51).  
The very randomness of history therefore means that the achievement of the present age 
can be supposed to be its work alone – it then owes nothing to the past, contrary to what 
the progressivist holds.  Enlightenment would then be humanity (or rather part of it) 
pulling itself up by its boot-straps.  This view of history can also make use of the idea of 
                                                
6 Beiser identifies Iselin along with John Millar and August Ludwig Schlözer as Herder’s targets in this 
respect.  Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism, pp. 206, 400 n. 101.
7 Iselin, cited in Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism, p. 52.
8 See Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment: Scottish Civic Discourse in Eighteenth-Century 
Germany, p. 169.
9 Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism, pp. 65-69; see also Oz-Salzberger, 
Translating the Enlightenment, pp. 169-189.
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progress, but only in a restricted sense, as applying to the present age.  ‘Progress’ would 
thus mark off the present as apart from the rest of history, rather than establishing its 
continuity with it.
Herder identifies a leading current of (particularly French) enlightenment with this 
version of presentism, mentioning in connection with it Bayle, Voltaire, Hume, 
d’Alembert and Diderot (F 298 / 4:41, F 312 / 4:57).10
What I have called ‘presentism’ is thus independent of a commitment to the idea of 
progress, when this is understood as a general, cross-cultural historical process.  
Alternatively, it can be seen as motivating divergent conceptions of progress, general 
and restricted.  The first subsumes the past under the present dynamic, the second sets 
the present dynamic off against the past.  
The two positions, progressivist and sceptical,11 can be summed up in Herderian 
fashion as follows.  The first is unhistorical, but not altogether demeaning to other 
cultures: it benignly, if myopically, sees them all as contributing and being oriented 
toward enlightenment.  If the present age is that of light, then that light has dawned 
gradually throughout all of history.  The second, sceptical position is somewhat more 
historical, being attentive to real differences between societies, but also more 
dismissive.  It recognizes, to an extent, the plurality of values demonstrated by human 
cultures, but then judges them (that is, in nearly all cases, condemns them) in the light 
of the present ideals.  Present light is contrasted with preceding obscurity; all other ages 
and places are dark ages, dark continents.  
If the sceptical account is more robust, it should be noted that of the two only the 
positive progressivist account allows for the construction of a properly universal
history, however fictional (on Herder’s account) this must of necessity be.  The 
rationalist expectation that human history be intelligible as a whole, and not just as a 
random collation, provided a powerful impetus to universal history of a progressivist 
bent.12
                                                
10 Many of these thinkers in fact held more complex views, coming close in some cases to a traditional 
cyclical view of history, in which the current ‘light’ of day was almost inevitably to be followed by 
night.
11 Beiser characterizes the two types of ‘presentist’ historical interpreters as, respectively, Aufklärer and 
skeptics (Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism, p. 208), which is unhelpful as Herder would 
want to emphasize the ‘Enlightened’ arrogance of both positions.
12 The eighteenth century, particularly in Germany, saw a growing demand that universal histories be 
structured totalities, rather than merely inclusive compilations.  Thus August Ludwig Schlözer, a 
famous Gottingen historian, argued in 1772 that ‘One can represent world history from two points of 
view: either as an aggregate of particular histories … or as a system, in which the world and humanity 
form a unity, and in which all individual parts of the aggregate … are collected and purposively 
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In discussing these two approaches, the one the flipside of the other, Herder implies 
that they exhaust the possible field.  Yet in subsequent passages, he adverts to a third 
construction, a kind of hybrid of the first two, which I will call negative progressivism, 
combining the idea of historical progress with the derogatory attitude towards earlier 
cultures.  These are now viewed as having been necessary for the subsequent 
achievement of enlightenment.  The present age did not come into being on its own, but 
required the preparation of the past.  ‘You can of course prove splendidly there how so 
many corners had first to be violently ground down before the round, smooth, nice thing 
that we are could appear!’  In short, ‘corruptions precede in order to produce 
improvement and order’ (F 310 / 4:54).  The day of eighteenth-century Europe not only 
succeeds the night of previous history, but is only possible because of that darkness.  
Herder says this position follows ‘immediately from “the pet philosophy” of the 
century’ (F 310 / 4:54).  In fact, given what he has already outlined, it by no means 
exhausts the enlightenment attitude as such, which has at least two other forms.  And 
yet, for his purposes, negative progressivism does adequately sum up the standard views 
he is opposing.  The dialectical recoil he adumbrates from positive progressivism to 
scepticism is then balanced out by a synthesis of the two positions, maintaining the 
universalism of the first with the greater grasp of particularity of the second.  Negative 
progressivism thus incorporates both a general and restricted concept of progress, the 
former covering the long negative work of preparation, to which past generations 
contribute but from which they do not benefit, and the latter the advent of positive 
progress in the present.  Progress is thereby figured as a two-stage process.  The 
conscious endeavours of enlightened Europe to advance towards a happier future follow 
on from, and realize, the unconscious, unintentional progress achieved in the past.
Herder rejects all three of these ways of viewing human history.  The basic flaw 
which vitiates them all follows directly from the ‘presentist’ starting point.  In looking 
at the past through the lens of the present, with contemporary values clearly to the fore, 
it becomes impossible to do it justice.  Past cultures are either completely 
misrepresented, as cruder versions of the historian’s own, or, if their difference is 
recognized (to some extent), they are treated without empathy, as depraved and 
barbaric.  The sceptical perspective seems least tainted by these misrecognitions, in that 
                                                                                                                                              
ordered’ (Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie, vol. 1, p. 16, my translation).  The latter was what 
was necessary: consequently, ‘a plan, a theory, an ideal of this science must be written’ (ibid. vol. 2, p. 
2, my translation).  Cf. Butterfield, Man On His Past, pp. 47-50 and Koselleck, Futures Past, p. 29.  
(Herder reviewed the first volume of Schlözer’s Vorstellung in 1772.)
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it does not have the universalist presumptions which motivate them much more 
evidently in the progressivist accounts; yet, so long as this scepticism goes hand in hand 
with an assertion of the superiority of the contemporary civilization, it must tend this 
way too.  Herder is also critical of the general prejudice that the present age is clearly 
superior.  In a manner similar to Rousseau, he points out the losses and disadvantages 
consequent upon present-day ‘progress’.  ‘Empathy’, as applied to the past, should not 
bring about a rose-tinted view of it; then again, the same clarity of vision is what should 
be applied to the present.  In being fairer to past cultures, that is, more positive about 
them, we can learn to become more objective about our own, by means of a 
counterbalancing awareness of its faults.  (It remains to be seen how Herder thinks this 
general historical project can be achieved and to what extent it would be genuinely 
philosophical, i.e. one which accounted for the unity of the historical domain.)
As might be expected, Herder takes particular exception to the third position, 
negative progressivism.  In viewing past cultures as necessary steps towards the present, 
which in themselves otherwise have no value, it claims that history operates 
instrumentally, sacrificing the happiness of previous generations for the benefit of that 
of enlightened Europe.  Having ironically described what he calls this ‘beautiful picture, 
order and progress [Fortgang] of nature’, Herder retorts ‘But not a thing in the whole of 
God’s creation, am I able to persuade myself though!, is only means – everything means 
and purpose simultaneously, and hence certainly these centuries [are so] too’ (F 310 / 
4:54).  Negative progressivism thus takes the ‘presentist’ disrespect for the past and 
attributes it to Providence.  For previous peoples and societies to be merely means 
towards the present, they must have been used in this way, and only a providential God 
can be supposed to be able to have done this.  This position thus relies upon, yet 
contradicts, Herder thinks, the concept of a divine creator.  A universal deity could not 
coherently be charged with such apparently random partiality towards his creatures.  In 
any case, the lives of past generations have not, on Herder’s account, been as wretched 
as ‘the pet philosophy’ supposes.
Divine goodness is not the only issue: just as important, from Herder’s point of view, 
is the retrospective attitude of historians (and others).  They cannot, of course, treat 
earlier generations as means, but find it quite easy to view them in this way.  This, no 
doubt, involves them in difficulties concerning providential justice, which they may not 
be aware of, but, more immediately expresses a meanness of spirit, a failure of historical 
empathy, which should be apparent to them.  It is as much this human failing as the 
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problem about God’s plans which concerns Herder in 1774.  (He might well want to 
connect this tendency with the prevalence of actual instrumentalization of contemporary 
(especially non-European) peoples: the failure to recognize integrity of past generations 
can go hand in hand with the ability to mistreat present day ones.)
The puzzle for readers of This Too a Philosophy of History is that, amidst the 
exposure and ridiculing of various progressivist positions, its author himself insists that 
there is ‘manifest progress [Fortgang] and development’ in history, though this is of a 
‘higher’ order than is usually supposed (F 298 / 4:41).13  What can he mean by this?  
How can Herder remain true to his historicist principles whilst using the idea of 
progress?   There are two main interpretative responses to this problem, but before I 
deal with them, there are two minor senses in which Herder clearly accepts that there is 
progress, which should not be confused with his ‘higher’ version. First of all, he is keen 
to assert the continuity of human history: ‘No one lives in his age alone, he builds on 
the preceding one, this becomes nothing but the foundation of the future’ (F 299 / 4:41).  
Cultures and civilizations rise and fall, but out of and into each other.  World history 
therefore does present a continuous narrative, in which what comes earlier can be seen 
as a means (but never merely a means) for what succeeds it.  In particular, the 
interconnectedness of cultures provides for the accumulation and development of 
knowledge. At this level, there is progress, though Herder will of course want to remind 
us that this trajectory has nothing to do with any putative advances in virtue and 
happiness and is indeed all too likely to inhibit them.  Secondly, ‘progress’ can also be 
used to describe the dynamic at work, though always in different forms, in each 
particular culture and historical era.  This is one way in which Berlin tries to square the 
interpretative circle: he says that Herder’s notion of ‘Fortgang is the internal 
development of a culture in its own habitat, towards its own goals’.14  In so far as all 
cultures demonstrate life, however slow or declining, progress could be said to be a 
trans-historical constant.  This is, however, rather strained.  Rising and falling are both 
motions, but only the former is progressive.  Herder would in any case be averse to 
valorizing a model of cultural development which can all too easily be used to demean 
                                                
13 The word used by Herder and rendered by Forster, here and elsewhere, as ‘progress’ is Fortgang, not 
Fortschritt.  Berlin notes this, and gives ‘advance’ instead, which is not inappropriate (‘Herder and the 
Enlightenment’, p. 214).  However, Berlin’s tactic implies that Herder is counterposing ‘advance’ to 
‘progress’ (cf. ibid. p. 215), whereas in fact Herder uses Fortgang to refer both to his own preferred 
‘higher’ concept and to those he is criticising (cf. p. 13 above).  (It is only in the late 1780s that he 
starts to use the term Fortschritt, by then becoming more prevalent.)
14 ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 217.
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seemingly static or slow-moving societies and, conversely, to laud contemporary 
European society.
There are, then, as mentioned, two main ways in which interpreters have tried to 
make sense of Herder’s claim that there is ‘progress in a higher sense’.  The first of 
these involves the assumption that history develops in the same way that an organism 
does, and has recently been adopted by Frederick Beiser.  The second focuses instead on 
the model of the artwork, and can be found in Isaiah Berlin’s essay.
Beiser claims that in This Too a Philosophy of History we find the application of ‘an 
organic analogy to history’, whereby ‘all the cultures of the past are so many stages of 
growth’.15  History therefore is always progressing because humanity is always 
developing.  There are obvious problems with this reading of Herder’s text.  For one 
thing, the evidence for it is exiguous.  Herder does use the ‘analogy taken from human 
ages in life’ (F 281 / 4:20), but only ever to characterize one particular historical 
sequence, namely the passage from the ancient Hebrews to the Roman Empire, which is 
narrated in one part of the text (as Beiser points out) in terms of the passage from 
infancy to adulthood.  But Herder is just as likely to employ quite different metaphors as 
well, such as from construction, to describe this historical succession (and others).  
There thus seems no good reason for taking the organic analogy to have either priority 
over the others or general extension over the whole of history.
It is unsurprising that Herder does not, contrary to what Beiser states, articulate his 
idea of ‘higher progress’ by means of an organic model, as it is ill-suited for his 
purposes.  If the life-cycle analogy were to be applied consistently, we would expect to 
find ageing, decline and death following on from growth and maturity.  This pattern 
may be generally applicable to civilizations themselves (and there are traces of such 
usage in Herder), but if assumed to be true of history as a whole, progress could only be 
used to describe the earlier stages.  (This is clearly why Herder’s growth metaphors fade 
away after the Romans.)  In order to forestall this objection, we must take the analogy to 
involve only the positive dynamic, such that there is always only growth (never 
degeneration).  This, then, strictly speaking, would be a maturation model, like an 
educative process, which need never end or enter into a down-turn, as opposed to an 
organic one.  The difficulty now is that a progressivist account of human history 
constructed on this model looks too much like the kinds of account Herder has already 
                                                
15 Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism, pp. 208-209.
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rejected.  Maturational progressivism, to give it a label, is clearly less unpalatable to 
him than the progressivist accounts considered earlier (indeed Herder was himself 
subsequently to promulgate a version of it).  It allows, unlike positive progressivism, for 
the real diversity of historical cultures, understood now as different stages of growth, 
and not as lesser versions of maturity.  Unlike negative progressivism, it can recognize 
the achievements of virtue and happiness in each stage, as being appropriate to them.  
And yet, it shares with both the assumption that later stages of history are superior to the 
preceding ones.  (Maturity is clearly both normative and teleological.)  Organicism, in
its abbreviated and maturational form, serves to support the presentist prejudices Herder 
finds so objectionable.
There is, as we shall see, a better way of making ‘higher progress’ intelligible.  It is 
worth pausing for a moment to note two factors which appear to incline Beiser towards 
his unsatisfactory interpretation of This Too a Philosophy of History.  The first is the 
strong connection he sees between historicism and organicism; as he writes, ‘historicism 
is frequently and properly associated with organicism, the notion that society can be 
explained according to the laws applicable to human creatures’, that is, in terms of 
‘stages of growth’.16  It is true that historicists, Herder included, are prone to interpret 
societies and cultures as organic wholes, but not that they are therefore similarly 
inclined to consider human history itself in this way.17  Beiser mistakenly elides these 
two levels.  Meinecke provides a useful corrective to the supposition that historicists 
seek to apply the organic analogy to history as a whole (as Beiser claims Herder does).  
On his account, historicism can deal with change in more various and subtle ways than 
are allowed by ideas of growth.18  This we noted earlier in Herder himself: construction 
metaphors, for example, can describe many more kinds of transition than organic 
development.  In ‘building on what has gone before’, cultures can demolish, refurbish, 
adapt, extend the work of their predecessors, indeed even just camp in the ruins left by 
them.  (Such metaphors, as well as allowing for more dialectical transformations, also 
suggest an open-ended, continuous process).  The second factor leading Beiser to think 
that ‘higher progress’ is quasi-organicist or educational is his anticipation of Herder’s 
                                                
16 Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism, p. 6.
17 This is not to deny that historicists can construe history in biological terms, only that the source 
domain for such representations are ideas of ‘bio-diversity’, not the idea of the growth of an individual 
organism.
18 Historism, cf. especially p. lvii: ‘there is a difference between the evolutionary conception of 
historism with its greater degree of spontaneity, plastic flexibility and incalculability, and the much 
narrower idea of a mere unfolding of an existing bud’.
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espousal, from the mid 1780’s onwards, of precisely such notions.  That is, he reads the 
earlier work in the light of the later positions, as if what Herder means by ‘higher 
progress’ in 1774 is to be understood by means of the doctrines expressed in 1787.  Like 
Meinecke and Berlin, I find the assumption of continuity implausible.  Beiser’s 
interpretation is thus itself ‘organicist’, reading the later ‘flowering’ of maturational 
progressivism back into the earlier ‘seed’, which is in turn indicative of the kind of 
errors organicism generates.
The alternative and superior reading is not explicitly developed by any commentator, 
though, as mentioned, it is certainly suggested by Isaiah Berlin.19  Part of what is 
striking about This Too a Philosophy of History is the frequency with which Herder 
characterizes human history as a work of art, most often a drama or a painting.  These 
descriptions suggest that he conceives of both the unity and the progression of history as 
analogous to that of a human artwork.  The course of human history thus amounts to an 
ongoing display of different instantiations of humanity: ‘the history of the human 
species … [is] an endless drama of scenes!, an epic of God’s through all millennia, parts 
of the world, and human races, a thousand-formed fable full of a great meaning!’ (F 
335-336 / 4:83). Each scene ‘displays a new and remarkable aspect of humanity’
(‘Ossian’, Cr 158 / 2:456); its function is not to advance the plot and help bring about a 
conclusion.  The drama is more like a pageant, more like Shakespeare (at least as 
Herder understands his work) than Racine.20  For whom, though, is this performance 
undertaken?  Clearly not the ‘actors’, who come and go with each scene.  One may 
attempt to step out of role and view the whole; in which case, however, one is 
confronted with a huge painting, of which one obtains only a brief and tangential 
glimpse: ‘who am I to judge, since I precisely only pass obliquely through the great hall, 
and eye a side-corner of the great covered painting in the obscurest shimmer? (F 357 / 
4:106).  The historian may try to focus on a ‘particular group’ of figures with the 
painting, but ‘If you hold your face close up to the picture, carve at this sliver, pick at 
that little clump of pigment,  you will never see the whole image – you see anything but 
an image!’ (F 293 / 4:35; cf. F 357 / 4:106 also).  Is history then a work of art with no 
audience or spectator?  Here it becomes evident that the artwork idea is more than just a 
                                                
19 ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 218.
20 Shakespeare’s plays demonstrate ‘a multiplicity of estates, ways of life, attitudes, nations and styles of 
speech’; ‘Every play is History [English in the original] in the widest sense’ (‘Shakespeare’, Cr 168 / 
2:508, Cr 175 / 2:520).  (See Eva Knodt, ‘Dramatic illusion in the making of the past: Shakespeare’s 
impact on Herder's philosophy of history’.)
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metaphor.  There is indeed an audience - of one: ‘it is only the Creator who thinks the 
whole unity of one, of all, nations in all their manifoldness without having the unity 
thereby fade for him’ (F 293 / 4:35).  Human history becomes an artwork, becomes 
whole, for God.21
Another form of art, one particularly suited to Herder’s ends, is music (see in 
particular F 336 / 4:83-84).  Thinking of history as if it were a piece of music captures 
the levels of diachronic and synchronic diversity best of all: at any one time a chord is 
being sounded, composed of the different notes struck by the various cultures around 
the world.  As these cultures change, instruments come and go and new tunes are 
sounded.  The resulting music has both harmony and melody; in fact, this image allows 
for discordant transitions which nonetheless enhance the whole.  Berlin makes use of 
this idea: history is, for Herder, ‘like a cosmic symphony of which each movement is 
significant in itself’.22  However, Berlin resists describing the advance of the whole as 
progress, wanting, as we saw earlier, to restrict the use of terms like progress and 
development to the dynamic of each ‘movement’.  This is not quite satisfactory: unless 
the segments themselves develop into each other or are similarly linked, the result
cannot be a whole.
Understood in this way, as the temporal development of an artwork, Herder’s 
‘progress in a higher sense’ is consistent with his historicism.  Each stage is as valuable 
as the rest, but the whole requires maximum diversity.  Historical change and 
development are just as important in historicist progressivism as it is for the version 
Herder opposes. The key difference is that for the historicist, change is significant for 
what it reveals - another aspect of humanity - not in respect of where it is heading - a 
greater or more achieved humanity.  The whole gains ever more perfection, but in the 
succession of aspects, not their accumulation.23
The Leibnizian basis of Herder’s thought should now be evident.  According to 
Leibniz, all possible perfections are so manifold as to prevent their compatibility: this 
explains why ‘the best of all possible worlds’ must contain imperfections.  Herder takes 
over this value pluralism and applies it specifically to the human species: the perfections 
                                                
21 Cf. Ranke: ‘Before God, all generations of mankind are equal; and this is the light in which the 
historian must look at them’; ‘every epoch is directly before God; and its value is not dependent on 
what it produces, but on its intrinsic existence and its own distinctive identity’ (quoted by Meinecke, 
Historism, pp. 505-506).
22  ‘Herder and the Enlightenment’, p. 218.
23 A difficulty of course can arise in thinking of this given the propensity to characterize the unity of 
artworks in rather indeterminately organic terms.
Herder 21
of which it is capable are also such that they cannot be realized together.  And yet this 
limitation can be circumvented by means of the very diversity of human life.  At any 
one time and in any one place, the human species may only be able to demonstrate some 
of its possible perfections, but at other times and in other places, it will be possible for 
other capacities and virtues to be exemplified.  Thus we read in This Too a Philosophy 
of History: ‘The human container is capable of no full perfection all at once; it must 
always leave behind in moving further on.’ (F 288 / 4:29).  Discussing the combination 
in ancient Greece of virtues and vices, Herder writes:
But was it possible for those perfections to be developed in that amount and degree without these 
shortcomings?  Providence itself, you can see, did not demand it, only wanted to attain its purpose 
in succession, in leading further through the awakening of new forces and the demise of others … 
Is humanity capable of pure perfection in a single present condition at all?  (F 295 / 4:37)
Finally: ‘What, O individual human being, with your inclinations, abilities and 
contribution, are you?  And you have pretensions that perfection should exhaust itself in 
you in all its aspects?’ (F 357 / 4:106).
Indeed, the Leibnizian antecedents include some of the metaphorical resources that 
Herder uses.  Recall the painting of which we glimpse only a fragment (F 293, F357); 
the same analogy is used by Leibniz in his 1697 text ‘On the Ultimate Origination of 
Things’.  In an attempt to mitigate the unease we may feel at being told that this is the 
best of all possible worlds, Leibniz informs us that ‘We know but a small part of the 
eternity which extends without measure, for how short is the memory of several 
thousand years which history gives us.’  He then compares our ‘meagre experience’ to 
the very constricted view one might have of a ‘very beautiful painting’, seeing ‘some 
small part’ and judging what we see to be a ‘confused combination of colours, without 
delight, without art’. 24   Notice that here our ‘short experience’ equates to human history 
as a whole; the ‘bigger picture’ in which the segment makes sense is eternity.  Herder’s 
innovation is to apply this analogy to each component segment of the past of the 
species: human history itself is the painting, rather than just a passage within it.25
Herder’s ‘philosophy of history’ of 1774 is attractive in its appreciation of diversity 
and refusal to patronize or look down upon other cultures.  It comes, of course, with
considerable drawbacks too, not least in its heavy reliance upon the person of God, 
whose aesthetic pleasure is what explains and legitimates the course of history.  One 
                                                
24 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, p. 153.  This text goes on make the analogy with music as well.
25 Herder is very unlikely to have read ‘On the Ultimate Origination of Things’, as it was only published 
in 1840 (Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, p. 486).
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familiar objection is that the ‘pluralism’ (Berlin’s term)26 which Herder espouses 
deprives him of any adequate normative criteria for judging or criticizing cultures.27  
This may well be true.  It is worth pointing out, though, that Herder is very critical of 
the Europe of his day, in ways which follow on from his historicist principles.  His 
doctrines about the suitability of different cultural forms in different particular historical 
and geographical circumstances lead directly to his denunciation of European 
colonialism.  He finds similar grounds for protesting against the multi-national machine 
states of despotic absolutism.  Kant, for one, may be able to offer better reasons for 
objecting to these things; one should not mistake Herder’s historicism, however, for a 
complacent relativism or accuse him of inconsistency when he does engage in such 
criticism.
One difficulty which Herder doesn’t address is that of reconciling his historicist’s 
sense for the entirety of the human past with his advocacy of local, self-contained 
cultures.  Doesn’t such historical sensibility itself require stepping beyond one’s own 
horizons?  Herder hopes that the appreciation of human diversity will work to reinforce 
the particularity of the historian’s home culture.  But, as Nietzsche was to point out, it is 
much more likely to undermine cultural integrity.28  Herder is not altogether unaware of 
this – ‘Enlightenment!  We now know so much more, hear, read so much, we are so 
peaceful, patient, gentle-hearted, inactive’ (F 332 / 4:78).  How, one wonders, are his 
own prolix efforts meant to have a different effect?  Nietzsche indeed suggests that 
immersion in history had a deleterious effect on Herder himself, more unsettling than 
tranquilizing, though just as inhibiting: ‘He was a restless guest, tasting in advance 
every spiritual dish the Germans raked together over half a century from all the realms 
of space and time’ and hence never ‘sat at the table of the actual creators’ nor was ‘truly 
happy and satisfied’.29
                                                
26 ‘Alleged Relativism’, pp. 79-80.
27 Allen Wood raises this charge in Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 233.  Beiser attempts to resolve the 
problem by appeal to his organicist account of ‘higher progress’: Enlightenment, Revolution and 
Romanticism, pp. 207-209.
28 ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, §4, p. 78.
29 The Wanderer and his Shadow, §118, p. 338.  (Nietzsche’s mother’s brother replaced Herder as 
General Superintendent of the Lutheran church in Weimar on the latter’s death.  Nietzsche was at one 
stage thinking of referring to this in his autobiography, Ecce Homo (see draft material, p. 472).)
23
Chapter Two: What’s the idea (in Kant’s ‘Idea’)?
Some of the complexity of Kant’s philosophy of history is concentrated in the very first 
word of the title of his first and most important text on the subject, the ‘Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ of 1784.  At first glance, it might seem 
that Kant intends by the word ‘idea’ simply to convey the sense that this little essay is 
merely a sketch, a suggestion, one which would have to be filled out, if others were 
willing to accept it.  Evidently the essay is an idea in this sense, but there is much more 
to Kant’s use of term than just this.30
To start, it is worth considering the apparent stimulus for the writing of ‘Idea’.  In
February 1784, Johann Schultz wrote in the Gothaische Gelehrte Zeitungen:
It is a favourite idea [Lieblingsidee] of Herr Professor Kant that the ultimate goal of the human 
race is the establishment of a perfect constitution.  He desires that a philosophical historiographer 
would undertake to write a history of humanity from this perspective in order to show whether 
humanity has come closer to this final goal at some time, has strayed from it at others, and what 
still remains to be done to achieve it.  (8:468, translation taken from Kuehn, Kant, p. 288)
Kant refers to this in a note to the title of his own essay, published in November that 
year: ‘A passage printed this year among other brief notices in the twelfth issue of the 
Gothaische Gelehrte Zeitungen, based, no doubt, on a conversation of mine with a 
passing scholar, calls for the present elucidation, without which the passage referred to 
would be unintelligible’ (8:17).  This is at least rather odd: Schultz was at that time 
Court Chaplain in Königsberg and also taught mathematics at the University (later 
becoming Professor of Mathematics) and so would have been known to Kant.  In fact, 
he and Kant were friends:  Schultz had long taken an interest in Kant’s work, and 
became one of its earliest promoters, bringing out in 1784 his Exposition of Kant’s 
‘Critique of Pure Reason’,31 the publication of which the notice in the Gothaische 
Gelehrte Zeitungen was announcing.  So, he was by no means ‘a passing scholar’!  Nor 
is Schultz’s text as unintelligible as Kant suggests.  The two peculiarities are linked: if 
Kant wants the reader to think that the original passage (which, noticeably, he himself 
does not provide) is an unsatisfactory résumé of his position, he is unlikely to want to 
admit that it came from the pen of one his most valuable scholarly defenders.  But why 
bother with this stratagem anyway?  My guess is that it is a ruse, designed to provide an 
                                                
30 I am focusing on the title here, but it is worth pointing out that Kant uses the term throughout the 
essay and in a way which is evidently intended to tie in with its appearance in the title (see in 
particular the citation from #9, 8:29 given on p. 33 below).  Paul Guyer has recently claimed that ‘the 
term “Idee” occurs explicitly only in the full title of ‘Universal History’, not in the body of the text as 
it does in Perpetual Peace’ (Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness, p. 427 n. 15).  However, in 
addition to the title, the word in fact occurs a further eleven times in what is quite a short text (!).
31 Available in an English translation by James C. Morrison.
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occasion for the essay which disguises its real polemical context.  It seems plausible to 
assume that the prompt for Kant’s essay came not in the form of a misleading summary 
which he wanted to correct, but rather the publication in Easter that same year of the 
first part of Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity.32  The text of 
Kant’s essay itself bears no trace of an engagement with Herder’s work; this was to 
come in the ‘Reviews’ he published in 1785 (discussed in Chapter Five).  Yet it is 
difficult to avoid concluding that one reason Kant had for writing an article on the 
philosophy of history at this stage in his career was the appearance of a work on this 
very topic which he took a dim view of.  Herder’s comparative popularity (and popular 
style) would moreover have raised the profile of the philosophy of history in a way 
which would make Kant’s intervention all the more effective.  Kant’s title thus 
announces the challenge his own work presents to that of his former pupil: the singular 
‘Idea’ unmistakably contrasting with Herder’s proliferating, plural ‘Ideas’.
This conjunctural and polemical significance of Kant’s use of the term ‘Idee’ is of 
course only part of the story, for the term already had considerable importance in the 
philosophical system which Kant had introduced three years previously with the 
publication of the first Critique.  Kant writes there that ‘Nobody attempts to establish a 
science without grounding it on an idea’ (A834/B862).   In so far then as a ‘universal 
history’ had pretensions to scientificity, it too would have to be based on an ‘idea’.  
What, in any case, would a universal history be?  It would be the history of all 
humanity, so universal in the sense of inclusive.  This comprehensiveness could take in, 
as was often the case with traditional universal histories, the future as well as the past.  
Yet it would presumably have to be more than just a collection of all the facts, actual 
and conjectural, falling under the intersection of the concepts ‘human’ and ‘history’.  
For Kant, this would amount to what he calls an ‘aggregate’, a mere ‘distributive unity’, 
and would fail to satisfy reason’s demand for ‘systematic’ or ‘collective unity’ 
(A644/B672): ‘Under the government of reason our cognitions cannot at all constitute a 
rhapsody but must constitute a system’ (A832/B860).  In order to achieve this more 
                                                
32 Kant was invited to review it in July 1784 that year (see the letter to Kant from C. G. Schütz, 10th July 
1784, 10:394).  It seems that at about that time he borrowed Hamann’s copy to have an initial look 
(Kuehn, Kant, pp. 292, 487 n. 73).  Kant’s review of Part One appeared within just two months of the 
‘Idea’ essay.  Had Kant read This Too a Philosophy of History?  There is nothing to suggest that he 
had, although he certainly did read Herder’s other major publication of 1774, his On the Oldest 
Document of the Human Race (see the correspondence between Kant and Hamann about the book 
from April 1774, 10:153-161).
What’s the idea …? 25
determinate form of unity, Kant holds that particular systematizing concepts are needed, 
which he calls ideas.33
The main place where Kant deals with the systematizing role of ideas in science is 
the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic (A642-704/B670-732).  The Appendix 
comes in two parts, the first entitled ‘On the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason’, 
the second ‘On the final aim of the natural dialectic of human reason’.  In what follows I 
shall deal with both in turn.
The Transcendental Dialectic as a whole deals with the metaphysical or 
transcendental ideas which reason generates in its search for the unconditioned.  Kant’s 
strategy is to demonstrate the aporias which result when these are taken to mark out 
supersensible objects of knowledge, ones which transcend the world of experience (e.g., 
the idea of the immortal soul and God).  The first part of the Appendix starts by 
suggesting that the transcendental ideas nonetheless also have an immanent use (as 
opposed to the bad transcendent use Kant has been criticizing), which leads one to 
expect that the discussion will once again focus on the traditional metaphysical ideas of 
God and so on.  But not so: it is only in the second part that the metaphysical ideas 
previously examined in the Transcendental Dialectic are again considered.  Instead, in 
the first part Kant introduces some new, formal ideas and their associated principles.  
The central idea is that of systematicity.  This in turn has three subordinate ideas, unity, 
manifoldness and affinity, which mark out the three vectors of systematic order 
(A662/B690).  These ideas, ‘taken in the highest degree of their completeness’ define 
the ideal ‘projected unity’ which reason always strives for.  Reason’s objects are the 
cognitions provided by the understanding, which present themselves as a mere 
‘distributive unity’ or ‘aggregate’ (A644-5/B672-3).  Using the threefold idea of 
systematicity, reason organizes these cognitions and directs the understanding to find 
more which can be fitted into the emerging pattern.  The idea of systematicity itself is 
unconditioned: it marks out an infinite and perfect order which reason with its 
theoretical constructions can only ever approximate (A647/B674, cf. also A663/B691). 
Reason’s use of its ideas of systematicity is therefore regulative, ‘bringing order into 
particular cognitions as far as is possible’.
                                                
33 We can therefore see that it is likely that Kant will share the expectation (articulated in particular by 
Schlözer – cf. pp. 13-14, n. 12 above) that universal history be more than just a compendium or 
chronicle.  (For explicit confirmation of this, see pp. 32-33 below).  It should also be noted that Kant’s 
system/ aggregate contrast replicates Schlözer’s.  Some other instances of Kant’s use of it can be 
found at A64/B89 and A832/B860.
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Kant insists that reason’s use of its regulative ideas cannot be merely ‘logical’, that 
is, merely an expression of its subjective preference for systematicity.  Rather, reason 
must also presume that ‘its goal’ is in harmony with ‘the arrangement of nature’, that 
systematicity is a feature of nature as well as of itself (A651/B679).  If this were not 
held to be so, reason would have no ground for believing that systematicity provided the 
‘touchstone for truth’ (A647/B675), nor would it confidently expect and search for it in 
circumstances where it was far from evident (A657/B685).  Kant terms this belief a 
transcendental principle or presupposition (A650/B678, A651/B679), arguing that the 
logical use of the regulative principles (as heuristic or methodological) is only possible 
on its basis.  Thus the idea of systematicity is held to have ‘objective but indeterminate 
validity’ (A663/B691): it essentially involves ‘the maxim of regarding such an order as 
grounded in nature in general’ (A668/B696).
The ideas of systematic unity as such are purely formal.  In order to have purchase in 
specific contexts of enquiry they have to be applied and instantiated.  Kant gives 
examples from the fields of chemistry and psychology: ‘ideas of pure earth, pure water’ 
etc. (A646/B674), and ‘the idea of a fundamental [mental] power’ (A649/B677).  These 
are all postulated theoretical entities, used to ground the unity (and difference) among, 
respectively, ‘materials’ and the various effects and faculties disclosed by ‘inner sense’.  
Again, Kant stresses that each particular idea ‘does not function merely as a problem for 
hypothetical use, but pretends to objective reality’ (A650/B678).  The idea is generated 
by reason, as staking out what would satisfy its drive for systematicity, but is then 
attributed to nature.
The problem with this move, which Kant repeats throughout the first part of the 
Appendix, is that such attribution appears as yet wholly ungrounded, if not 
unintelligible.  Systematic order, as we have seen, is reason’s own creation.  Yet the 
transcendental idea of systematicity attempts to project this creativity onto nature.  
Reason needs reassurance that its theoretical constructions of systematic unity are not 
simply just that – its own constructions – so attributes that unity to nature itself.  But 
nature itself, as ‘the single given object’ (A684/B712) demonstrates no comparable 
constructive agency, only mechanical connection.  The transcendental presupposition 
that systematicity is (indeterminately) objective is insufficient to shore up the regulative 
use of reason.34
                                                
34 Thomas Wartenburg’s account of the regulative use of ideas in science in ‘Reason and the Practice of 
Science’ is vitiated by his not seeing this problem.  This is related to his taking Kant’s account to be 
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Kant moves on to address this problem in the second part of the Appendix (indeed, 
this part only fully makes sense as response to it).  He is ostensibly concerned here with 
the three metaphysical ideas investigated in the Dialectic proper, namely the 
psychological, cosmological and theological ideas (the soul, the world and God).  These 
are now redescribed as themselves having regulative (or immanent) application, in 
accordance with the general account of the regulative use of reason given in the first 
part of the Appendix.  In the process, something interesting occurs.  The three 
transcendental ideas are usually taken as having their own form of metaphysical unity, 
as the ideas of the subject, the object and the totality of knowledge. However, in their 
regulative guises, the first two appear as mere instances, if very general ones, of 
systematicity,35 whereas the last, the idea of a highest intelligence, is revealed as the 
keystone of the whole structure.  As Kant writes, ‘it is from the idea of a most wise 
cause that we take up the rule that reason is best off using for its own satisfaction when 
it connects up causes and effects in the world’ (A673/B701).
The thought of such a ‘highest intelligence’ or ‘most wise cause’ is stated to be the 
only way in which it is possible to consider the world as a whole and in all its parts as 
forming a systematic unity.  The regulative use of reason requires the thought of a 
divine world cause in order to be able to conceive of nature as itself systematically 
ordered, which in turn is required if we are to take reason’s striving for systematicity to 
be anything more than its own subjective ‘principle of economy’ (A650/B678).  The 
regulative idea of a highest intelligence or world cause (identified as the idea of God at 
A685/B713) is thus what underpins the transition from the merely logical use of the idea 
of systematicity to its transcendental use.36  
It is worthwhile clarifying what this argument is not.  Firstly, it is not the argument 
that the regulative use of reason finds the idea of a divine world cause useful, as itself a 
                                                                                                                                              
contained in the first part of the Appendix alone, whereas in fact the second part is, as we shall see, a 
necessary continuation of it.
35 Remember that Kant prepared us for the regulative role of the idea of the soul in the first part of the 
Appendix, in the form of the ‘fundamental power’.
36 Oddly, having made so much of this distinction between the logical and the transcendental application 
of ideas in the first part of the Appendix, Kant neither uses nor refers to it at all in the second part.  In 
fact, given what I am suggesting about the real purpose of the second part, this is really quite strange.  
There are other indications of a superficial lack of a join between the two halves, notwithstanding 
their deeper harmony.  For example, in the first part, Kant denies that regulative ideas allow of a 
‘deduction’ (A663-4/B691-2), while in the second part he claims that they do (A699-70/B697-8).  
This leads one to suspect that the first part may have been written after the first, without the second 
part being revised accordingly.
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heuristic device for promoting the search for systematic order.37  Kant clearly does 
believe that it is useful in this regard, but doesn’t argue for its introduction simply on 
this basis, even though at times it can seem that he does.  For example, he writes that 
‘we have to do merely with a regulative principle, which we recognize as necessary … 
and for which we assume a supreme ground merely with the intention of thinking the 
universality of the principle all the more determinately’ (A676/B704, underlining added 
for emphasis).  This can be read as suggesting that whilst the regulative principle is 
necessary, the assumption of a ‘ground’ is simply a means of reinforcing our grip upon 
the principle, but not in itself a necessary condition for our use of it.  Kant goes on, 
though, a few sentences later: ‘I am not only warranted but even compelled to realize 
this idea, i.e., to posit for it an actual object’ (A677/B705, underlining added for 
emphasis).  (By giving the idea (of systematicity) an object Kant here means giving it a 
ground or cause, i.e. a ‘higher intelligence’.)  Similarly, and even more clearly, Kant 
subsequently states that ‘reason cannot think this systematic unity in any other way than 
by giving its idea an object’ (A681/B709, underlining added for emphasis; again, 
‘giving its idea an object’ means positing a divine cause).  It is indeed this stronger 
construal of the relation between the ideas of systematicity and God that the 
transcendental use of the former idea requires.38  Accordingly, Kant urges that not only 
‘can we … assume a unique wise and all-powerful world author … but we must
presuppose such a being’ (A697/B725, Kant’s emphasis).
Secondly, it is not a teleological proof of the existence of God.  The argument does 
not proceed from the perception of natural order to the claim that a divine creator must 
exist, but rather from the necessity to presuppose that nature is systematically ordered to 
the idea of a world-cause.39 The extent to which that presupposition is borne out, i.e. by 
the successful application of ideas of systematicity in natural science, goes to support 
that presupposition, and does not add to the warrant we have for postulating the idea of 
its cause.  Kant reiterates throughout that the regulative use of reason gives us no 
                                                
37 Susan Neiman’s account of the regulative use of ideas frequently reduces Kant’s argument to this 
merely heuristic level.  She writes, for example, that the ‘claim [that] God created the world … is 
simply a model that we can use in giving life and body to the directive to seek systematic unity’ (The 
Unity of Reason, p. 182, underlining added for emphasis).
38 A related interpretation of this part of the Appendix would have it that its primary purpose is to 
provide a role for the metaphysical ideas, so as to rescue the systematicity of reason itself.  No doubt it 
achieves this, but the impetus comes from the demands of the theoretical and regulative use of reason, 
not from a desire to sublimate its metaphysical tendencies.
39 Cf. Kant’s consideration of the ‘physico-teleological proof’ of God’s existence (A620-6/B648-54).
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grounds for believing that God exists, only instead for thinking that it is 'as if' there is 
such a being.
There are thus two ways in which one can misconstrue the regulative idea of a 
highest intelligence.  One way is to underplay its role, by reducing it to a merely useful 
heuristic fiction.  The other way, by contrast, is to exaggerate its force, and treat it as a 
teleological argument for the existence of a highest intelligence.
Kant indeed argues towards the end of the Appendix that it is more appropriate to 
talk of Nature rather than God ‘because this restrains us from the presumption of 
making a bigger assertion than we are warranted in making, and at the same time points 
reason back to its proper field, which is nature’ (A701/B729, cf. A699/B727).  
Referring to the idea of the highest intelligence as ‘Nature’ instead of ‘God’ therefore 
underlines its regulative status in two ways.  Firstly, it is supposed to accentuate the 
abnegation of any existential claim, to make it ‘clear that I ground things not on the 
existence or acquaintance with this being, but only from the idea of it’ (A701/B729).  
Presumably ‘Nature’ achieves this by virtue of more evidently being a fictional 
personification.40  Secondly, and more straightforwardly, ‘Nature’ directs us to nature, 
whereas the thought of God can encourage metaphysical day-dreams.41
Though the form of Kant’s argument so far is clear, it is unlikely to be judged 
convincing.  That there is a need to see the systematicity we expect in nature as 
somehow grounded in it is apparent, but why does this lead ineluctably to the idea of a 
highest intelligence as cause of the world?  Kant’s reason for thinking that it does relies 
on the idea that systematic order is something we know we can and do produce 
ourselves.  In investigating what we evidently have not created, we can suppose it to be 
systematic only by thinking that it has been created in a manner analogous, if superior, 
to our own rational productions.  Kant is much more explicit about such analogical 
inferences in the earlier consideration of the ‘physico-teleological proof’ of God's 
existence.  The comparison there is drawn between ‘the artful structure [of] natural 
products’ and that of the products of ‘human art’: 
once we are supposed to name a cause [for natural products], we could not proceed more securely 
than by analogy with such purposive productions [those of human art], which are the only ones 
where we are fully acquainted with the causes and the ways they act.  Reason would not be able to 
justify to itself an attempt to pass over from a causality with which it is acquainted to obscure and 
unprovable grounds of explanation, with which it is not acquainted.  (A626/B654)
                                                
40 This argument is made explicitly in the Critique of Judgment, 5:383.
41 My interpretation in this paragraph follows that of Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Nature or Providence? On the 
Theoretical and Moral Importance of Kant’s Philosophy of History’.
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(Notice here that the systematicity or ‘artful structure’ is taken as given; reason is 
presented as subsequently searching for ‘a cause’.  Kant's argument in the Appendix 
reveals that the analogy must operate first of all in the other direction.  It is only in 
virtue of a prior and regulative assumption of some form of divine causality that reason 
is entitled to think it encounters ‘artful structure’ in nature, as opposed to this being just 
a subjective projection.)
The analogy between natural products and human art can also be drawn, more 
pertinently and more closely, between our construction of systematicity in our 
knowledge of nature, a human product, and that same systematicity considered as 
objective and therefore as if a divine product.  The regulative use of reason enables the 
construction of epistemological systems which must be taken as mapping out and onto 
an original ontological construction.
As well as obliging us to think of systematicity as always created by a rational agent, 
the inescapable analogy with human rational activity requires the thought that such 
activity is necessarily end-directed.   We create things, which are systematic, but for 
purposes, with aims in mind.  So too, then, in respect of the transcendental pre-
supposition of systematic unity.  This must be thought of not only as created, but also as 
created in order to realize ends.  The ends or aims served by the overall systematicity of 
nature of course remain as necessarily obscure as the similarly suppositive process of its 
creation.  Theoretical inquiry has neither reason nor ability to push its investigations in 
either of these directions.  The mere idea that nature is purposive confirms and grounds 
the presupposition of its systematicity, in tandem with the idea that it is a creation (the 
two ideas, for human reason, being indissoluble).
We can now see how complex Kant’s doctrine of regulative ideas is.  The central 
idea is that of systematicity (including its three subordinate ideas).  This idea as such 
then features both as a logical idea (the subjective and formal goal of reason's 
endeavours) and as a transcendental idea (the formal structure of the world).  Its use in 
theoretical inquiry requires its manifold application and instantiation - as ideas of this 
and that postulated entity or classificatory category.  Further, the transcendental idea 
necessarily involves the positing of the additional ideas of a higher intelligence (as 
ground and cause of objective systematicity) and the unknowable end or ends served by 
that systematicity.  The regulative use of reason thus points both to theology and 
teleology.
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I have so far presented the complete opacity to human reason of, on the one hand, the 
possible process by which natural systematicity could have been created and, on the 
other hand, its putative ends or aims as being of the same order.  However, there is an 
important asymmetry between the two.  The mere thought that it is as if nature is 
created suffices to account for the supposition of systematicity.  Yet in so far as the 
purposiveness of that systematicity remains equally abstract, human reason will 
inevitably find its investigations somewhat stymied.  That is, systematicity in its 
maximal sense is only arrived at in any particular instance when there is also a grasp of 
the end aimed at.42  (This is clearly the case with understanding of human systematicity.)  
Reason will therefore want to apply particular regulative ideas of ends in its 
investigation of nature, with a view to achieving a higher degree of systematicity:
This highest formal unity that alone rests on concepts of reason is the purposive unity of things; 
and the speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to regard every ordinance in the world as 
if it had sprouted from the intention of a highest reason.  Such a principle, namely, opens up for 
our reason, as applied to the field of experience, entirely new prospects for connecting them up 
with teleological laws, and thereby attaining to the greatest systematic unity among them.  (A686-
7/B714-5)
Luckily nature itself (once again) answers to this demand.   Teleology thus figures not 
only in the form of a background presupposition of empirical science (i.e., in terms of 
what Kant later calls, in the Critique of Judgment, ‘formal purposiveness’) but also as a 
mainstay of a particular type of empirical science (biology).  For it is in organic nature 
that reason finds instances of systematicity which call for the application of ideas of 
ends.  This is not so much because organic nature is simply more ordered than the rest 
of nature; rather, it is because it demonstrates a different quality of systematicity, 
namely the systematicity of activity.  By activity we should understand something 
analogous to human activity itself, not the merely mechanical mobility of a clockwork 
device or planetary bodies (both of which we must think of as the results of such or 
similar activity). For Kant, then, the systematicity of living things obliges us to say that 
(it is as if) they have ends set for them by Nature which they are striving to reach and in 
relation to which all their parts and sub-processes are organized.  This general idea (cf. 
A688/B716) is then applied to the various species of organisms, whose classification 
itself takes shape by means of regulative ideas of systematicity (cf. A651-6/B679-84).  
The end, though, which each individual member of the species is striving to realize, is 
                                                
42 ‘Teleological explanations seem more genuinely explanatory that others because they explain 
systematicity in terms most comprehensible to us’ (Neiman, The Unity of Reason, p. 88).
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(as far as we can tell) just the idea of (the perfection of) the species itself, the full and 
continuing realization of its potentialities.43    
Such teleological ideas of end are clearly meant to be part of the complex system of 
regulative ideas.  Yet they are regulative in a quite particular sense.  By now, though, 
the meaning of ‘regulative’ is no doubt already rather opaque, so a little clarification is 
in order. Reason’s ideas were originally characterized as regulative because they 
marked out the unconditioned goal which reason itself strives for.  That is, they regulate 
or direct its activity (cf. A644/B672).  This regulative function is predicated upon the 
very unattainability of the goal itself: reason can only ever approximate the perfection 
of systematicity it holds out for itself (cf. A647/B674, A663/B691, also A509/B537).  
There is, then, no ‘as-if’-ness about ideas of reason considered in this way: they are 
simply reason's ends.  As the account unfolds, however, the regulativity of ideas takes 
on an additional sense.  Reason finds itself positing pseudo-objects in the guise of 
‘ideas’ in order to facilitate its pursuance of systematicity (such as the ideas of basic 
elements or fundamental powers mentioned earlier).  These ideas are regulative in an 
additional sense, in that they postulate, if ‘problematically’ or provisionally, the 
existence of something.  When Kant calls these ideas ‘regulative’ (or, often, ‘merely 
regulative’) he means to convey the problematical status of the existence of these 
objects as well as their role in directing or underpinning empirical enquiry.  This 
problematical status is of course most relevant to those ideas whose objects it would be 
impossible for the progress of science eventually to discover, and above all to the idea 
of a ‘world-cause’ which serves as the keystone of the whole system.   Regulativity thus 
has two aspects.  The first involves the goals reason sets itself (the ‘logical’ use of 
ideas).  The second relates to the associated postulation of entities (the ‘transcendental’ 
use of ideas), and it is here that the qualifier ‘merely’ crops up.  The teleological ideas 
of ends are regulative in both these senses, functional and ontological, yet their 
functional role is necessarily double.  The idea of an organism’s end regulates our 
inquiry into that organism, but is also supposed to regulate the very activity and 
organization being examined.
And so to return finally to the question of universal history.  The systematicity 
required for the construction of a genuinely universal history is only possible by the 
                                                
43 Compare A317-8/B374: ‘A plant, an animal … these show clearly that they are possible only 
according to ideas; although no individual creature, under the individual conditions of its existence, is 
congruent with the idea of what is most perfect of its species’.
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application of a unifying ‘idea’: ‘Nobody attempts to establish a science without 
grounding it on an idea’ (A834/B862).  That Kant expects his ‘idea for a universal 
history’ to have exactly this function is made explicit at the end of the essay: ‘this idea
may yet serve as a guide to us in representing an otherwise planless aggregate of human 
actions as conforming, at least when considered as a whole, to a system’ (#9, 8:29, 
underlining added for emphasis).44  This claim echoes a programmatic statement made 
in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic about the regulative use of ideas in 
science:
This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely that of the form of a whole of cognition, 
which precedes the determinate cognition of the parts and contains the conditions for determining 
a priori the place of each part and its relation to the others.  Accordingly, this idea postulates 
complete unity of the understanding’s cognition, through which this cognition comes to be not 
merely a contingent aggregate but a system interconnected in accordance with necessary laws.  
(A645/B673, underlining added for emphasis)
So what kind of idea?  The most likely candidate would seem to be a regulative 
teleological idea, on the basis that human activity is more like that of other living 
species than, say, the movement of heavenly bodies (notwithstanding Kant’s invocation 
of Kepler and Newton at 8:18).  In this case, universal history would be, as Allen Wood 
says, ‘a branch of biology’.45  But surely this would be a very odd way of proceeding? 
Why should we attempt to understand human action on the model of other organisms 
when our understanding of those organisms relies upon the analogy we make between 
our own end-directed behaviour and the apparently end-directed behaviour we take 
them to display? (cf. the passage from A626/B654, quoted at the bottom of p. 29).  
Surely it must be possible to conceive of a less indirect route.  In particular, if it were 
the case that human actions in general were themselves intentionally oriented towards 
an idea, then the universal historian would not have to apply an idea in order to
systematize the data, but would be able simply to recognize this idea in history.  That 
ideas can have this practical function, namely of regulating our actions as well as our 
theoretical endeavours, is emphasized by Kant at the very outset of the Transcendental 
Dialectic (A314-7/B371-4).  Indeed, taking his lead from Plato, he implies there that 
ideas have their place first and foremost in this realm, ‘where human reason shows true 
causality’ (A317/B374).  Two practical regulative ideas are mentioned: the idea of 
virtue and the idea of ‘the Platonic republic’.  As ideas, both are thoughts of a kind of 
                                                
44 Again, note Kant’s agreement with Schlözer’s stipulations for universal history (cf. pp. 13-14, n. 12).
45 Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 208.
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perfection, which human action can aim at, but never completely accomplish.  In respect 
of the second idea (which is more extensively discussed than the first), Kant writes:
A constitution providing for the greatest human freedom according to laws that permit the freedom 
of each to exist together with that of others … is at least a very necessary idea….  Even though this 
may never come to pass, the idea of this maximum is nevertheless wholly correct when it is set 
forth as an archetype, in order to bring the legislative constitution of human beings ever nearer to a 
possible greatest perfection.  (A316-7/B373-4, underlining added for emphasis) 
The idea of the optimal integration of the freedom of individuals can serve to motivate 
and guide the efforts of individuals to bring it about.  As a task which is both collective 
and endless, its undertaking would require historical time.  This idea therefore seems 
perfectly suited to function as an ‘idea for a universal history’.  Indeed, the ‘Platonic 
republic’, in the more abstract form of the ‘perfect constitution’, is of course what 
Schultz went on to claim was the germ of Kant’s proposed philosophical history (see p. 
23).46  To construct a universal history on this basis would be to ground it in rational 
practical teleology, the end-directed comportment of rational agents.  To the extent that 
their efforts were successful, the resulting universal history would track the emergence 
of collective agency, this being what the ever-improved forms of political organization 
would generate.  This teleological process would thus reflexively strengthen itself, by 
bringing human beings closer together and enhancing their collective ability to control 
their destiny.
The first Critique opens up two possible directions in which a universal history could 
go.  On the one hand, the desired systematicity could be achieved by applying the idea 
of a ‘plan of nature’, such as investigators use in relation to organic nature.  On the 
other hand, the idea could be discovered in history, as one of the goals rational agents 
set for themselves.  In the first case, the plan would be ‘regulatively’ referred to 
‘Nature’; in the second, actually attributed to human beings, both individually and, 
increasingly, collectively.  It might seem obvious that the rational teleology approach is 
the one Kant would adopt in his outline philosophical history, given its applicability to 
human beings as practically rational agents.  (Schultz seems to have thought so.)  We 
shall see in the next chapter whether this is so.
                                                
46 Schultz, as the author of a comprehensive Exposition of Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, would have 
been familiar with Kant’s discussion of the idea of the Platonic republic (though it does not figure in 
his account of the Critique).
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Chapter Three: Kant’s historical teleology
We saw in the last chapter that the first Critique provided two kinds of regulative idea 
with which one could construct the outline of a universal history: on the one hand, a 
theoretical idea, constructed on the basis of natural teleology; on the other, a practical 
idea, taken instead from rational teleology.  Looking now to the ‘Idea’ essay, we find 
Kant almost immediately appearing to reject both approaches.  At the beginning of the 
second paragraph of the introductory comments, he writes: ‘Since human beings neither 
pursue their aims purely by instinct, as the animals do, nor act in accordance with any 
integral, prearranged plan like rational cosmopolitans, it would appear that no 
systematic [planmässig] history of humanity is possible (as it would be, for example, 
with bees and beavers)’ (8:17, translation amended).  The project of universal history 
seems to founder at the very outset.   The course of human history is so chaotic, it 
seems, that it resists any form of systematization.  It is not just simply unorganized, 
such that it allows ordering, but is instead disorganized, preventing any attempt to 
structure it.  Neither of the two types of teleological order can mesh onto it.  The 
problem is that human beings evidently do operate teleologically, but, unlike 
comparable animals or rational cosmopolitans, their ends are not harmonized and united 
into or as if by the one idea.  Instead, they are all at odds: ‘everything as a whole is 
made up of folly and childish vanity, and often of childish malice and destructiveness’ 
(8:18).
The two teleological accounts Kant invokes here underpin quite different kinds of 
history.  He discusses the possibility of systematic history with regard to animal species 
(as in ‘natural history’), but of course such history would present the simple repetition 
of patterns of development and behaviour through the generations, and would not have 
to account for change over historical time, nor be able to do so.  By contrast, the kind of 
universal history appropriate to rational cosmopolitans would have to allow for the 
possibility of historical change.  Indeed, as rational agents working to a plan, such 
beings would have a progressive history, as they endeavoured to approximate their 
regulative practical goals.  
It should be noted straightaway that Kant presents the dilemma facing the 
prospective universal historian in a manner which relies upon a very strong conception 
of rational teleology.  That is to say, the contrast is drawn between animals and rational 
cosmopolitans, with the latter understood as agents who have already all agreed on their 
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joint plan of action.  It is as if such agents were already citizens in a perfect 
(cosmopolitan) state, such as would enable them to achieve this degree of unanimity.  
This at least leaves open the possibility that there might be other, weaker forms of 
rational teleology which might find more purchase in relation to human history.
The two teleological models Kant refers to at the beginning of ‘Idea’, natural and 
collectively rational, generate distinct conceptions of history, namely static and 
developing.  Although human beings act in ways that prevent the application of either of 
these teleological models, nonetheless the course of their history displays a kind of 
change similar to that found in the second of these.  It is of course because of this 
historical heterogeneity that the whole issue of the possibility of a universal, 
systematized history becomes relevant in the first place (as compared with the 
uniformity of the past in ‘natural history’).  The form of human history thus encourages 
the application of rational teleology, although its content does not.
The tendency to think of universal history in terms of rational teleology is motivated 
in two further ways, practical and theoretical.  Firstly, the very self-conception human 
beings can have of themselves as rational and free agents inevitably inclines them to 
expect history as a whole to conform to a rational plan.  Kant stresses that the fact that it 
doesn’t provokes ‘indignation [Unwillens] … despite the apparent wisdom of individual 
actions here and there….  The result is that we do not know what sort of opinion we 
should form of our species, which is so proud of its supposed superiority’ (8:17-18, 
translation amended).  Secondly, a history of rational world citizens would not have to 
make recourse to the ‘merely’ regulative props indispensable in natural science, and so 
would answer all the more satisfactorily to reason’s demand for total intelligibility.  In 
other words, given that ‘reason has insight only to what it itself produces according to 
its own design’ (Bxiii) and that it is in the realm of practice that ‘human reason shows 
true causality’ (A317/B374), the most adequate universal history would be one that 
tracked the practical rational causality of humanity.
There are three reasons, therefore, why the prospective universal historian will tend 
towards systematization by means of rational teleology.  Yet this is not possible: human 
beings do not ‘act in accordance with any integral, prearranged plan like rational 
cosmopolitans’.  It would appear that the philosophical historian, faced with this 
impasse, now has no room to move in.  Kant, though, breezily declares that there is 
another route: ‘The only way out for the philosopher, since he cannot assume that 
humanity follows any rational objective of its own [vernünftige eigene Absicht] in its 
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collective actions, is for him to attempt to discover a natural objective [Naturabsicht] 
behind this senseless course of human events’ (8:18, translation amended).   Given that 
the rational teleology approach appears to fail, therefore, the only recourse is to try 
again with natural teleology.  But why does Kant think that this is at all promising?  
Haven’t we already been told that the organic ‘natural history’ model will not work
here?
Kant’s justification for appealing to a Naturabsicht is in fact quite straightforward.  
Although human history is disanalogous with natural history in that it is properly 
historical and isn’t instinctually determined, it does, like natural history, involve 
individuals who have no ‘agreed plan’.  In the case of animals, this absence of plan 
doesn’t vitiate the purposive systematicity, as this is intelligible in the light of a 
regulative intention of Nature, in accordance with which the creatures operate 
unwittingly.  That is, to understand the purposive design and behaviour of, say, bees, the 
investigator has to think of these as fulfilling a plan of Nature’s.  Nature here is 
personified as an intelligent, designing agent.  (Remember that Kant made it clear in the 
first Critique that this is the most appropriate way to characterize the intelligent author 
to whom reference must be made in teleological investigations.)  Kant’s hunch is that it 
might be possible to find a Naturabsicht which fits human history and which would 
help generate the desired systematicity.  Human history is not the same as natural 
history, but it might be like it.  (As we shall see, the Naturabsicht also ultimately leads 
to a vernünftige Absicht, the very absence of which originally occasioned this detour 
into natural teleology.)  
Our suspicions are likely to be aroused by Kant’s reference to the idea of a natural 
objective, as this sounds as if it will involve the fanciful postulation of an extrinsic 
purpose served by the course of human history, similar perhaps to Herder’s idea that 
history is a pageant arranged by God for his own benefit.  In fact, the regulative idea of 
a natural objective is meant to function reflexively: it amounts to the general claim that 
the aim of every living species is its own perfection.  ‘Nature’s intention’ is that each 
individual (or pair or group) fully realizes (or comes close to so doing) the capacities of 
the species (cf. A317-318/B374, cited on p. 32, n. 43).
The idea of a natural objective thus forms a key element of natural teleology.  Kant 
expands on its role in the first ‘Proposition’ of the essay:
All the natural capacities of creature are destined sooner or later to be developed completely and in 
conformity with their end.  This can be verified in all animals by external and internal or 
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anatomical examination.  An organ which is not meant for use or an arrangement which does not 
fulfil its purpose is a contradiction in the teleological theory of nature.  (8:18)
The strategy of universal history is to apply this regulative maxim to human beings and 
see whether a plausible account of human history can be generated.  The first and 
crucial step is taken in the Second Proposition:
In man (as the only rational creature on earth) those natural capacities which are directed toward 
the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed only in the species, but not in the 
individual.  Reason, in a creature, is a faculty which enables that creature to extend far beyond the 
limits of natural instinct the rules and intentions it follows in using its various powers, and the 
range of its projects is unbounded.  But reason does not work instinctively, for it requires trial, 
practice and instruction to enable it to progress gradually from one stage of insight to another.  
Accordingly, every individual man would have to live for a vast length of time if he were to learn 
how to make complete use of all his natural capacities; or if nature has fixed only a short term for 
each man’s life (as is in fact the case), then it will require a long, perhaps incalculable series of 
generations, each passing on its enlightenment to the next, before the seeds implanted by nature in 
our species can be developed to that degree which corresponds to nature’s intention.  (8:18-19)
In essence, therefore, universal history is made possible by means of the application of 
natural teleology to rational beings.  Nature’s plan is that human beings, like other 
living creatures, fully develop all their capacities.  Rational capacities, unlike instinctual 
ones, allow of and in fact demand endless development.  Given that human beings are 
finite (this is part of what it is for them to be natural creatures), this task must be 
accomplished by the species over successive generations.  Humanity is therefore 
necessarily historical.47
Kant seems initially reluctant to follow through on the logic of his own argument and 
call reason ‘a natural capacity’.  As a result we get in the Proposition itself the 
symptomatically awkward locution, ‘natural capacities directed toward the use of 
reason’, whatever that means.  The following elaboration of the Proposition makes it 
plain that it is reason itself which develops over time, not some putative natural 
capacities which sustain its use.  Kant’s initial scruple is quickly forgotten, though, for 
thereafter he repeatedly uses ‘natural capacities’ to refer to what are clearly rational
ones (e.g. #4, passim).  To an extent, we may feel that this is warranted simply because 
rationality pertains to human beings as part of their ‘nature’.  But this is to use ‘nature’ 
in a different sense to that which is operative in ‘the teleological theory of nature’ (#1, 
8:18).
There is a further difficulty, the resolution of which will in turn justify Kant’s 
naturalistic characterization of rationality.  The difficulty is that Kant’s argument can 
seem to be in danger of proving too much.  If human beings are historical because they 
                                                
47 R. G. Collingwood comments: ‘Kant has here achieved the remarkable feat of showing why there 
should be such a thing as history; it is, he shows, because man is a rational being, and the full 
development of his potentialities therefore requires an historical process’ (The Idea of History, p. 98).
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are rational, why doesn’t their history display tranquil and orderly progression?  This is 
indeed what seems to be suggested in the picture of generations ‘each passing on its 
enlightenment to the next’.  It is as if each generation is as rational as the others, 
handing onto its successors the results of its endeavours and thereby helping to achieve 
incremental advance.  As Herder pointed out in relation to Iselin and others, this 
conception of progress bears little relation to the historical record.
The problem arises because there are two senses in which reason determines human 
historicality.  On the one hand, the application of reason to tasks human beings can set 
themselves, such as improving their material conditions, can generate an endless 
historical sequence.  This is the sense implicit in the model referred to in the previous 
paragraph.  On the other hand, the development of reason as a faculty also requires 
historical time.  It can seem that Kant’s argument in the Second Proposition trades on 
the first sense, whereas in fact it relies upon the second.  Indeed, this is the real point of 
describing reason as natural: it too must grow and unfold, like a natural organ.  Human 
historicality results originally not from the fact that human beings are rational but from 
the fact that they have the capacity to become rational.48
For Kant, the development of rationality amounts to more than an endless 
maximization of its instrumental potency.  It also involves the increasing awareness of 
reason’s ability to set its own ends.  This in turn means that the species will have 
gradually to attain collective agency.   Rationality requires that human beings ultimately 
comport themselves in the manner of ‘rational cosmopolitans’, acting in accordance 
with an agreed plan.  The development of reason thus connects directly with the process 
of approximating the perfect political constitution as outlined in the first Critique.  In 
coming ever closer to this ideal state, human beings will progressively acquire the 
capacity to act as a collective agent, that is, as humanity.  The quasi-organic way in 
which reason develops amounts in part to this knitting together of individuals into a 
harmonious unity.
We can now see how Kant’s idea for a universal history combines natural teleology 
with rational teleology.  There are in fact two ideas at work in it, not simply one as 
suggested by the title.  The first idea, taken from natural teleology, is that of the full 
development of the capacities of the species, and the second idea, taken from rational 
                                                
48 Kant writes in his Anthropology that ‘man, as an animal endowed with the capacity for reason … can 
make of himself a rational animal’ (7:321).  Collingwood again: ‘History, then, is a progress toward 
rationality, which is at the same time an advance in rationality’ (The Idea of History, p. 99).
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teleology, is that of the species coming to act as a collective agent though ever 
perfecting its political institutions.  Our history is not like that of rational cosmopolitans, 
but it could well be that of agents coming to be rational cosmopolitans.
Universal history thus shares with the study of organic nature the regulative idea that 
species are such that they can achieve the full development of their capacities.  Unlike 
organic nature, though, historical teleology involves the use of this idea with regard to 
rational creatures.  This has two general consequences.  Firstly, human beings have a 
genuinely historical existence (due to both the development and the application of 
reason), something not to be found at all elsewhere.  Secondly, the extent to which 
human beings, like other creatures, have to be interpreted as functioning in accordance 
with a plan of nature because they act without a plan of their own is necessarily 
qualified.  The full development of their rational capacities (which is the Naturabsicht) 
must involve the acquisition of collective agency, which precisely means that human 
beings will come to agree a plan of their own.  ‘Nature’s plan’ is for humanity to have 
eventually a plan of its own, and so has a curiously self-effacing quality.  Its satisfaction 
requires its own progressive evanescence.  As they approach the status of rational 
cosmopolitans, human beings will continue the process of developing their capacities, 
but in an increasingly self-conscious manner.
It is important to stress these aspects of Kant’s historical teleology, as many recent 
commentators have tended to over-emphasize its similarity to natural teleology.  This 
tendency is certainly a salutary correction to the usual preference for predominantly
moral interpretations, which disregard or deprecate the elements of natural teleology, 
but itself goes too far in the other direction. For example, Allen Wood, a particularly 
prominent exponent of this new approach, writes that Kant’s ‘theory of human history 
… is “naturalistic” … in that it does attempt to understand humanity as a biological 
species in the same way as other animals are to be understood’.49  This claim is correct 
at a formal level, in that universal history only gets going by virtue of the use of the 
principal regulative maxim of natural teleology (i.e. Kant’s ‘First Proposition’), but at 
the substantive level it is clearly wrong, as the outcome of the use of this maxim is a 
completely sui generis account. In a similar vein, Wood states that ‘Kant’s philosophy 
of history is “naturalistic” in that he treats history as a branch of biology’.50  Not so: the 
                                                
49 Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 207 (emphasis added).
50 Ibid. p. 208 (his emphasis).
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application and consequent adaptation of a biological principle by the philosopher in 
this context do not make the results natural science.
This ‘naturalistic’ reading is encouraged by Kant’s insistent and continual appeal to 
the personification of Nature in the ‘Idea’ essay.  Nature, we read throughout, wills, 
gives, uses, knows, compels and imposes.  It has already been pointed out that this 
language is quite consistent with the characterization of natural teleology in the first 
Critique, and so does not, contrary to Yovel’s claim,51 mark a regression into pre-critical 
dogmatism.  But does it not nonetheless confirm the equation of historical teleology 
with natural teleology?  There are two points to be made in response here.  Firstly, while 
Kant does continue to refer in this way to ‘Nature’ right up to the end of the essay, he 
significantly adverts in the penultimate paragraph to ‘Providence’ instead (#9, 8:30).  
This shift to an overtly moral conception of the world author confirms that humanity’s 
historical task will in due course be the realization of a moral world order.  The role of 
‘Providence’ is to underpin the practicality of reason’s own ethical projects, not to serve 
as the nominal locus of the plan human beings unconsciously carry out.   I will say more 
about this in the next chapter.
Secondly, the very insistence with which Kant appeals to ‘Nature’ demonstrates the 
extent to which historical teleology is not wholly naturalistic.  This sounds paradoxical, 
but follows from the peculiar character of that teleology.  The idea of ‘Nature’s plan’ or 
‘objective’ is taken from the study of organic nature, but functions differently there.  We 
expect, Kant holds, when investigating living creatures, to find that it is at least possible 
for each individual (or pair or group) to develop fully (or near enough) the capacities of 
the species.  Nature’s plan is thus for bees and beavers to be more or less as they are.  
With humanity, though, things are different: the natural objective necessarily remains 
only ever partially fulfilled (human beings have yet to become what they are).  The plan 
therefore always stands out from the course of human history, rather than being in effect 
adequately actualized in it, as in ‘natural’ history.  This incompletion marks out the 
plan’s historical, futural status, indeed the demand that humanity attain to a position 
from which it can rationally direct its continuing realization. As a result, the universal 
historian is perhaps obliged to be more emphatic in making recourse to talk of ‘Nature’s 
plan’ than the natural teleologist from whom it was adopted.
                                                
51 Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History, pp. 154-155.
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In sketching out the way in which Kant wants to interweave natural and rational 
teleology I have rather jumped ahead of the argument as it unfolds in the Idea essay.  To 
return, then, to where we were: having informed us in the Second Proposition what 
‘Nature’s plan’ is, Kant now turns in the Third to the ‘means’ it uses to achieve its 
purpose.  The primary means is, we should not be surprised to read, reason itself, along 
with the absence of instinctual prowess:
Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes 
beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any 
other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by 
his own reason.  For nature does nothing unnecessarily and is not extravagant in the means 
employed to reach its ends.  Nature gave man reason, and freedom of will based upon reason, and 
this in itself was a clear indication of nature’s intention as regards his endowments.  For it showed 
that man was not meant to be guided by instinct or equipped and instructed by innate knowledge; 
on the contrary, he has meant to produce everything out of himself.  Everything had to be entirely 
of his own making – the discovery of a suitable diet, of clothing, of external security and defence 
(for which nature gave him neither the bull’s horns, the lion’s claws, nor the dog’s teeth, but only 
his hands)…. (#3, 8:19)
Humanity therefore starts in conditions of scarcity – not so much a scarcity of external 
resources as of the equipment with which to secure them – and has to work out for itself 
how to get by in the world.  But Kant considers that this is not enough to account for a 
genuinely progressive momentum.  Why will our primitive human beings not be content 
with the first form of diet, clothing, etc that they produce, or some subsequent forms 
which seem (to them) to put them on a par in terms of the conveniences of life with 
other animals?
It is to rule out this possibility that Kant introduces in the following proposition his 
famous thesis of ‘unsocial sociability’.
The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of 
antagonism within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-
governed social order.  By antagonism, I mean in this context the unsocial sociability of men, that 
is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which 
constantly threatens to break this society up.  This propensity is obviously rooted in human nature.  
Man has an inclination to live in society, since he feels in this state more like a man, that is, he 
feels able to develop his natural capacities.  But he also has a great tendency to live as an 
individual, to isolate himself, since he encounters in himself the unsocial characteristic of wanting 
to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas. (#4, 8:20-21)
Kant goes on to demonstrate how such antagonism leads to the generation of ‘law 
governed social order’, and it is this aspect of the thesis that has traditionally attracted 
most attention.  But in Proposition Four itself (and to a lesser extent in the following 
Proposition as well), the focus is on the way in which social antagonism serves to 
stimulate the development of human abilities.  It has this effect by generating ‘self-
seeking pretensions’, such as ‘the desire for honour, power or property’, which 
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‘encourage man towards new exertions of his powers and thus towards further 
development of his natural capacities’ (8:21).  
It can now appear that Nature is playing a more interventionist role, kitting human 
beings out with specific inclinations so as to realize its end.  Moreover, these would 
seem to be inclinations which we might well want to be without, or at least hope would 
be eradicated in the course of historical progress.  But when examined more closely, 
‘unsocial sociability’ reveals itself to be just the way in which reason itself is 
manifested.  Kant explains the sociability element of the oxymoron not by appeal to 
some kind of herd-instinct, but rather by virtue of the fact that only in society does man 
‘feel able to develop his natural capacities’, these capacities of course being essentially 
rational ones.  Sociability is thus the result of an indistinct sense that human beings are 
creatures whose ‘capacities are such that they can only be fully developed in the 
species, but not in the individual’ (#2, 8:18).  In opposition to this is the inclination to 
unsociability, ‘the characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with 
[one’s] own ideas [nach seinem Sinne’] (#4, 8:21).  This is surely a crude form of 
autonomous self-determination, distortedly expressed in the form of rationally 
engendered self-regard (what Kant will subsequently term ‘radical evil’).  So once 
more, Nature is responsible for nothing other than human beings having reason (and not 
much besides). 52
The picture so far then looks like this: human beings lack the instinctual equipment 
which enables animals to get by, so must apply reason in order to survive (#3).  At the 
same time, reason generates desires and conceptions of self-regard which serve to 
ensure that the process of development continues even after basic survival needs have 
been met (#4).  Of course, ‘unsocial sociability’ also leads to conflict between 
individuals, which in turn cuts against the tendency for their efforts to contribute to the 
realization of the capacities of the species.  Consequently, what is further required is 
‘law-governed social order’.  This too is then shown to emerge from the premises so far 
                                                
52 Yet again, therefore, we are liable to be misled by Kant’s emphatic talk of Nature.  In his ‘Conjectures 
on the Beginning of Human History’, written a year and a half later, he goes some way to counteract 
it.  For example, we read in the Fourth Proposition of ‘Idea’ that ‘Nature should be thanked for 
fostering social incompatibility, enviously competitive vanity, and insatiable desires for possession or 
ever power’ (8:21).  In the ‘Conjectures’, we are told by contrast that ‘it is a peculiarity of reason that 
it is able, with the help of the imagination, to invent desires which not only lack any corresponding 
natural impulse, but which are even at variance with the latter.  Such desires, which are known 
primarily as lasciviousness, gradually engender a whole host of superfluous or even unnatural 
inclinations to which the term luxuriousness applies’ (8:111, underlining added for emphasis).  The 
two statements are not inconsistent, once we realize that Kant’s account of what is natural for human 
beings in the earlier essay is nothing other than for them to possess reason.
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adduced, in that the conflict and chaos engendered by ‘unsocial sociability’ prompt 
individuals to undertake a sequence of prudentially motivated transitions into civil 
society.  In this condition, ‘unsocial sociability’ is regulated and thereby rendered much 
more efficacious in the service of ‘Nature’s plan’.  Human beings’
inclinations make it impossible for them to exist side by side for long in a state of wild freedom.  
But once enclosed within a precinct like that of a civil union, the same inclinations have the most 
beneficial effect.  In the same way, trees in a forest, by seeking to deprive each other of air and 
sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they grow beautiful and 
straight – whereas those which put out branches at will, in freedom and in isolation from others, 
grow stunted, bent and twisted.  All the culture and art which adorn mankind and the finest social 
order man creates are fruits of his unsociability.  (#5, 8:22)
The development of social order facilitates the productiveness of ‘self-seeking 
pretensions’, whilst slowly mitigating their destructive force.  The remaining difficulties 
they provoke in turn ensure that there is always pressure to improve further social 
arrangements.  This process will continue indefinitely, ever more closely approximating 
the ‘perfectly just civil constitution’ (#5, 8:22).  Kant has at last explicitly introduced his 
supposed Lieblingsidee.
Kant’s proposal for a universal history is thus constructed on the basis of two ideas 
or ends: the first one, taken from natural teleology, of the full development of the 
capacities of the species, and the second one, associated with political philosophy, of the 
perfect state.  Their interrelation is best expressed in the Eighth Proposition: ‘The 
history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan 
of nature to bring about a … perfect political constitution as the only possible condition 
[Zustand] within which all natural capacities of  mankind can be developed completely.’ 
(#8, 8:27)  The realization of the two ideas is to run concurrently.  Just as humanity can 
never stop developing its capacities, because the ‘range of [reason’s] projects is 
unbounded’ (#2, 8:19), so too it will never have done perfecting its political 
organization.  Discussing the difficulties involved in bringing about a perfect state, Kant 
writes: ‘Nature only requires of us that we should approximate to this idea’ (#6, 8:23).
Kant distinguishes two levels at which ‘law governed social order’ is to be achieved.  
The first is that of the state itself, the second, the international sphere.  Whilst some 
progress has been made (in some parts of the world at least) at the first level, little has 
been made at the second, where states themselves behave much like individuals did 
before they were forced to enter into civil society.  The next stage will be to start the 
process of regulating international relations and building ‘a federation of peoples’, 
which will in turn make it possible for the deformations presently afflicting civil society 
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to be progressively eliminated.  Once again, the impetus for this transition will come 
from the miseries and costs brought about by unchecked antagonism:
Wars, tense and unremitting military preparations, and the resultant distress which every state must 
eventually feel within itself, even in the midst of peace – these are the means by which nature 
drives nations to make initially imperfect attempts, but finally, after many devastations, upheavals 
and even complete inner exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which reason could have 
suggested to them without so many sad [traurig] experiences – that of abandoning a lawless state 
of savagery and entering into a federation of peoples…. (#7, 8:24)
Kant stresses the haphazard character of the course history is likely to follow on its way 
to a cosmopolitan world order.  ‘Progress’ toward the commencement of perpetual 
peace will be wayward and painful.  Once underway, though, progress will adopt a 
much more regular pace.  It should also take the form of a more balanced development 
of human capacities.  Unrestrained antagonism, both at the national and international 
levels, not only holds up the process of development, but also ensures that such 
development as has taken place has neglected the all-important moral dimension:
When it is little beyond the half-way mark in its development, human nature has to endure the 
hardest of evils under the guise of outward prosperity before this final step (i.e. the union of states) 
is taken; and Rousseau’s preference for the state of savagery does not appear so very mistaken if 
only we leave out of consideration this last stage which our species still has to surmount.  We are 
cultivated [kultiviert] to a high degree by art and science.  We are civilized [zivilisiert] to the point 
of excess in all kinds of social courtesies and proprieties.  But we are still a long way from the 
point where we could consider ourselves moralized [moralisiert].  For while this idea of morality 
is indeed present in culture, an application of this idea which only extends to the semblances of 
morality, as in love of honour and outward propriety, amount merely to civilization.  (#7, 8:26, 
translation amended [‘moralized’ in place of ‘morally mature’])
The invocation of Rousseau in this passage provides a good opportunity to comment 
on the extent to which Kant is responding to and indeed agreeing with the citizen of 
Geneva’s critique of progress in the Discourse on Inequality.  Rousseau’s opposition to 
progress is quite unlike Herder’s.  Rather than denying, as we saw Herder do, that 
history is essentially characterized by a progressive dynamic, Rousseau accepts that it 
is, but argues that its tenor is mainly negative.  The reason for this is that what generates 
‘progress’ is not human rationality as such (what Rousseau terms ‘perfectibility’), but 
the spur given to this by the reflective selfishness all human beings develop in society 
(what he calls ‘amour-propre’).  Progress is thus in large part attributable to 
reprehensible motivations.  Moreover, given these motivations, progress invariably goes 
hand in hand with inequality and conflict, and the increase in social complexity and 
inequality in turn serve to heighten amour-propre.  Kant’s ‘Idea’ essay clearly borrows 
much from this account.  He agrees that perfectibility is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of progress: rational beings would be content to remain in an ‘Arcadian, 
pastoral existence’, with all their talents ‘hidden for ever in a dormant state’ were it not 
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for their ‘self-seeking pretensions’ (#4, 8:21).53  The idea of ‘unsocial sociability’ is 
clearly inspired by Rousseau’s ‘amour-propre’ (cf. Religion, 6:27, 93).  And given this 
second and decisive factor, the course progress takes is inevitably ambivalent, involving 
as many disbenefits (violence, inequality) as benefits, if not more, at least so far.54
Kant does not fully endorse the Rousseauian approach, however.  The important 
differences are as follows.  Firstly, in the Discourse, Rousseau argues that progress was 
not originally inevitable, because human beings initially lived asocially, and so did not 
acquire the amour-propre required to get historical advance going.55  There is 
considerable scholarly debate about how serious this line of argument is intended to 
be.56  We may suppose that Kant agrees with the skeptics, viewing it as a rhetorical 
device to isolate a notional ‘pure state of nature’ for contrastive purposes.  In ‘Idea’ and 
elsewhere, human beings are assumed to have always existed in societies, and hence 
with ‘unsocial sociability’ from the outset.  Secondly, Kant is more positive about the 
development of civil order, which he sees as following a prudentially guided 
progressive course.  This will, or so he hopes, in time ensure that future progress takes a 
less pernicious form.  There is little indication in Rousseau of a comparable degree of 
trust in human beings’ ability to learn from their mistakes.  There are of course 
optimistic elements in his thought, particularly in The Social Contract and Émile.  Kant 
emphasizes these in ‘Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History’ and argues that 
his own way of construing the history of the species accommodates and reconciles their 
optimism and the pessimistic account of the past articulated in the Discourse (8:116).  
Kant’s philosophical history certainly is a brilliant response to Rousseau, synthesizing 
and taking forward many of the latter’s ideas.  Whether it is, as Kant and many Kantians 
like to think,57 genuinely in Rousseau’s spirit, is another matter, which I will not go into 
here.58  
                                                
53 Richard Velkley is mistaken in claiming that Kant places more importance on ‘the stimulation of 
natural hardship’ in bringing about progress than Rousseau does (Freedom and the End of Reason, p. 
156).  For both, subjective factors equally outweigh objective pressures.
54 In ‘Idea’ the emphasis falls on war and aggression; inequality is rather neglected.  But this 
Rousseauian theme is stressed in parallel discussions in ‘Conjectures’ (8:117-118 n.) and the Critique 
of Judgment, §83 (5:432).
55   Rousseau, The Discourses, pp. 157-9, Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 3, pp. 160-2.
56 Compare, for example, Victor Gourevitch, ‘Rousseau’s Pure State of Nature’, with Henrich Meier,
‘Rousseau’s Second Discourse’.
57 For example, Eric Weil: ‘it took Kant to think Rousseau’s thoughts’ (cited by Gourevitch, ‘A brief 
guide to further reading’, p. xxxviii).
58 One reason why Kant may have had an exaggerated sense of the optimism of Rousseau’s work and 
felt that his own followed on from it is his belief that Rousseau had endorsed the Abbé de Saint-
Pierre’s plans for a federation of nations, published in 1713 under the title Projet pour rendre la paix 
Kant’s historical teleology 47
The difference, then, between Herder and Rousseau as critics of progress can be put 
like this.  In response to the postulation of a progressive historical dynamic, Herder 
denies that there is any such primary dynamic: things aren’t (and don’t need to be) 
getting better.  (And yet, for Herder, the belief that they are may in fact make things 
worse.)  Rousseau, on the other hand, accepts that there is this general trajectory, but 
claims that it is on balance deleterious.  (And yet, for Rousseau, the mutability that 
marks history does mean that change for the better could take place.)  There are 
therefore two distinct ways of opposing Enlightenment historical ‘optimism’.  On the 
one hand, we have Herderian optimism (in the original sense of the term) – all is (and 
has been) good.  On the other hand, we have Rousseauian pessimism – things have in 
fact been getting worse and worse.59  Each position, though, incorporates an inverse 
rejoinder in respect of the future: with Herder, the fear that the belief in improvement 
may bring about decline; with Rousseau, the idea that awareness of decline may 
encourage attempts to rectify matters.  The optimism and pessimism are thus both 
tempered.  As critiques, Rousseau’s account has the advantage of intimacy with its 
object – this indeed is what made it so powerful.60  At the same time, however, this 
intimacy allows for the possibility that it could be taken up into a more sophisticated
version of Enlightenment progressivism – which is more or less what Kant did.  
Kant has so far identified three dynamics as the ‘means’ Nature uses in order to realize 
its plan:
1. rational inventiveness in response to scarcity and danger (#3);
                                                                                                                                              
perpétuelle en Europe.  This belief was not unreasonable, given that Rousseau had composed a
paraphrase of the Abbé’s work, ‘Extrait du Projet de Paix Perpétuelle de M. L’Abbé de Saint-Pierre’, 
published in 1761.  However, this was a piece of work Rousseau had been commissioned to do (and 
did reluctantly).  (See Maurice Cranston, The Noble Savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1754–1762, pp. 
25-28.)  Rousseau was in fact fairly skeptical about the proposal, and expressed his thoughts about it 
in his ‘Jugement sur le Projet de Paix Perpétuelle’, which was only published posthumously, in 1782.  
Kant knew of the Abbé’s ideas before 1761, but after having read Rousseau’s Extrait nearly always 
paired the two together as advocates of the plan for perpetual peace (cf. Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 3, p. 
CXLV).  There are two such references in the published work, one in ‘Idea’, the other in ‘Theory and 
Practice’ (8:313). There is nothing to suggest that Kant knew that Rousseau was less than a whole-
hearted supporter of the Abbé’s scheme; certainly, his continuing references to Rousseau as proposing 
the very same idea imply that he was not aware of this.
59 Herder was certainly aware of the dissimilarity between his position and Rousseau’s.  In his ‘Journal 
of My Voyage in the Year 1769’, he wrote: ‘In every age – though in each in a different way – the 
human race has had happiness as its objective; we in our own times are misled if, like Rousseau, we 
extol ages which no longer exist and never did exist, if we make ourselves miserable by painting 
romantic pictures of these ages to the disparagement of our own’ (B 89 / 9.ii:30).  Herder rejects what 
he takes to be (not unreasonably) Rousseau’s nostalgia.  Note by contrast that Kant concedes there is 
something in this primitivism. 
60 Cf. Mark Hulliung, The Auto-Critique of Enlightenment, Chapter 2, ‘Philosophical History’.
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2. unsocial sociability leading to the development of human capacities (#4);
3. unsocial sociability leading to the establishment and development of civil 
order (##5-7).
These are not strictly separate, as unsocial sociability has its progressive effects by 
stimulating rational inventiveness.  Indeed, Kant implies that the first dynamic tends 
only to function in this way.  Nature, we should remind ourselves, in fact does nothing 
during the historical process.  Having supposedly placed human beings, unpractised
rational creatures, on the earth, it then retires, and leaves them to get on with it.  It has 
also now been clarified that Nature’s plan has two component ideas: (i) the idea of the 
full development of human capacities; (ii) the idea of ‘the perfect civil union of 
humanity’ (#9, 8:29).
It is tempting to describe Kant’s theory so far as a theory about the unintended 
consequences of human action.  It is evidently an unintended consequence of selfish and 
aggressive actions if these provoke other people to take steps to constrain their 
perpetrators.61  But this unintended consequence is precisely what the second set of 
individuals themselves intend.  From the point of view of the universal historian, the 
reaction of the second group can itself (if successful) have unintended consequences, 
namely the benefit it brings to future generations and, more importantly, the 
contribution it makes to bringing humankind closer to a perfect civil order.  Every 
successful institution of a new mode of social order is therefore progressive in two 
senses: to the individuals bringing it about, it marks an advance on the previous 
unsatisfactory state of affairs; to the universal historian, it is part of a process of 
approximating a perfect state of affairs.  In the first instance, progress is retrospective 
and aims at a new (but inevitably temporary) stasis; in the second, it is forward-looking 
and aims at continual renovation.  We can therefore identify three types of unintended 
consequence:
1. one type of actions provoking attempts to prevent or minimize them;
2. actions producing the benefits they were meant to have but for longer than 
was intended or envisaged;
3. actions incrementally amounting to progress towards a state of affairs not 
intended or envisaged by the agents.
                                                
61 These could indeed be the same people who were responsible for the selfish and aggressive actions, 
reflecting subsequently on the consequences of their actions.
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It should be noted that the third type is not strictly speaking an unintended consequence, 
but rather an unintended significance.  Universal history redescribes the operation of 
prudential reactive rationality as oriented towards a distant future telos.62  The primary 
unintended consequence remains the way in which unregulated unsocial sociability 
generates its own regulation.  The progressively systematic way in which this occurs 
obliges the philosophical historian to attribute this consequence to an intentional agent, 
on the principle that the thought of order requires that of a designer.  Consequently, 
instead of saying merely that unsocial sociability leads to law-governed social order, 
Kant tells us that ‘Nature … employs the unsociableness of human beings … as a means
of arriving at’ it (#7, 8:24, underlining added for emphasis).  Even more strikingly: ‘All 
wars are accordingly so many attempts (not indeed by the intention of men, but by the 
intention of Nature) to bring about new relations between states’ (#7, 8:24-25).  
Unintended consequences, if they produce order, have to be thought of as in some sense 
intended, though not of course by the human agents involved.  In this, Kant is at one 
with many other eighteenth-century thinkers, such as Adam Smith with his ‘invisible 
hand’.63  We should not make the mistake, however, of assuming that Kant (and the rest) 
are attempting to explain the actions and events (in this instance, for example wars) by 
their effects.64
In any case, historical progress is not solely to be explained by appeal to unsocial 
sociability and reactive rationality.  These factors, as we have seen, generate advances 
which can be construed as incrementally realizing two regulative ideas, the full 
development of human capacities and the perfect political constitution, although this is 
no part of the intention of the human agents involved.  This, though, is not to rule out 
the possibility that human beings could wilfully direct themselves towards these ideas 
and act accordingly.  Indeed, as I have already argued, it follows from Kant’s 
conception of what it would be for the human species to develop its rational capacities 
that the universal historian will anticipate that human beings (or at least some of them) 
                                                
62 Cf. Michael Rosen’s discussion of unintended consequences: one of the ‘superior perspectives’ from 
which they can be observed involves the supposition ‘that actions have a wider significance as part of 
a progressive process of historical development’ (On Voluntary Servitude, p. 101, cf. p. 124 also).
63 Smith is similarly not averse to invoking ‘the intention of Nature’ and ‘the plan of Providence’ when 
accounting for the unintended generation of civic order.  See J. Alvey, ‘Adam Smith’s view of 
history’, p. 5.  For evidence of Kant’s familiarity with Smith’s work, see Samuel Fleischacker,
‘Values behind the market: Kant’s response to the Wealth of Nations’.  Fleischacker reckons that ‘it is 
not inappropriate to see overtones of Smith in all of [‘Idea’]’s social teleology’ (p. 386).
64 A (hostile) account of historical teleology which I think makes this mistake is to be found in Jon 
Elster, Making Sense of Marx, pp. 108-118.
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will at some stage start comporting themselves in this way.  In other words, progress 
will gradually become fully intentional.  If this were not to occur, then the species 
would have failed to develop its abilities along the lines which the application of the 
maxims of natural teleology led us to expect.
Kant of course believes that this development has already begun in his historical 
present.  The term he uses to refer to this pivotal quality of the current era is 
enlightenment.  In his hands, the term ‘Aufklärung’ is to an extent ambiguous, for he 
employs it not only to refer to the sui generis progressive potential of the present but 
also to designate the progressive dynamic of history as a whole.  Both senses are to be 
found in ‘Idea for a Universal History’. As to the broader idea of enlightenment, we are 
told in the second section that the task of developing humanity’s capacities ‘will require 
a long, perhaps incalculable series of generations, each passing on its enlightenment to 
the next’ (#2, 8:19).  In the fourth section, ‘unsocial sociability’ is introduced as the 
primary mechanism generating ‘a continued process of enlightenment’ (#4, 8:21).  
Finally, Kant’s outline of political history in the ninth section tracks the survival 
through each ‘revolution’ of ‘a germ of enlightenment’ (#9, 8:30).  The more focused
version of Aufklärung figures in the eighth section: describing the political and social 
conditions of present-day Europe, Kant comments: ‘thus … enlightenment gradually 
arises’ (#8, 8:28, Kant’s emphasis).  This enlightenment is not just yet more in the way 
of cultural development or improvement of political institutions, but rather the advent of 
a new principle of development and improvement.  
The claim that enlightenment describes what is distinctive about the present is more 
fully articulated in another of Kant’s short essays, namely ‘An Answer to the Question: 
What is Enlightenment?’, published just one month after ‘Idea for a Universal 
History’.65  The term is initially applied in relation to the process of individual 
development: ‘Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred 
minority [or immaturity: Unmündigkeit]’ (8:35).   Understood in this way as maturity, 
enlightenment is the condition in which autonomy has been achieved and can start to 
operate.  In the normal run of events, of course, ‘minority’ is not ‘self-incurred’, but 
rather the necessary process of becoming mature.  It can be ‘self-incurred’ if, once this 
development has taken place, the opportunity to ‘come of age’ is resisted.  Kant’s real 
position is that such arrested development is far more likely to be the result of 
                                                
65 December 1783, also in the Berlinische Monatsschrift.
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imposition from outside, not ‘self-incurred’.  Thus when considering social
enlightenment, he writes ‘that a people should enlighten itself is … possible; indeed, 
this is almost inevitable, if only it is left its freedom’ (8:36).   Toward the end of the 
essay, Kant makes explicit the designation of his historical present in terms of 
Aufklärung:
If it is now asked whether we at present live in an enlightened age, the answer is No, but we do 
live in an age of enlightenment.  As matters now stand, a good deal more is required for people on 
the whole to be in the position, or even able to be put into the position, of using their own 
understanding confidently and well in religious matters, without using another’s guidance.  But we 
do have distinct intimations that the field is now being opened for them to work freely in this 
direction and that the hindrances to universal enlightenment or to humankind’s emergence from its 
self-incurred minority are gradually becoming fewer.  In this regard this age is the age of 
enlightenment or the century of Frederick. (8:40)
Kant therefore has two conceptions of enlightenment.  The first applies to history as 
a whole, and involves a gradual process whereby each generation learns from both the 
successes and the mistakes of its predecessors, thereby becoming successively more 
‘enlightened’.  The second applies to the present, and marks a qualitative shift whereby 
humanity is for the first time entering into its maturity.   The first construal of 
enlightenment of course also gives the present a privileged place: the progressive 
dynamic of history ensures that the present era is always superior to the past.  Thus Kant 
can refer to his time as ‘the age of the greatest enlightenment yet’ (‘The End of all 
Things’, 8:339), with the implication that previous ages were also times of 
enlightenment, just with less of it than now.  The ‘maturity’ model, by contrast, 
unavoidably marks out the past as unenlightened.
The discussion of the Eighth Proposition does not explicitly thematize this second 
idea of enlightenment along the lines of ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (although, as 
mentioned, the term is used in this sense, and emphasized, about half way through it).  
But the idea that the historical present is pivotal is central to it.  Having stated in the 
Proposition itself that history can be seen as the process whereby a ‘perfect political 
constitution’ is approximated, Kant writes: ‘We can see that philosophy too may have 
its chiliasm [Chiliasmus], but one whose occurrence can be promoted by its idea [ihre 
Idee], though only from afar, so that they are anything but over-fanciful 
[schwärmerisch]’ (#8, 8:27, translation amended).  Chiliasm is the religious doctrine 
that Christ will reign on earth for a thousand years before the last judgment.  This idea is 
translated by Kant into ‘philosophical chiliasm, which hopes for a state of perpetual 
peace based upon a federation of nations united in a world republic’ (Religion, 6:34).  I 
shall return in Chapter Five to discuss his appropriation of this Christian belief.   For 
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now, what is important to note is Kant’s willingness to conceive of historical progress 
as having as its end a temporal state, a period of time, rather than just, as usual, an 
asymptotically approximated point.66  One can adduce two reasons as to why one might 
conceive of the goal of progress in this extended fashion: firstly, it helps us to consider 
the progressive process as involving attainment as well as endeavour; secondly, it 
articulates the important sense in which history is (that is, will be) stadial.  Perpetual 
peace will be a qualitatively distinct phase in human history, and one which deserves 
millennial status.  Of course, unlike the original religious version, the philosopher’s 
millennium is not supposed to terminate, but rather continue into perpetuity, achieving 
ever greater perfection.67  However, the difference between the two which Kant chooses 
to emphasize involves the role of human agency.  The ‘millennium’ of perpetual peace 
is not a schwärmerisch delusion, he argues, because its ‘occurrence can be promoted by 
its idea’.  Philosophical chiliasm does not rely upon an ‘invisible hand’ to bring about 
the condition it anticipates.  Instead, philosophy itself serves to stimulate interventions 
which consciously aim at the idea.  The teleological dynamic of history is starting to 
become explicit: human beings can begin to take over the reins from Nature.
As yet, though, there is nothing to suggest that such enlightened chiliasm was not 
possible in earlier times (unless we take the reference to philosophy to suggest that only 
in the enlightenment has it taken off).   Kant goes on to make it clear that the invocation 
of chiliasm at this late stage in the argument of the essay does expressly relate to the 
possibilities of his own historical present:
human nature is such that it cannot be indifferent even to the most remote epoch which may 
eventually affect our species, so long as this epoch can be expected with certainty.  And in the 
present case [in unserem Falle] it is especially hard to be indifferent, for it appears that we might 
by our own rational projects [vernünftige Veranstaltung] accelerate the coming of this period 
which will be so welcome to our descendents. (#8, 8:27)
The clear implication of this passage is that such rational projects were not a realistic 
possibility for ‘our’ predecessors.  This is confirmed in what follows, for Kant goes on 
to describe the conditions under which ‘enlightenment’ has arisen in eighteenth-century 
Europe, and how the commitment to the good of ‘the enlightened person [der 
aufgeklärte Mensch] … must gradually spread upwards towards the thrones and even 
influence their principles of government’ (#8, 8:28).
                                                
66 Kant comments on this in The Conflict of the Faculties: the belief that ‘the human race exists … in 
perpetual progression toward improvement … could also be called chiliasm if we view the goal of 
progress within a broad prospectus [im weiten Prospect]’ (7:81, underlining added for emphasis).  
67 And yet we will see at the end of the next chapter that Kant is not averse to exploiting the implication 
of finality and consummation.
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Kant’s chiliasm could still justly be accused of being schwärmerisch were it not for 
the fact that he places the hoped-for millennial condition far off in the future.  Even 
though we can assist in its realization, this can only be ‘from afar [von weitem]’.  In the 
passage quoted in the previous paragraph, it is implied that it is ‘the most remote 
epoch’.  This also contrasts with much religious chiliasm, which is notorious for 
expecting, indeed predicting, the imminent arrival of the thousand-year reign.68  But it is 
not only the religious whose hopes can be mocked as ‘enthusiastic’.  Previously in the 
essay, Kant had commented that the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s plan for a federation of 
nations, which Kant himself approves of, had been ridiculed as ‘schwärmerisch … 
because [the Abbé] thought its realization was so imminent’ (#7, 8:24).69  (Notice now 
how the two factors differentiating philosophical chiliasm from other, ‘religious’ forms 
of chiliasm stand in a degree of tension: philosophy both sets the goal in the far distance 
and yet tells us that we can hasten its approach.)
Enlightened individuals try to influence the public and powers that be and thereby 
help humankind along in the direction of a cosmopolitan world order.   The Abbé de
Saint-Pierre is indeed a good example, even though his efforts were flawed.  What he 
lacked, it would seem, was a properly historical perspective on how this world order 
might be arrived at.  This perspective, as elaborated by Kant, provides two things: 
firstly, a historical time-scale, whereby we recognize the immense period in which 
peace is to be achieved; secondly, an account of this historical mechanism which can 
assist in bringing it about.  The Abbé lacked both these and as a result his interventions 
were ineffectual: firstly, as we have seen, he assumed that it would be possible very 
soon to institute a new international order; secondly, he had no idea as to how this 
would come about other than by moralizing appeals to the princes.  The enlightened 
activist therefore needs the historical perspective Kant provides in order to be truly 
                                                
68 Kant was certainly familiar with one chiliast who conforms to this stereotype, namely the Swabian 
pietist and theologian, J. A. Bengel (1687-1752), whose work on apocalyptic chronology he discusses 
in the first part of The Conflict of the Faculties (7:62-63 n.).  The editors of Religion and Rational 
Theology also detect his presence elsewhere in The Conflict of the Faculties (7:80-81) and in Religion
(6:18).  According to them, Bengel prophesied that the millennium would commence in 1836 (p. 457 
n. 9), though a later note (ibid. p. 473 n. 31) gives 1738 (sic) instead.  Ernest Benz identifies two such 
predictions, one for 1809, and a subsequent estimate of 1846 (The Mystical Sources of German 
Romantic Philosophy, p. 34).  Of course, given the nature of Bengel’s enterprise, it could well be that 
all of these dates can be correctly attributed to him.
69 Kant in fact refers to the plan ‘put forward by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau’ (emphasis 
added).  See footnote 58 above.  L. W. Beck’s translation of this passage has the plan for a league of 
nations being ‘laughed at as fantastical by the Abbé de St. Pierre and by Rousseau, perhaps because 
they believed it was too near to realization’ (On History, p. 19, emphasis added).  Beck must have had 
Rousseau’s genuine opinion of the Abbé’s idea in mind in rendering the passage this way.  However, 
the result is both inaccurate and incoherent.
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enlightened.  Kant’s universal history does more than merely describe enlightenment: it 
enacts it as well.  In disclosing Nature’s plan to us, it enables us to make it our own.  
The point is reiterated in the Ninth Proposition: ‘A philosophical attempt to work out a 
universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature aimed at a perfect 
civil union of mankind, must be regarded as possible and even capable of furthering the 
purpose of nature itself.’ (#9, 8:29, underlining added for emphasis).
Some commentators on Kant’s philosophy of history are so taken with its stress on 
‘Nature’s plan’ that they completely overlook the extent to which it explicitly adverts to 
enlightened action.  For example, Booth writes: ‘How [philosophy] can bring the 
millennium to pass Kant does not tell us’.70 This then enables him to claim that Kant’s 
philosophical history predicts an era of peace which will arrive without any intentional 
effort being required to bring it about: universal history’s ‘promise, its “sweet dream” 
does not require any effort by us’.71 This is plainly incorrect.  (A more pertinent 
objection would question whether the belief that ‘Nature’ is inevitably going to force 
humankind to advance towards perpetual peace does not undermine the moral, 
enlightened commitment to work toward this same goal.  I address this in Chapter
Seven.)
The converse error is made by those commentators who are prone to exaggerate the 
sense of the importance of the present they detect in his historical writings.  Yovel is a 
good example:
The Enlightenment is thus a turning point in history…. Once the philosopher has succeeded in 
grasping the immanent plan of nature, it ceases to be hidden; and its coming to philosophical 
consciousness creates a new historical situation … after the cunning of nature has made the 
Enlightenment itself possible, there is a new departure in history. 
Yovel goes on to suggest that he finds this somewhat ‘utopian’, but does not elaborate.72  
Later on he writes:  ‘Now it is possible to look back on the history … of religion and 
politics, and find the latent paradigm unwittingly produced in them…. [W]ith the full 
theoretical explication of these histories … in politics, religion, and above all in ethics, a 
radically new era begins’.73  I believe Yovel exaggerates the significance of the era of 
enlightenment, indeed as if it were an enlightened age, which Kant of course denies.  
Kant himself never describes his own era in these inflated terms.  Yovel is of course 
perfectly aware that the ‘rational history’ is not expected to replace natural teleology but 
                                                
70 Interpreting the World: Kant’s Philosophy of History and Politics, p. 108.
71 Ibid. p. 115.
72 Kant and the Philosophy of History, pp. 153-4.  
73 Ibid. p. 269, underlining added for emphasis.
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will instead work alongside it, indeed in a subsidiary role.  Yet he continues to indulge 
in talk of ‘a radically new era’.  His interpretation therefore suffers from being too 
dualistic, as is for example evidenced by the title of his fourth chapter: ‘Rational History 
versus Natural Dialectic’.74  This then forms the main theme of his objection to Kant’s 
theory, i.e., that it is too dualistic.75  Kant attempts to provide a much more unified 
account than that which Yovel describes.
In conclusion: Kant’s universal history is teleological.  The ‘aggregate’ of historical 
data is unified by showing how human actions over time amount to progress toward the 
realization of two goals, the full development of human capacities and the attainment of 
perfect civil order.  The universal historian employs these two ideas to regulate the 
ordering of the data.  In so far as they enable order to be constructed, these ideas must 
also be attributed to historical agents.  For the most part, though, they cannot be 
attributed to historical human agents: even when they make progress, they are not doing 
so with the idea of it in mind.  Accordingly, the developing diachronic order has to be 
regulatively attributed to ‘Nature’: what the universal historian uncovers is Nature’s 
plan, not one held to by past individuals.  Kant’s historical teleology thus relies upon a 
version of natural teleology.  As I have tried to emphasize, this should not obscure the 
fact that the primary and only properly explanatory form of teleology involved in 
universal history is that which operates at the level of the ordinary, end-directed 
behaviour of human beings.  Indeed, Kant’s extensions of teleology outside the human 
domain all rely upon analogy with it.  The expectation that universal history be 
teleological thus derives from the understanding that human beings are consciously end-
directed agents.  So whilst universal history makes explicit appeal to the intentionality 
of Nature, this is required in order to be able to conceive of the order which 
unintentionally results from the intentional activity of human beings.  Our end-
directedness comes first.  Not only that, but it is for Kant both possible and necessary 
that this develops in such a way as to obviate reference to ‘Nature’s plan’.  Enlightened 
human beings are able to orient themselves to the ideas which had previously been the 
sole possession of Nature.  In addition, part of the plan shared by Nature and the 
enlightened is the construction of forms of global civil order which will enable 
humanity as a whole gradually to develop and exercise collective agency.  As well, 
then, as the nominal agency of Nature, there are three types of human teleological 
                                                
74 Ibid. p 158; see also his diagram on p. 195.
75 Ibid. pp. 277-9.
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comportment on which Kant builds his philosophical history: individual, but oblivious 
to the two ideas and prompted by unsocial sociability; individual and committed to the 
ideas; collective and committed to the ideas.  The course of history should show a 
transition from the former to the latter, as human beings come to be rational 
cosmopolitans.
57
Chapter Four: Reconciliation and Theodicy
In the first Critique, Kant identifies three questions which he claims determine the scope 
of philosophy.  These are ‘What can I know?’, ‘What should I do?’ and ‘What may I 
hope?’  The first question marks out the theoretical ambition of philosophy, the second, 
its practical scope, whilst the third question is ‘simultaneously practical and theoretical’
(A805/B833).  Kant explicitly refers to his universal history as ‘philosophical history’ 
(‘Idea’, #9, 8:31), so in which of these senses is it ‘philosophical’?
For the most part, as we saw in the previous chapter, the emphasis in ‘Idea’ falls on 
the theoretical character of universal history.  The ideas adduced serve to regulate and 
systematize an otherwise disordered array of empirical data, just as in other areas of 
theoretical enquiry.  The task is outlined by reference to notable scientists, namely 
Kepler and Newton, and proceeds by employing principles taken from ‘the teleological 
theory of nature’ (8:18).  At the same time, though, universal history also has a clear 
practical role.  Individual agents in the present can use it to comprehend and regulate 
their own ethical, intellectual and cultural projects (rather than being buffeted around by 
‘unsocial sociability’).  Indeed, it is part of the narrative of Kant’s universal history that
they do so.  
Kant’s philosophical history can therefore be seen as answering to the first and 
second of the defining questions.  But the third question touches on a motivation for it 
which is, if anything, more important still.  To get a grip on this, it makes sense initially 
to think of it somewhat differently from the formulation given in the Critique.76  Instead, 
we can take it as articulating a demand for a kind of existential reassurance, something 
like ‘how ought I to think of myself, qua human being?’  What is being asked for is a 
way of reconciling ourselves to the human condition.  There are two aspects of the
human condition that are particularly relevant here.  The first is the chaotic and 
distressing character of the historical life of our species.  This was described in ‘Idea’ in 
the following way:
We can scarcely help feeling a certain distaste on observing [human beings’] activities as enacted 
in the great world-drama, for we find that, despite the apparent wisdom of individual actions here 
and there, everything as a whole is made up of folly and childish vanity, and often of childish 
malice and destructiveness.  The result is that we do not know what sort of opinion we should 
form of our species, which is so proud of its supposed superiority.  (8:17-18)
The second is our own individual mortality.  Kant touches on this in the second section 
of ‘Idea’: ‘every individual man would have to live for a vast length of time if he were 
                                                
76 It should be understood that in what follows I am describing just one strand of the many which Kant’s 
third question opens up. 
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to learn how to make complete use of all his natural capacities [i.e. reason] … [but] 
nature has fixed only a short term for each man’s life’ (#2, 8:19).  In both cases, the 
problem arises when the individual recognizes that she has reason, but then is 
confronted by facts which undermine this self-identification.  If I, as a human being, am 
rational, then why have my fellows on the whole behaved so irrationally?  Why am I 
unable to live up to my (infinite) rational potential?
These difficulties allow of religious, other-worldly resolution (of sorts), which Kant 
is himself not averse to propounding at times.  For example, the ‘distaste’ we feel at the 
wrong-doing displayed in the past may perhaps be offset by the belief that the offenders 
face divine justice in the afterlife.77  The disproportion between the length of our lives 
and the infinite possibilities of reason is cancelled if we can think of God allowing us to 
live on after the expiry of our mortal existence (though Kant only ever allows this 
‘postulation’ in respect of the demands of pure practical reason, i.e. morality).78
Kant’s universal history provides more direct means of neutralizing the worries 
touched on in ‘Idea’.  We can reconcile ourselves to the course of past history if we 
come to see it as the unavoidable way in which the human species develops, in 
particular, the way in which it develops its rational capacities.  Kant’s use of ‘childish 
[kindischer]’ twice in the passage cited above from 8:17-18 is revealing: we are meant 
to take it as straightforwardly pejorative, but if history involves the process of humanity 
becoming mature, then some form of ‘childishness’ is precisely what we should expect 
to find in it.
The second issue, mortality, is directly addressed in the second section:
And the point of time at which this degree [i.e. the full degree] of development is reached must be 
the goal of man’s aspirations (at least as an idea in his mind) [muß wenigstens in der Idee des 
Menschen das Ziel seiner Bestrebungen sein], or else his natural capacities would necessarily 
appear by and large to be purposeless and wasted.  In the latter case, all practical principles would 
have to be abandoned….  (#2, 8:19, underlining added for emphasis) 
Kant argues that such comportment is necessary if we are to reconcile ourselves to the 
fact we are each unable to develop our rational capacities to their maximum extent.  The 
reflective appreciation of what human beings are capable of requires this commitment to 
                                                
77 See, for example, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:489-90.
78 Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, 5:122-124.  The general argument was advanced by Joseph Addison 
in 1711: ‘a Man can never have taken in his full measure of Knowledge, has not time to subdue his 
Passions, establish his Soul in Virtue, and come up to the Perfection of his Nature, before he is hurried 
off the Stage.  Would an infinitely wise Being make such glorious Creatures for so mean a purpose?  
Can he delight in the Production of such abortive Intelligences, such short-lived reasonable Beings?  
Would he give us talents that are not to be exerted?  Capacities that are never to be gratified?’  The 
answer is of course, ‘no’: the soul is immortal and can therefore make ‘perpetual Progress … towards 
the Perfection of its Nature’.  (The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond, vol. 1, p. 458).
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the progress (and the achievements) of the species.  Without it, we would feel alienated 
from our own abilities and indifferent to their development.79  
Universal history thus reassures me in my identity as a rational being and encourages 
me to commit myself to the progress of the species.  I now can do so, as the 
philosophical historian has shown me that there is progressive movement in history, 
despite appearance to the contrary; moreover, I should do so, in order that I do not 
abandon ‘all practical principles’.  What, then, may I hope for?  Obviously, that 
progress continues and that, more importantly, it takes a less rocky road than before.  In 
particular, I may hope that my own efforts (in all fields) both contribute to what has 
already been achieved and are themselves built on in the future.  Theory and practice 
come together as hope.
Kant’s universal history is therefore maximally ‘philosophical’: it provides answers 
to all three questions.   ‘What can I know?’ – that there has been progress.  ‘What ought 
to do?’ – act so as to achieve progress.  ‘What may I hope?’ – that there will continue to 
be progress.   Answered in this way, the three questions illuminate the distinct temporal 
vectors of philosophical history, its concern respectively with the past, present and 
future.
The claim that Kant is concerned in his philosophy of history to show how we can be 
reconciled with history and indeed mortality is liable to encounter resistance from some 
of his interpreters.  An instance of this resistance is to be found in Yovel.  He recognizes 
that Kant at times does argue that we should ‘be content … with the course of human 
affairs as a whole’ (‘Conjectures’, 8:123), but considers that this results in an unduly 
contemplative and passive attitude.  On his account, the ‘more interesting’ (and 
authentically Kantian) position is as follows: ‘justification of the individual’s existence 
lies not in knowledge of the course of history, but in action, by which man ‘gives value 
to … life’ [8:122]; it is not in the contemplation of history but its actual creation in 
praxis where finite rational beings should look for their metaphysical satisfaction’.80  
What Yovel ignores is the connection between the two points of view (which is what 
Kant was getting at with his ‘simultaneously practical and theoretical question’).  As 
Kant has argued in ‘Idea’, reconciliation with history is necessary if we are to be able to 
                                                
79 Cf. ‘Conjectures’ on the ‘discontent’ which ‘thinking people are subject to’ (8:120-121).
80 Kant and the Philosophy of History, pp. 145-146 n. 18.
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conceive of ourselves as rational practical agents, and so undertake the ‘creation of 
history’ Yovel focuses on.81
The manner in which universal history counters the distaste observers are liable to 
feel when confronted with the ‘malice and destructiveness’ which predominate in the 
record of the past is suggestive of theodicy.  This is the name given, following Leibniz, 
to theological endeavours to demonstrate that the existence in the world of evil, 
suffering and imperfection generally is compatible with the existence of a divine and 
loving god.  Theodicy is a complicated topic.  One of the reasons for this is that there 
are two distinct concerns underlying the project.  The first involves the issue of how one 
is to relate oneself to a world of evil and suffering.  The second focuses directly on the 
idea of God: how are we to think of him given the fact that he appears to allow these 
imperfections?  These two questions articulate what we may respectively refer to as the 
subjective and objective aspects of the task of theodicy.  It endeavours to address the 
first, subjective question by appealing to the idea of divine justice, but this then 
generates the second, objective question.  God is the answer from the subjective point of 
view, but the problem from the objective point of view.82  One can see how theodicy 
gets caught up in a circle, appealing to God to assuage the distress caused by the 
experience of imperfection but then struggling to reconcile our idea of God with that 
same imperfection.  A further difficulty arises in respect of the different ways in which 
faith in God helps to sustain the believer in the face of sin and pain.  One type of 
theodicy will want to use the idea of God to enable acceptance and affirmation of the 
world as it is: things are not as bad as they initially appeared.  Another type of theodicy 
instead concedes that they are as bad as they look, but goes on to claim that God will 
rectify matters in another world.  The first approach attempts to achieve a reconciliation 
with the world; the second tries to provide compensation for it (as with the ‘religious, 
other-worldly solutions’ mentioned on p. 58).83  The reconciling approach is in principle 
more attractive, as it deals directly with the original problem, but is in practice very 
difficult to bring off.  By contrast, consolation is easier to offer, but is less satisfying as 
a solution.
                                                
81 Neiman’s account in The Unity of Reason (pp. 175-176) is similarly flawed.
82 This ambivalence is reflected in the famous debate between Rousseau and Voltaire following the 
Lisbon earthquake.  Rousseau exemplifies the subjective dimension of theodicy (for him, belief in 
God is the answer), whereas Voltaire focuses on the objective problem.
83 This distinction between ‘reconciliation [Versohnung]’ and ‘consolation [Trost]’ is taken from Hegel, 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 67, see also The Encyclopaedia Logic, §147Z, pp. 
222-3.  For discussion, see Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, Chapter Three.
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Kant’s attitude towards theodicy is of a piece with his general strategy of denying 
knowledge of the objects of religious belief in order to make room for faith in them 
(Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxx).  Consequently, he urges that all attempts to deal with 
the objective problem of theodicy, that is, the issue of how to square the idea of God 
with the reality of evil and suffering, should be abandoned.  There is no way we can 
accomplish this, and trying to do so is both presumptuous and counter-productive.  
However, we are justified in appealing to God’s goodness in order to counteract the 
despair which the experience of evil, suffering and imperfection will otherwise 
produce.84  Kant thus counterposes what he calls ‘authentic theodicy’, which adopts the 
subjective point of view, to ‘doctrinal theodicy’, which deals with the objective problem 
(‘Theodicy’, 8:264).  By distinguishing the two and ruling the second to be illegitimate, 
Kant hopes to break the circle bedevilling theodicy.  The question remains as to whether 
Kant’s ‘authentic theodicy’ will reconcile believers with the world or instead outline 
how they will be compensated for the way it is.  In fact, Kant appears to want to have it 
both ways: his texts oscillate between the two approaches.  The issue of how we should 
understand the relation between these two strategies will be touched on in the rest of 
this chapter and in the following two as well.
To add to the complication, we should note that the term ‘theodicy’ is frequently 
used nowadays in yet another way.  Two notable exponents of this trend are Raymond 
Geuss and Susan Neiman.  Both of them have recommended that we distinguish 
between the original, religious conception of theodicy and what they call a ‘more 
encompassing sense’ or a ‘broad sense’ respectively.85  Their approach is to detach the 
underlying subjective question – how can we be ‘at home’ in a world of evil and 
suffering – from the religious answers which theodicy (in the traditional sense) 
provides.  Consequently, the term can serve to characterize philosophical strategies 
designed more generally to reconcile us to the world we live in, whether these strategies 
are religious or not.  This inflation owes a great deal to Hegel, and certainly seems 
appropriate in relation to his philosophy, given the ambiguous status of God within it.  
In other contexts, though, the use of ‘theodicy’ in this broad sense is rather unhelpful.  
There are two obvious reasons why this is so.  Firstly, we end up using the term to 
characterize philosophical projects which have nothing to do with divine justice, which 
is what the word means.  Secondly, this use of the term obscures the extent to which 
                                                
84 Cf. the third Critique, §87, 5:452-453.
85 Geuss, ‘Art and theodicy’, pp. 82-83; Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, p. 239.
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traditional theodicy tended to end up neglecting the task of reconciling human beings 
with the world.  As I have argued, the problem of theodicy in its ‘objective’ form 
concentrates on reconciling the idea of God with the world.  In so far as a subjective 
dimension continues to be articulated, its focus will be the believer’s relation to God, 
not the world.86  Even to the extent that the human perspective is central to theodicy, it 
by no means follows that the result is reconciliation: often enough, theodicy ends up 
offering consolation instead.  
In line with Geuss’ and Neiman’s expanded understanding of theodicy, it would 
seem straightforward enough to take Kant’s philosophical history as an example of the 
enterprise.87  The ‘third question’, as I have glossed it, expresses the need for 
reconciliation, and universal history is evidently intended as one way of answering it.  
But to leave it at that would be unsatisfactory, given that Kant has his own explicit and 
sophisticated attitude toward theodicy.  We should therefore consider how this attitude 
might relate to his ‘idea for a universal history’.  
The best place to start is Kant’s ‘Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion’, 
delivered either in 1783-84 or in 1785-86, that is, either just before or a short time after 
the publication of the ‘Idea’ essay.88  These lectures are intriguing as in them Kant gives
a much more positive account of traditional theology than the reader of the first Critique
would have expected.  This is, one assumes, because they are lectures, intended to give 
the students a comprehensive view of the range and sophistication of Christian thinking, 
and not just the lecturer’s own, more austere version of it.  Kant’s generosity to the 
tradition extends to its endeavours in theodicy, which he outlines in some detail.  The 
problem is introduced as follows: ‘Against these moral perfections of God, reason 
makes objections whose strength have driven many human beings crazy and plunged 
them into despair’ (28:1076).  (Note that this is what I have termed the objective, 
theocentric problem of theodicy, though with an emphasis on its subjective 
                                                
86 For example, Kant describes the traditional task of theodicy as ‘combining [vereinigen] the course of 
world events with the divinity of their creator’ in order that ‘the impartial spectator’ can be ‘reconciled
[versöhnte] with heaven’ (‘Theodicy’, 8:260 n., underlining added for emphasis and translation 
amended [‘combining’ replacing ‘reconciling’ in the first line]).
87 Neiman fails to address Kant’s philosophical history in Evil in Modern Thought.  She recognizes that 
both Rousseau and Hegel offer historical solutions to the general problem of theodicy, but not that 
Kant can also be seen as doing so.  Her portrayal of Kant bears too much resemblance to the Hegelian 
caricature.  Geuss also does not discuss Kant’s account of history, but then his focus in ‘Art and 
theodicy’ is Hegel and post-Hegelian ‘theodicies’.  However, his treatment oddly ignores the fact that 
Hegel himself only describes his philosophy of history as a theodicy and indeed emphasizes that our 
need for reconciliation is strongest is relation to history (Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 
pp. 42-43).
88 On the dating of the lectures, see Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 337-338. 
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consequences.)  Kant proceeds to present a variety of traditional theodicial arguments, 
such as the idea that the wicked really do, contrary to appearances, suffer in this life 
(28:1076-1082).  It is striking that all of these arguments are expressly rejected in the 
1791 ‘Theodicy’ essay (for example, compare 28:1081 and 8:261-262).  However, there 
is one argument, and it is the one which is of interest to us, which does not figure in the 
subsequent attack on doctrinal theodicy.  This involves the claim that evil will disappear 
‘through the progress toward good’, that it is what human beings have to overcome in 
the historical process of their gradual perfection.  The account Kant gives of this is 
initially very similar to that given in ‘Idea for a universal history’ (but notice how God 
is invoked, not Nature):
One must note that among the many creatures, the human being is the only one who has to work 
for his perfections and for the goodness of his character, producing them from within himself.  
God therefore gave him talents and capacities, but left it up to the human being how he would 
employ them…. He proceeds to educate himself, but with each new step he takes some new false 
steps, and in this way he approaches ever nearer to the idea of perfection in a rational being, which 
he will nevertheless perhaps not attain to for millions of years. – In this earthly world there is only 
progress.  (28:1078-1079)
It would thus appear that Kant was at least tempted to enlist historical progressivism in 
the service of doctrinal theodicy.  Perhaps he just couldn’t resist experimenting with his 
thoughts on philosophical history in this way and then sharing them with his students.  
But what is remarkable is the extent to which he then has to deviate from the account 
familiar to us from ‘Idea’.  The Lectures continue:
Thus evil in the world can be regarded as incompleteness in the development of the germ toward 
the good.  Evil has no special germ; for it is mere negation and consists only in the limitation of 
the good.  It is nothing beyond this, other than incompleteness in the development of the germ to 
the good out of uncultivatedness…. God wills the elimination of evil through the all-powerful 
development of the germ toward perfection.  He wills that evil be removed through the progress 
toward good.  Evil is also not a means to good…. (28:1079, emphases removed)
In this progressivist theodicy, evil is nothing other than an absence which humanity 
gradually fills in – there is not even anything the species could be said to overcome.  
Downplaying the reality of ‘evil’ in this fashion was a standard manoeuvre in traditional 
theodicy, and one of the features which Kant was later to pour scorn on.  As well as 
being inadequate as a theodicy, Kant’s account is also deficient when compared to the 
philosophical history which it relies upon.  Whatever other failings one might want to 
charge Kant’s universal history with, disregarding or diluting the prevalence of human 
wrong-doing and suffering is not one of them.  Indeed, it is one of its strengths that it 
shows how they produce progress.  But in using progress as a theodicy, Kant has to 
discard the claim that unsocial sociability is its primary mechanism.  This then leaves 
the account of history as little more than a pious wish.
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This is of course no accident.  If God’s goodness and justice are supposed to be 
vindicated by the progress toward perfection which he makes possible, then there can be 
no praise of ‘vanity’ or ‘insatiable desires’ and the like, as we found in ‘Idea’ (#4, 8:21). 
Recognizing the extent to which progress only takes place because of ‘evil’ would be to 
impugn the very divine goodness supposedly being defended.  This, I would argue, is 
another reason why Kant is keen to use the regulative idea of Nature in his historical 
teleology.  Earlier it was noted that Kant recommends use of ‘Nature’ rather than ‘God’ 
in teleological inquiry because: (i) the former term involves a less assertoric claim; (ii) it 
points us toward nature, rather than leading us away into the domain of the supernatural 
(A699-701/B727-9).  We should now also see that we can assign to Nature intentions 
and devices which it would sound at least odd to attribute to God. Thus Kant can write 
‘Wars, tense and unremitting military preparations, and the resultant distress … are the 
means by which Nature drives nations … to take the step … [of] entering a federation of 
peoples…’ (‘Idea’, #7, 8:24, underlining added for emphasis).  To claim that these were 
the means by which God got the human species to take this step would be precisely to 
exacerbate the kind of problem which doctrinal theodicy attempts to resolve.  This ties 
in with Kant’s repeated insistence on the inadequacy of the ‘physico-teleological’ proof 
of God’s existence (or argument from design).  There are two aspects to this 
inadequacy: on the one hand, it would be impossible to discover sufficient order in 
nature from which to infer an omnipotent being (as opposed to merely a very potent 
one, or collection thereof, as in paganism); on the other hand, natural order is morally 
neutral, or patchy, and so gives us no reason to think that its putative creator is 
supremely good (again, paganism, with its set of sometimes benign, sometimes malign 
artistic deities, seems more congruent with natural teleology).89
Kant’s attempt to use universal history as a doctrinal theodicy ironically 
demonstrates why his version of it cannot serve this purpose.  It is therefore not 
surprising that we hear no more from him along these lines (and indeed that he only 
articulated it in the lecture hall in the first place).  But this does not debar universal 
history from functioning as an authentic theodicy.  Remember that for Kant authentic 
theodicy involves that faith in God which helps enable the believer to reconcile herself 
                                                
89 For example, from Kant’s ‘Theodicy’ essay: ‘Teleology (and through it, physicotheology) gives 
abundant proof in experience of this artistic wisdom [i.e. Nature].  But from it no inference is allowed 
to the moral wisdom of the author of the world [i.e. God]’ (8:256 n.; cf. A627/B655).  Teleology’s 
affinity with paganism is emphasized in the Critique of Judgment, §85, 5:439-440; cf. A625/B653.
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with an imperfect world.  We have already seen how philosophical history contributes 
to this task.  And yet for it to share in the title of authentic theodicy, it surely has to 
incorporate some form of appeal to divine justice, and it would seem from the argument 
of the previous paragraph that it cannot.  Does Kant’s reliance upon ‘Nature’ prevent us 
from describing his universal history as an authentic theodicy?
It might well do, were it not the fact that his reliance upon ‘Nature’ is by no means as 
exclusive as his practice throughout most of ‘Idea’ implies.  Toward the end of the 
essay, Kant states that his universal history 
opens up the comforting prospect of a future in which we are shown from afar how the human race 
eventually works its way up to a situation in which all the germs implanted by nature can be 
developed fully, and in which man’s destiny can be fulfilled here on earth.  Such a justification
[Rechtfertigung] of Nature – or, better [besser], of Providence – is no mean motive for adopting a 
particular point of view in considering the world.  (#9, 8:30, translation amended [‘better’ 
replacing ‘rather perhaps’ in the fourth line])
The appearance here of ‘Providence’ marks a significant change of perspective.  History 
is no longer being considered simply from a theoretical point of view: the emphasis has 
turned instead to the way in which universal history answers to and directs human 
hopes.  Accordingly, it seems, we are now allowed to make reference to Providence, 
indeed to speak of its ‘justification’.  The introduction of an explicitly divine label for 
the creative agent to whom reference must be made in teleological enquiry does indeed 
suggest that Kant’s philosophical history should be thought of as an authentic theodicy.  
But how is Nature as it were upgraded to Providence?  It seemed that one of the reasons 
why the idea of Nature was used in teleology in general and in universal history in 
particular was precisely that it did not have providential connotations.90
The difficulty is resolved when we recall that the universal historian expects the 
course of human history in due course to involve both the construction of a 
cosmopolitan order and the genuine implementation of moral principles (‘Idea’, #7, 
8:24-26).  Accordingly, if the record of the past suggests the hand of what Kant 
elsewhere calls ‘stepmotherly Nature’ (Groundwork, 4:394, second Critique, 5:146),91
the future should see developments which indicate a much more providential plan.  It is 
above all the ‘comforting prospect’ of the future provided by universal history that 
enables reference to be made to Providence.
                                                
90 That Kant distinguishes between Nature and Providence separates him from many other eighteenth 
century thinkers, for whom the two were in effect interchangeable.  This is true, for example, of both 
Herder (cf. the passages from Ideas cited in the next chapter, pp. 69-70) and Adam Smith (cf. the 
passages cited by Alvey, ‘Adam Smith’s view of history’, p. 5).
91 Contrast Herder: ‘I find Nature everywhere a good mother [gütige Mutter]’ (Ideas, VIII.5, C40 / 
6:294). 
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For the most part, Kant has a simpler and more direct way of invoking the idea of a 
providential God in the form of his moral proof for the existence of God.  According to 
this, the demands of morality license the ‘postulation’ of the existence of a moral author 
of the world as the precondition for the belief that these demands are realizable.92  
However, what Kant offers us in the ‘Idea’ essay is not the mere postulation of 
Providence but rather its ‘justification’ (8:30).  Teleological universal history amplifies 
and strengthens practical faith.  Indeed, it does more than this: it ensures that such faith 
takes a mundane, historical form.  Without it, Kant argues, our hopes and wishes would 
inevitably be obliged to take an exclusively other-worldly turn, marked by dejection and 
palpably second-best:
For what is the use of lauding and holding up for contemplation the glory and wisdom of creation 
in the non-rational sphere of nature, if the history of mankind … is to remain a constant reproach 
to everything else?  Such a spectacle would force us to turn away in revulsion, and, by making us 
despair of ever finding any completed rational aim behind it, would reduce us to hoping for it only 
in some other world. (#9, 8:30) 
As ‘Providence’ signifies, as Kant says elsewhere, the ‘concurrence of divine wisdom 
with the course of nature’ (‘End’, 8:337), such other-worldly moral faith would have to 
eschew the idea of it and instead rely solely upon the thought of God as a heavenly 
ruler.  In the absence of the reconciliation which universal history enables, consolation 
will be all that is available.
But if our hopes for the human future are such that belief in Providence is justified, 
how is this to be squared with the recourse the past obliges us to make to ‘stepmotherly’ 
Nature?  Presumably, once the philosophical historian has plotted out the full dynamic 
of human history, it becomes possible to see that the harshness of Nature’s means were
all intentionally for the best.  As Kant writes early on in ‘Idea’, 
It seems as if Nature had intended that man, once he had finally worked his way up from the 
uttermost perfection in his manner of thought and thence (as far as possible on earth) to happiness, 
should be able to take for himself the entire credit for doing so and have only himself to thank for 
it.  It seems that Nature has worked more with a view to man’s rational self-esteem than to his 
mere well-being.  For in the actual course of human affairs, a whole host of hardships awaits him.  
(#3, 8:20)
Nature thus operates rather like the tutor in Rousseau’s Émile.  The tutor is trying to 
raise his charge so that he attains to autonomy and self-esteem: ‘preparing from afar the 
reign of freedom’.93 To this end, Émile is subjected to various hardships.  Presumably, 
once his education is complete, he will be able to see that this apparently ‘stepfatherly’ 
treatment was in fact providential from the outset.
                                                
92 Critique of Practical Reason, 5:124-132.
93   Rousseau, Emile, p. 63, Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 4, p. 282.
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The obvious problem with this manner of reconciling universal history’s references 
to (non-moral) Nature and (moral) Providence is that the human species, unlike Émile, 
is not an individual.  If Nature/Providence is, as it were, ‘cruel to be kind’, the cruelty 
and the kindness seem to be unevenly distributed across the generations.  Émile may 
have no cause for complaint at the hardships and deceptions he undergoes, but surely 
the innumerable human beings who have suffered because of unsocial sociability 
(usually someone else’s) and missed out on the eventual attainment of ‘self-esteem’ 
would have?  Kant is aware of this, for he almost immediately goes on to note that
What always remains disconcerting about all this is firstly, that the earlier generations seem to 
perform their laborious tasks only for the sake of the later ones, so as to prepare for them a further 
stage from which they can raise still higher the structure intended by nature; and secondly, that 
only the later generations will in fact have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a 
whole series of their ancestors (admittedly without any conscious intention) had worked without 
themselves being able to share in the happiness they were preparing.  (#3, 8:20, translation 
amended)
The ‘disconcerting’ character of progress, the very skewed distribution of the supposed 
benefits of historical progress, problematizes a retrospective redescription of Nature as 
Providence (it certainly wasn’t providential to those earlier generations).  Indeed, this 
apparent unfairness is surely one of the reasons why Kant invokes Nature nearly all the 
time, not Providence.  
It would therefore appear that the extent to which universal history can serve as a 
‘justification of Providence’ is limited.  However, this is in line with Kant’s insistence 
that we should not presume to think that the ways of Providence are entirely accessible 
to us (i.e. that we should not slide from authentic to doctrinal theodicy).  
Notwithstanding the ‘disconcerting’ features that remain, ‘it is of the utmost importance 
that we should be content with Providence’ (‘Conjectures’, 8:121), and we should not 
allow those features to undermine our confidence in progress.
The observation that a certain kind of progressivist philosophical history portrays 
earlier generations as mere means to the advantages to be enjoyed by later ones was of 
course pressed by Herder as a knock-down objection to that particular genre (Chapter 
One, p. 15).   More needs to be said as to why Kant rejects Herder’s criticism (which he 
may have in mind in writing the passage quoted above), and I will turn to this task in 
Chapter Six.  For now, I hope to have shown that universal history attempts to provide 
us not only with knowledge and guides for action but also reconciliation with human 
history and grounds for hope.  It is therefore appropriate to think of it as, in Kant’s own 
terms, a form of theodicy.  
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Chapter Five: Herder (and Hegel) vs. Kant
Two months after the appearance of ‘Idea for a Universal History’, Kant’s review of the 
first part of Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity was published 
(8:45-55, January 1785).  In this, Kant took issue with his former pupil’s poeticizing 
and analogizing approach in dealing with the place of human species in nature (the 
directly historical elements of Ideas were still to follow).  Kant’s review infuriated 
Herder, who vowed to take his revenge in the second part, which he was then working 
on.94  The object of his attack would inevitably be ‘Idea for a Universal History’, whose 
theses he lambasted in letters at the time.  Part II of Ideas, comprising Books Six to Ten, 
duly appeared in August 1785.  The critique of Kant’s philosophy of history is a 
running theme throughout Books Eight and Nine.  Book Eight indeed opens with a 
disparaging reference to the ‘metaphysician’, i.e. Kant, who proceeds in an a priori
fashion, ignoring the actual material of history, unlike the genuine ‘philosopher of 
history’, i.e. Herder (VIII.0, C 33 / 6:286).95  Kant is in fact never mentioned in the 
work, though he is (inaccurately) quoted once (IX.4, B 323 / 6:368-369).  The challenge 
laid down by Herder must have been irresistible, and Kant replied in November 1785 
with his second review (8:58-66),96 over half of which (amounting to nearly all the 
substance) is devoted to dealing with Herder’s criticisms of his own ‘Idea’ essay.  In 
what follows, I shall consider the debate between the two as it focuses on the question 
of progress.  One of Herder’s objections is more precisely (and more revealingly) 
articulated by Hegel, and so for a few pages I enlist the latter to press the anti-Kantian 
case.
Much of Herder’s sniping at Kant is ineffective and ad hoc.  For example, in Book 
Eight he blithely deprecates the attribution of unsociability to humanity: ‘Peace, 
therefore, not war is the natural state of mankind’ (VIII.4, C 61/ 6:316).  As no doubt 
even Kant may have conceded, Herder is in better form when dealing not with 
arguments but with metaphors.  His twisting round of the arboreal analogy from 
Proposition Five of ‘Idea for a Universal History’ (quoted on p. 44) is particularly 
effective: ‘As far as it may be, no tree is permitted to deprive another of air, so as to 
                                                
94 See in particular Herder’s letters to J. G. Hamann of the 14th February and F. H. Jacobi of the 25th
February 1785 (Briefe, 5:106, 109).
95 Herder regularly referred to Kant in this way, as in for example his letter to Hamann of the 28th
February 1785: ‘It is strange that the metaphysicians, as for example your Kant, do not want any 
history even in history’ (Briefe, 5:111, translation taken from Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn, p. 642).
96 In fact this was Kant’s third publication in this series: between his two reviews he replied in print to a 
protest about the first review made by a defender of Herder (‘Reviews’, 8:56-58).
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render it a stunted dwarf, or force it to become a crooked cripple, that it may breathe 
with more freedom.  Each has its place allotted it, that it may ascend from its root by its 
own impulse, and raise its flourishing head.’ 97  (VIII.4, C 61 / 6:316)
In the closing paragraphs of the fifth and final chapter of Book Eight, Herder 
launches into his most extensive attack on Kant’s position:
How, for instance, can it be, that man, as we know him here, should have been formed for an 
infinite improvement of his mental faculties, a progressive extension of his perceptions and 
actions? nay, that he should have been made for the state, as the end of his species, and all 
preceding generations properly for the last alone, which is to be enthroned on the ruined 
scaffolding [or ‘edifice’: Gerüst] of the happiness [Glückseligkeit] of the rest?  The sight of our 
fellow-creatures, nay even the experience of every individual life, contradicts this plan attributed 
to creative Providence. (VIII.5, C 75 / 6:332) 
Herder registers the duality of the historical process as construed by Kant, involving the 
development of both human faculties and political structures (the two ‘ideas’ dwelt on 
previously).  He also seems to have in mind the passage at the end of the Third 
Proposition in which Kant admits that historical progress is ‘disconcerting’ (quoted on 
p. 67): he picks up on Kant’s construction metaphor as well as the suggestion that Glück
is reserved for those at the end of the process.  Herder objects to the accounts both of 
the means and the ends of historical progress that he detects in Kant.
Firstly, the idea that earlier generations suffer in order to bring about benefits for 
later ones is on the one hand not true – there is no evidence for such a claim – and on 
the other hand cannot be true, for it involves attributing evil to Providence.  These of 
course were general criticisms which Herder had already advanced forcibly in This Too 
a Philosophy of History: now we find them thrown at Kant: ‘Ye men of all the quarters 
of the Globe, who have perished in the lapse of ages, ye have not lived and enriched the 
earth with your ashes, that at the end of time your posterity should be made happy by 
                                                
97 The editor of Ideas in Werke, Martin Bollacher, otherwise so astute in detecting references to Kant 
and others in Herder’s text, does not comment on this one.  
    The arboreal analogy had featured in an earlier debate about progress.  In Émile, Rousseau cites 
Fontenelle’s claim that the ‘whole dispute about ancients and moderns comes down to knowing 
whether the trees in the past were bigger than those today’.  Fontenelle means us to take the question 
in a purely rhetorical sense – of course trees were the same then as now.  Similarly, human beings 
were the same then as now, and so the moderns should be taken as the equals of the ancients.  
Rousseau, by contrast, takes it as a serious question: ‘If agriculture had changed, it would not be 
impertinent to ask this question’ (Émile, p. 343; Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 4, p. 676).  The relevant 
trees to compare are not wild, natural ones, but cultivated varieties.  As practices of cultivation can be 
assumed to have changed over time, the results will have done so as well.  The implication is therefore 
that contemporary ‘trees’, i.e. human beings, are stunted and distorted.  Compare the famous opening 
paragraph of Book One: ‘Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything 
degenerates in the hands of man.  He forces one soil to nourish the products of another, one tree to 
bear the fruit of another … He wants nothing as nature made it, not even man; for him … man must be 
fashioned in keeping with his fancy like a tree in his garden.’  (Émile, p. 37; Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 
4, p. 245.)
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European civilization: is not a proud thought of this kind treason against the majesty of 
Nature?’ (VIII.5, C 78 / 6:335).   The argument, such as it is, seems to be this: history 
cannot reveal the sacrifice of the happiness of early generations for the benefit of later 
ones, because no such sacrifice has taken place: the supposition that earlier generations 
were less happy is false, occasioned by the kind of ‘presentist’ inability to understand 
and appreciate past forms of life.  Earlier generations are just as able to attain 
contentment and well-being as their successors: the ability of each in this regard is quite 
independent of the attainments of the others.
Secondly, the ends which Kant adduces are served by historical progress cannot in 
any case be the destination of the human species: on the one hand, they are not required 
for what is its true destination, namely happiness, and on the other hand, they are all too 
likely to cut against it.  ‘Neither our head nor our heart is formed for an infinitely 
increasing store of thoughts and feelings; our hand is not made, our life is not calculated 
for it’ (VIII.5, C 75 / 6:332).  The basis for Herder’s claim is much the same as we have 
seen above: very many human beings have been perfectly happy without enlightenment 
and government, so these cannot be necessary for this.  Moreover, members of those 
societies with a surfeit of enlightenment and government (i.e. contemporary European 
ones) are manifestly less happy.  Herder is particularly suspicious of ‘large states’ in 
which ‘hundreds must pine with hunger, that one may feast and carouse: thousands are 
oppressed, and hunted to death, that one crowned fool or philosopher may gratify his 
whims’ (VIII.5, C 77 / 6:334).
Kant comments in his review on both of Herder’s lines of attack.  With regard to the 
first objection, he notes his critic’s allegation that the idea of progress is a ‘treason 
against the majesty of Nature’, adding archly that others would ‘more prosaically
describe [it] as blasphemy’.  Unfortunately, Kant then passes up on the opportunity to 
deal directly with the charge, appealing to ‘the limits of length to which this review is 
subject’ (‘Reviews’, 8:61).98  As already promised, I shall pick up this issue in the next 
chapter and examine various reconstructions of what Kant would or should have said in 
response.
A little later, Kant responds to Herder’s assertion that the end of Providence in 
relation to human beings is their happiness.  Kant retorts that happiness cannot 
constitute ‘the value of [human] existence’, whereas, we are to presume, the ends he has 
                                                
98 In fact, it was the time constraint Kant was working under which was probably more relevant (Kuehn, 
Kant, p. 297).
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identified in ‘Idea’ can.  This is not to gainsay the importance of the ‘image of 
happiness which each individual creates for himself’; indeed it is by means of this that 
the dynamic of ‘progressing [fortgehende] and growing activity and culture’ is set in 
motion (8:64, translation amended).  There is, one feels, more that Kant could and 
should have said here.  Happiness as such may not suffice as a postulated end of history, 
but is it thereby to be excluded altogether?  The manner in which Kant constructs his 
idea of the highest good suggests not.99  In respect of Kant’s philosophy of history, the 
case for making happiness more central is surely strong.100  Kant has already stated that 
desire for happiness is an important motor of progress: we may be prone to assume that 
this desire is self-defeating, but is this necessarily always going to be the case?  In 
particular, will historical experience not enable human beings to learn from the ways in 
which happiness has proven to be elusive?  More pertinently, the historical prognosis 
contained in ‘Idea’ does imply that the future will be a happier time.  Perpetual peace 
may not directly produce happiness, but it will certainly eliminate one of the primary 
causes of unhappiness.  Kant himself recognizes that future generations will share in a 
Glück unavailable to their predecessors; Herder is not entirely unjustified in seeing in 
this an expectation of greater Glückseligkeit.  Again, I shall return to this issue in the 
next chapter.
Herder’s treatment of Kant in the fifth chapter of Book Eight is vitiated by his 
implicit presumption that Kant is guilty of what I earlier called ‘presentism’.  It is as if 
for Herder the ‘enlightenment’ idea of progress (i.e. not his own ‘higher’ version) must 
always translate into an uncritical enthusiasm for contemporary conditions.  Thus just 
because Kant’s version of the idea emphasizes the development of political institutions, 
he is therefore assumed to be a supporter of the machine states of ‘enlightened 
absolutism’ and is condemned accordingly.  However, Kant is largely at one with 
Herder in his dislike of these autocratic regimes, indeed his ‘universal history’ explicitly 
                                                
99 In the second Critique, Kant argues that whilst virtue is the supreme good, ‘it is not, on that account, 
the whole and complete good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings; for this, 
happiness is also required’ (5:110).
100 If we identify the purpose of history as the progressive realization of the highest good, then the case is 
unarguable.  A sophisticated exposition along these lines is presented in Yovel, Kant and the 
Philosophy of History.  I have resisted following this approach partly because he has exemplified it 
well enough and partly because it obliges one to concentrate on fitting Kant’s philosophy of history 
into his system as a whole, rather than attending to its details and considering it in relation to the work 
of other thinkers.  Two symptomatic absences which indicate the difference between Yovel’s 
approach and mine: (i) the idea of the highest good does not appear in the three Kant essays in 
philosophical history which I focus on; (ii) Herder’s name is completely absent from Kant and the 
Philosophy of History.  
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elaborates his objections to the status quo.  What is to be hoped for in the future is 
something quite different: the ‘perfect political constitution’ will be ‘without precedent 
in the past’ (‘Idea’, #8, 8:28).101
Herder continues to worry away at aspects of Kant’s philosophical history at various 
places within Book Nine.  He takes particular exception to the claim that ‘the human 
being is an animal that needs a master’ (‘Idea’ #6, 8:23), calling it ‘easy but evil’ and 
suggesting that it should instead be reversed: ‘the human being that needs a master is an 
animal’ (IX.4, B 323 / 6:369).  Herder fails to attend to Kant’s argument that coercion is 
necessary in order to constrain the unsociability that impedes the development of 
individual and collective autonomy: we all need a master in order to become our own 
masters.  Kant repeats Herder’s unattributed and tendentiously inaccurate quotation in 
his response (‘Reviews’, 8:64).102  He goes on to deny that the doctrine is ‘evil’, but 
adds that ‘it may well have been stated by an evil man’, this being his only (moreover 
indirect and ironic) admission of authorship of the claims which Herder’s criticisms 
were directed at. 
A more substantial line of criticism is advanced in the first chapter of Book Nine of 
Ideas.  Herder here considers claims about the development of humanity which give 
pride of place to the species, rather than to individuals.  Once again, and again without it 
being made explicit, his target is clearly Kant, as the latter in turn recognised.  The 
Second Proposition of the ‘Idea’ essay stated that ‘In man, as the only rational creature 
on earth, those natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason are such 
that they could be fully developed only in the species, but not in the individual’ (8:18).  
(This apparent privilege is also conveyed in the first review: ‘all that nature reveals to us 
is that it abandons individuals to total destruction and preserves only the species’ 
(‘Reviews’, 8:53).)  Such claims, unsurprisingly, Herder finds completely unacceptable, 
seeming, as they do, to express a complete disregard for the ends of individuals.
Herder’s argument, as I reconstruct it, has three parts to it.  In the first, Herder claims 
that the idea that ‘the education of mankind’ means ‘the education of the species as a 
whole and not that of so many individuals comprising it’, is only intelligible on the 
presupposition that the species is itself the real individual, of which putatively 
                                                
101 Wood notes Kant’s agreement with Herder regarding contemporary ‘paternalistic’ government, but 
does not explain why Herder gets Kant wrong (Kant’s Ethical Thought, pp. 254-255).
102 Herder’s full ‘quotation’ reads: ‘the human being is an animal that needs a master, and who expects 
from this master, or association with him, the happiness of his ultimate destiny’ (IX.4, B323 / 6:368-
369, underlining added).  Only the underlined phrase is Kant’s; the rest is bogus.
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individual persons’ minds are only fragments (IX.1, B312 / 6:337-338).103  This idea he 
calls ‘the Averroistic system’ (referring to the medieval Islamic philosopher Ibn 
Rushd’s doctrine of monopsychism), thereby presumably intending to convey its 
flagrant untenability, without having to elaborate as to the moral or metaphysical 
reasons for this.104  If monopsychism is ruled out, then, and this is the second part of the 
argument, the idea that the species develops, but not the individuals, becomes ‘wholly 
unintelligible’.  ‘For species and genus are merely abstract concepts, empty sounds 
unless they refer to individual beings’ (ibid.).  Any property which is attributed to the 
species must also apply to the individuals whom the species-concept describes.  Kant, in 
replying to Herder on this point, finds (initially) nothing to disagree with: ‘Certainly, 
anyone who said that no single horse has horns although the species as a whole is 
horned would be uttering an absurdity.  For in this instance, “species” signifies nothing 
more than that precise quality in which all individuals must be identical’ (8:65).  At this 
stage, Herder and Kant could, it seems, agree on two points: (i) the species, as a 
universal term, does not develop, educatively or in any other way, at all: it is precisely 
what must remain constant throughout any developmental changes; (ii) if, on the other 
hand, we take ‘species’ to denote the collectivity of members falling under the 
universal, then this can be said to develop only by virtue of the development of the 
members.  Thus, to talk of ‘the education of the species’ just means the successive and 
cumulative education of the individuals comprising it.  Herder can therefore himself 
write: ‘We speak therefore of an education of mankind.  Every individual only becomes 
man by means of education, and the whole species lives solely as this chain of 
individuals.’ Herder’s supposition that he has identified a dilemma for Kant (Averroism 
or unintelligibility) is mistaken.  It relies upon the allegedly Kantian premise that the 
species develops, not its individual members.  But this is not what Kant claims.  His 
position is instead that only the species fully develops (‘Idea’, #2, 8:18, cited in the 
previous paragraph).  This does not imply that individuals themselves do not develop 
(or are ‘educated’).
                                                
103 ‘Education of mankind’ is Lessing’s phrase, not Kant’s, though the latter is happy to continue with it 
when responding to Herder.
104 ‘Averroes’ is the Latinate name given to Ibn Rushd.  Wood, commenting on the Herder-Kant 
exchange, claims that ‘Herder does not explain what makes Kant's view “Averroistic” ’ (Kant’s 
Ethical Thought, p. 390 n. 7), when in fact he is quite clear what this is.  Wood may have been led into 
this misconception by dealing only with the sentences from Herder which Kant excerpts in the second 
of his ‘Reviews’ (8:65), as these omit the phrase which answers his question.  
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The real bone of contention between Kant and Herder lies in the different ways in 
which they understand the relation between the two senses of ‘species’, as universal and 
collectivity.  For Kant, the important sense in which the species (in the second sense) 
develops is by realizing the potentialities which define the species (in the first sense).  
As a result, later generations can partake in a more fully actualized humanity than their 
predecessors.  It is precisely this coupling which Herder, in the third part of his 
argument, rejects: 
if I were to attribute to such abstract concepts [species or genus] every perfection, culture and 
enlightenment of which man is capable, I should contribute to the actual history of man no more 
than if I were to speak of animalkind, stonekind and metalkind in general, and decorate them with 
all the noblest qualities which, if they really existed, in any one single individual or entity, would 
cancel each other out. (IX.4, B 312 / 6:338)
Herder takes human ‘perfection, culture and enlightenment’ to come in as many 
different forms as do, say, metals or animals.  The species as collectivity, or ‘chain of 
individuals’, displays a multiplicity of perfections which therefore cannot be attributed 
to the universal concept of the species, as potentialities latent within it: this would be as 
if to claim that the concept ‘metal’ contained the specifications for all possible metals 
and was realized in each of them.  No one metal, however, could demonstrate all the 
‘qualities’ of ‘metalkind’; they ‘would cancel each other out’.  The same, then, is true 
for humanity.  Its perfections are plural; historical time is required for their successive 
realization.  If one talks of an ‘education’ or ‘progress’ of the species, it can only mean 
a transition through various perfections, not an advance to one.  Herder’s objection to 
Kant’s species-talk thus, ultimately, rests upon his Leibnizian historicism.  In the second
review Kant accurately quotes from, but does not respond to, this passage.  One can 
imagine that if he had done, he might have pointed out the confusion between species 
and genus at work in it.  Herder’s comparison of humanity with ‘metalkind’ implies that 
it is like a genus-term, under which species (which specify various ‘perfections’) fall.  
He thus tries to articulate the relation between individuals and their species-concept on 
the model of that between species and the genus to which they belong, in order to apply 
to the former the looseness appropriate to the latter.  
Herder in turn might be quite happy to defend his more elastic conception of the 
human species.  Do we not find just such a diversity of ways of life comparable to the 
differences between animal species in the same genus?  Is it not this ability to adapt to 
different historical and geographical conditions that constitutes our common humanity?  
If this means that the human species is sui generis, well Kant himself argues that it is 
(cf. ‘Idea’, ##2-3).  The nub of the dispute relates to the authors’ respective conceptions 
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of human rationality which, we may take it, both agree is what marks out the species 
from the rest.  For Herder, rationality is primarily adaptive, whereas for Kant it is
essentially self-determining.105
The main reason why Herder suspects Kant of ‘Averroism’ is the latter’s claim that 
the potential of the human species is realized in the collectivity, not in individuals.  This 
collectivity needs to be understood in two ways, synchronically and diachronically: (i) 
at any one time, human beings collectively (if imperfectly) realize their common 
essence; (ii) correlative to that imperfection, human beings through time advance in the 
project of realizing their common essence.  The individual is thus doubly subordinate: 
she herself can never be fully human, but must recognize that humanity in the living 
human totality of which she is a member; however, even that living human totality 
cannot fully represent humanity, but is only one of a succession of generations in which 
human rationality is ever more adequately developed.  This is the main point Kant 
emphasizes in his rejoinder to Herder: it is possible to speak of the species attaining its 
end, that is, fully developing human potential, not because it in fact does exhaust this 
process, but rather because it continues doing so into infinity:
if the human species signifies the totality of a series of generations which runs on into infinity … 
and if it is assumed that this series constantly approximates to the line of its destiny which runs 
alongside it, then it is not a contradiction to say that the series in all its parts is asymptotic to this 
line yet coincides with it as a whole.  In other words, no single member of all the generations of 
the human race, but only the species, attains its destiny completely.  The mathematician can 
provide elucidation here; the philosopher would say that the destiny of the human race as a whole 
is incessant progress, and that its fulfilment is merely an idea - but in every respect a very useful 
idea - of the goal to which, in keeping with the intention of providence, we have to direct our 
endeavours. (‘Reviews’, 8:65)
Notice how in this passage the characterization of the species’ ‘destiny’ alters: at first it 
is what is approximated, asymptotically, but by the last sentence it has become the 
process of approximation itself.  From progressing towards the goal, progress itself 
becomes the goal.  (I return to discuss this issue again later in the chapter.)
The suspicion of ‘Averroism’ takes root in Herder because he reads Kant as saying 
that the species can achieve what individuals cannot, and thus that the species has a 
mind superior to and incorporating the minds of individuals.  However, the superiority 
of the species over the individuals results not from the limitations of the latter’s mental 
                                                
105 Herder’s conception of rationality is conveyed in these sentences from Ideas: ‘The practical 
understanding of man was intended to blossom and bear fruit in all its varieties: and hence such a 
diversified earth was ordained for so diversified a species’ (VIII.3, C 58 / 6:313); ‘Reason is an 
aggregate of observations and exercises of the soul: it is the sum of the education of the race’ (IX.1, 
Bu 49 / 6:337).  Kant of course holds that reason is no mere ‘aggregate’ but necessarily systematic –
cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A832/B860 and my earlier discussion, pp. 24, 33.
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faculties, but from the finitude of their existence.106  From this, no ‘Averroistic’ 
conclusion should be drawn.
Kant’s urge to respond to Herder was by no means exhausted by the second review.  
He proceeded in his next two publications, ‘On the Definition of the Concept of a 
Human Race’ (also November 1785) and ‘Conjectures on the Beginning of the Human 
History’ (January 1786) to take further issue with Ideas, firstly, its criticism of his racial 
theorizing, and secondly, its interpretation of the Book of Genesis (Ideas X.5-7).  
Indeed, it has been argued by Zammito that the writing of the Critique of Judgment
itself was largely motivated by Kant’s continuing desire to attack Herder.107  Kant 
passed up the opportunity to review the Third Part of Ideas for the Philosophy of the 
History of Humanity, which came out in 1787, wanting instead to concentrate on the 
‘critique of taste’ which would in time become the third Critique.108  One need not 
subscribe, though, to the Zammito thesis in order to hold that Kant still wished to 
maintain the debate with Herder.  For Kant tried quite hard (in the end unsuccessfully) 
to get a colleague and supporter, C. J. Kraus, to deliver a proxy critique of the Third 
Part.109  Herder similarly would not let matters lie, developing over the following years
an ever more comprehensive but by all accounts inept ‘metacritique’ of his former 
teacher’s philosophical system.  However, in the ensuing debate, the issue of historical 
progress, which had been central to the skirmishes of 1785, got largely submerged.  In 
particular, Herder did not bother to react directly to Kant’s second review, as he had 
done to the first (in turn provoking Kant’s ripostes in the second).  Nonetheless, it is 
possible to detect one further move in their argument about progress.  In the final Book 
of Part Three of Ideas, published in 1787, Herder writes as follows:
The end of whatever is not merely a dead instrument must be implicated in itself.  Were we 
created, to strive with eternally vain endeavours after a point of perfection external to ourselves, 
and which we could not reach, as the magnet turns to the north; we might not only pity ourselves 
as blind machines, but the being likewise, that had condemned us to such a state of Tantalism, in 
forming us for the purpose of such a malignant and diabolical spectacle.  Should we say in his 
exculpation, that some good was at least promoted, and our nature preserved in perpetual activity, 
by these empty endeavours, incapable of ever attaining their object; it must be an imperfect, 
ferocious being, that could deserve such an exculpation: for in activity that never attains its end 
can lie no good; and he has weakly or maliciously deceived us, by placing before our eyes such a 
                                                
106 As emphasized in ‘Idea’: ‘every individual man would have to live for a vast length of time if he were 
to learn how to make complete use of all his natural capacities’ (#2, 8:19); regarding ‘the inhabitants 
of other planets … perhaps their position is such that each individual can fulfil his destiny within his 
own lifetime. With us it is different; only the species as a whole can hope for this’ (#6 n., 8:23).
107 Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s ‘Critique of Judgment’.  His approach is heavily criticized by Kuehn 
in a review in Kant–Studien 87 (1996).
108 See Kant’s letter to Schütz, 25th June 1787, 10:490.  This letter implies that Kant had earlier indicated 
his willingness to review the third instalment of Ideas.
109 See Kuehn, Kant, pp. 330-331. 
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dream, from a purpose unworthy of him.  But happily we are taught no such doctrine by the nature 
of things.  (XV.1, C 82 / 6:630-631)
If we are to take it that no generation attains the end, and that all are consigned to move 
along the path of endless progress, then we are being presented with an account of 
human history just as unsatisfactory as in the ‘ruined scaffolding’ passage (quoted on p. 
69).  The unsatisfactoriness has two aspects: on the one hand, such a picture is 
inconsistent with our belief in a provident creator; on the other, it provides a highly 
unattractive template for our own endeavours: we should not try to comport ourselves in 
this way.  To be continually aiming at something which can never be attained is rather 
all too reminiscent of the perverse punishments inflicted in ancient myths.  Herder had 
in fact already suggested this criticism in the 1785 instalment, associating the (Kantian) 
idea of the ‘infinite improvement of mental faculties’ with ‘the Hell of Tantalus, the 
bottomless buckets of the vainly labouring Danaids’ (VIII.5, C 76 / 6:333).  It is not
unreasonable to suppose that its elaboration in 1787 is in part a response to Kant’s 
striking assertion of the infinity of progress at the close of his review of Part Two of 
Ideas.110  
This antipathy to the endlessness of historical progress was subsequently to become a 
pronounced theme in Hegel’s philosophy of history, and it is worth pursuing the issue 
with reference to him.111  We read in Hegel that historical
advance or progression appears to be a process of infinite duration, in keeping with the notion of 
perfectibility – a constant progress which must always remain distant from its goal … [But] 
progress … is not an indeterminate advance ad infinitum, for it has a definite aim – namely that of 
returning upon itself.  (Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 149)  
This vision of a process whereby the spirit realizes its aim in history clashes with a widespread 
attitude concerning the nature of ideals and their relationship to reality.  For no opinion is more 
widely held or more frequently voiced than the lament that ideals cannot be translated into reality 
… But … ideals of reason … have a genuine claim to be satisfied, for their non-fulfilment is 
generally recognized to be an objective injustice.  (Ibid. pp. 65-66)
Hegel’s rejection of the idea of infinite progress is elaborated in the Science of Logic
(1812, 1831) and The Encyclopaedia Logic (1817, 1830).  These texts deal with such 
progress at a general level, so that the endlessness both of historical progress and of the 
progress of the immortal soul toward holiness are addressed.  The latter conception 
features in Kant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul as argued for in the Critique 
                                                
110 It is also worth noting that Herder starts in 1787 to reject the idea that progress is ‘asymptotic’,
picking up the term Kant used in the conclusion of the second review (and which he hadn’t used 
before): cf. Ideas, XV.3, C 103 / 6:654-655.  There are further denials that progress is asymptotic in 
Herder’s Letters for the Advancement of Humanity from the 1790’s - see Werke, vol. 7, pp. 121, 126 
and 802-803. 
111 Michael Forster makes a very strong case regarding Herder’s importance for Hegel throughout 
Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit.
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of Practical Reason.  In what follows I shall stay with Hegel at this more general level 
before considering the way in which the differences between the two types of progress 
have a bearing on the effectiveness of Hegel’s criticism.
Hegel’s charge, like Herder’s, is in essence that the endlessness of progress consigns 
the advancing subject to an infinity of dissatisfaction.  His way of pressing this 
complaint is to castigate ‘progress’ as amounting to what he terms ‘spurious or negative 
infinity’.112  He thus distinguishes between true and spurious infinity, which correspond
to what A. W. Moore terms metaphysical and mathematical infinity.113  The former is a 
self-enclosed perfection, the latter an infinite progression.  In the Science of Logic, the 
two are figuratively represented in the images of the circle and the (endless) straight 
line.114  True infinity ‘consists … in remaining at home with itself in its other, or (when 
it is expressed as a process) in coming to itself in its other’.115 Spurious infinity is, by 
contrast, the endless failure to arrive.  Without the hope of ever ‘coming home’, what 
was the point of setting off?
Hegel’s polemic stresses the tediousness of ‘progressus in infinitum’: for example, 
he mocks Kant and others for finding the (spurious) infinite sublimely terrible: ‘the only 
really terrible thing about it would be the tedium of continually positing a limit which is 
again done away with, so that one stays forever at the same spot’.116 Elsewhere he 
bemoans the ‘perpetual repetition of one and the same content’, the ‘tedious alteration’ 
and ‘wearisome repetition’ involved.117 This is due to the way in which Hegel 
conceives of infinite progression as an uncompletable series of finite steps, in which the 
finite (where the process has got to) is repeatedly ‘negated’ in favour of the next stage, 
which when attained is likewise ‘negated’: ‘a limit is set, it is exceeded, then there is 
another limit, and so on without end’.118 Infinite progression is thus understood on the 
model of the series of natural numbers (e.g. 1 + 1 + 1 +1 and so on) or the succession of 
temporal instants.119
This is clearly an inadequate model for understanding Kantian infinite progress.  
Hegel takes progress to involve continual advance by means of a repeated procedure, 
                                                
112 The Encyclopaedia Logic, §94, p. 149.
113 The Infinite, pp. 1-2.
114 Science of Logic, p. 149.
115 The Encyclopaedia Logic, §94, p. 149.
116 Ibid. §104, p. 166.
117 Science of Logic, pp. 142, 229.
118 The Encyclopaedia Logic, §94, p. 150.
119 ‘E.g., we say, for example, “this time”, “now”, and then we keep continually going beyond this limit’, 
ibid. §94, p. 150.
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whereas Kant thinks of it as essentially goal directed.  (Which is not to say that these 
could not be compatible.)  In Hegel’s characterizations, there is no sense of an ultimate 
end, instead just a re-iterated dynamical sequence.  No wonder, then, that ‘this progress 
is not a real advance but a repetition of one and the same thing’.120 This captures 
perfectly well the endless advance of the natural numbers.  As there is no end-point 
towards which they are leading, of course they do not take us any further.  Hegel is 
right: nothing but tedium could be said to be the outcome.  Another way Hegel 
describes the spurious infinite is as a kind of perpetual ‘flight’ or ‘fleeing’ (Flucht, 
fliehen).121  This suggests that the dynamism of progress is essentially negative, powered 
by a dissatisfaction with the stages that have been reached, rather than a desire to get to 
where the series is leading.  Again, this seems to miss the mark with regard to Kantian 
progress, with its momentum of approximation, not escape.
The appropriate mathematical analogy for Kantian infinite progress, a process aimed 
at and advancing toward a goal which it nevertheless cannot reach, is, as we already 
know, asymptotic approximation, not sequential advance.  In figural terms, this would 
be represented as a curving line approaching a straight line, as Kant himself does in the 
second review, or, in numerical terms, the sequence 1 + ½ + ¼ + ⅛ and so on, that is, 
endlessly inclining towards 2.122  Michael Inwood, from whom I have taken the 
numerical exemplification, claims that Hegel tends not to ‘distinguish between a series 
that tends towards a limit … and one that does not’.123  It is not surprising, then, that 
Hegel’s characterizations of the latter type of series (tedium, flight) are inappropriately 
applied to the Kantian conception.
The terms Hegel should have employed in this respect, instead of ‘tedium’ and 
‘flight’, are ‘frustration’ and ‘pursuit’.  For example, the immortal soul, endlessly 
advancing toward holiness must surely feel frustration in never being able to reach that 
goal; the task is one of continuous pursuit, but with the object always elusive, even as 
the gap is always diminishing.  In general then, for Hegel, an endless process of 
asymptotic approximation, necessarily related to an unattainable goal, can only be 
permanently unsatisfactory.  The curving line of progress strives to meet up with the 
                                                
120 Science of Logic, p. 228.
121 Science of Logic, p. 228, The Encyclopaedia Logic, §94, p. 150.
122 So the ‘spurious’ infinity of progress is always approaching, but never reaching, the ‘true’ infinity of 
perfection.  Cf. A. W. Moore, The Infinite, pp. 86-87.
123 Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, p. 140. 
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straight line of perfection, but never does so.124  It is this sense of the ‘spuriousness’ of 
infinite progress which appears to be in Hegel’s mind in the Lectures on the Philosophy 
of World History (cf. the ‘lament’ that the ‘goal’ or ‘ideal’ can never be fully realized).
However, the pursuit model underpinning this objection is really not appropriate: 
progress is not just a matter of getting ever closer to some ultimately unattainable goal; 
it is, step by step, an actual increase in perfection (perfection here understood in a 
relative sense).  The supposition that endless progress is fruitless or even self-
contradictory because it never gets to the end is surely false.  This is not to say that talk 
of ‘asymptotic approximation’ is therefore out of place: if for instance we take the 
curving line to be defining a volume as well as marking a trajectory, then the 
geometrical figure retains its applicability.
This does not completely dispose of the objection.  Endless progress remains a state 
of permanent dissatisfaction, even if not quite to the complete extent implied by terms 
like ‘pursuit’.  Herder’s earlier version of the criticism registers this: even if some good 
is achieved in the course of progress, the fact that it nonetheless continues to aspire to a 
goal it can never reach means that it must always generate discontent.  But now we 
come to the real difficulty with this line of argument: to whom are we to attribute the 
dissatisfaction?  In so far as we are taking Hegel’s objection to relate to the putative 
endless progress of the immortal soul, the answer is obvious: the individual moral agent.  
If, on the other hand, we are considering it in relation to historical progress, matters are 
less clear.  An unhappily striving subject is only conceivable if we do what both Kant 
and Herder do not, and think of the human species as a supra-individual subject (i.e. as 
with Averroes).  Hegel of course does have a candidate for such a subject in his idea of 
Geist, which we can imagine would find infinite historical progress endlessly 
dissatisfying.  But this does not justify Hegel in supposing that Kantian historical 
progress also involves this negativity.  (Herder is somewhat less culpable, in that he 
evidently does suspect that Kant implicitly relies upon a conception of the species as an 
individual, but, as we have seen, this suspicion is unfounded.)  
The pertinence of Hegel’s objection to Kant’s conception of immortality is borne out 
by the fact that Kant himself is aware of the problem.  This, I would argue, is apparent 
                                                
124 Joseph Addison writing in The Spectator in 1711 used the figure of asymptotic lines: ‘The soul 
considered with its Creator, is like one of those Mathematical Lines that may draw nearer to another 
for all Eternity, without a possibility of touching it: And can there be a Thought so transporting, as to 
consider our selves in these perpetual Approaches to him, who is not only the Standard of Perfection 
but of Happiness!’.  He evidently didn’t find the prospect disturbing.  (The Spectator, ed. Donald F. 
Bond, vol. 1, p. 459.)
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even in the second Critique, but becomes more evident in his subsequent writings.  For 
example, in Religion we read that
According to our mode of estimation, [to us] who are unavoidably restricted to temporal 
conditions in our conceptions … a continuous advance in infinitum [continuirlicher Fortschritt ins 
Unendliche] from a defective good to something better, always appears defective, so that we are 
bound to consider the good as it appears in us … as at each instant inadequate to a holy law.  
(6:67)  
And more clearly still in ‘The End of All Things’:
For the state in which [the immortal individual] now is will always remain an ill compared with a 
better one which he always stands ready to enter; and the representation of an infinite progression 
toward the final end is nevertheless at the same time a prospect on an infinite series of ills which, 
though they may be outweighed by a greater good, do not allow for the possibility of contentment; 
for he can think that only by supposing that the final end will at sometime be attained.  (8:335)
Kant’s attempts to resolve this difficulty by factoring in some kind of divinely induced 
ultimate attainment are complex and fascinating, but need not detain us here.125  
For Kant, the human species is destined to make endless progress.  This necessarily 
involves that there is a goal which can never be attained.  Accordingly, there are in 
effect two ends: the actual end of infinite progress and the nominal end of full 
perfection.  Humanity can achieve the former, but not the latter and yet it is only by 
aspiring to the latter that it can ensure that it remains on track in respect of the former.  
Following Silber, we can term these ends ‘immanent’ and ‘transcendent’ respectively.126  
The clearest indications Kant himself gives of this necessary duality relate (once again) 
to the individual’s moral vocation:
This holiness of will is nevertheless a practical idea, which must necessarily serve as a model to 
which all finite rational beings can only approximate without end and which the pure moral law, 
itself called holy because of this, constantly and rightly holds before our eyes; the utmost that 
finite practical reason can effect [bewirken] is to make sure of this unending progress [Progressus] 
of one's maxims towards this model and of their constancy in continual progress [Fortschreiten], 
that is, virtue….  (5:32-33)
That law of all laws, therefore, like all the moral precepts of the Gospel, presents the moral 
disposition in its complete perfection, in such a way that as an ideal of holiness it is not attainable 
by any creature but yet is the archetype which we should strive to approach and resemble in an 
uninterrupted but endless progress [Progressus].  (5:83)
The criticism is often made that because it is impossible for human beings to achieve 
holiness they cannot be coherently commanded to try to do so.127  Yet it is possible 
                                                
125 For an interesting account (about which I have reservations), see Perovich, ‘“For reason … also has its 
mysteries”: Immortality, Religion, and “The End of All Things” ’.  See also Ward, The Development 
of Kant's View of Ethics, p. 152.  It is worth noting that Kant continues to worry away at the issue of 
immortality well into the 1790’s.  It has become all too common to assume that he either abandoned 
or neglected the earlier doctrine in favour of exclusively mundane conceptions of the human vocation.  
See for example Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion, p. 182 and Michalson, Kant and the Problem of God, 
p. 99.
126 Silber, ‘Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent’.
127 Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 140; Reath, ‘Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant’, 
p. 607; Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness, p. 352.
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(assuming temporal immortality) endlessly to approximate holiness, and so this must be, 
as Kant says, ‘the real object of our will’ (5:122).  This ‘real’ or immanent end has to be 
regulatively determined by the ‘ideal measure’ of the transcendent end.128  In the 
‘asymptotic approximation’ passage from the second review of Herder’s Ideas, the same 
argument is made in respect of historical progress: ‘the philosopher would say that the 
destiny of the human race as a whole is incessant progress, and that its fulfilment is 
merely an idea - but in every respect a very useful idea - of the goal to which, in keeping 
with the intention of providence, we have to direct our endeavours’ (8:65).
I have argued that the Herder-Hegel objection to the infinity of progress relies upon 
the assumption that there is a supra-individual historical subject who can experience 
something of the dissatisfaction they exaggeratedly portray (as is the case with the 
immortal soul).  Kant should therefore have no problem espousing the endlessness of 
historical progress.  It is therefore somewhat puzzling that he is by no means as 
assertoric on this issue as one might have expected.  In particular, the doctrine is barely 
detectable in ‘Idea for a Universal History’.  There and elsewhere we find an apparent 
emphasis on the completability of the historical process.  
Accordingly, every individual man would have to live for a vast length of time if he were to learn 
how to make complete use of all his natural capacities; or if nature has fixed only a short term for 
each man’s life (as is in fact the case), then it will require a perhaps incalculable [unabsehlichen] 
series of generations, each passing on its enlightenment to the next, before the germs implanted by 
nature in our species can be developed to that degree which corresponds to nature’s original 
intention.  And the point in time [Zeitpunkt] at which this degree of development is reached must 
be the goal of man’s aspirations (at least as an idea in his mind), or else his natural capacities 
would necessarily appear by and large to be purposeless and wasted.  (‘Idea’, #2, 8:19, translation 
amended [‘long’ in line three deleted])
Kant twice refrains in this passage from stating that the full development of our rational 
capacities is an endless task.  His motivation for doing so may in part relate to a desire 
to minimize the discrepancies which arise when principles of natural teleology are 
applied to human beings.  These principles lead to the expectation, as with other 
species, that human capacities will be developed completely, with no unrealized excess 
(cf. ‘Idea’, #1, 8:18).  More significant is the claim that the thought of such a 
completion is required if individuals are to be able to reconcile themselves to the 
inevitable discrepancy between their abilities and achievements.   This is more than just 
the thought that fulfilment is the asymptotically approached goal: fulfilment is now 
supposed to be a state we think of as being achieved at some distant Zeitpunkt.  Why 
does Kant say that this is necessary?  My guess is that in identifying with the species, 
                                                
128 Cf. Silber, op. cit. p. 485.
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the individual attributes to it its own concern for the contentment which completion 
brings (cf. ‘End’, 8:335).  To that extent, Herder and Hegel are right: the endless 
progress of the species is, to our imagination, ‘tantalizing’, and consequently we are 
motivated to imagine its consummation.  There are thus two perspectives on the 
progress of the species: the theoretical one, which asserts its endlessness, and the 
subjective one, which imagines its culmination.129
Kant’s most explicit treatment of this issue is in Religion.  Part Three of the work 
deals with the historical development of an ‘ethical community’, or a ‘universal republic 
based on the laws of virtue’ (6:98), or ‘church invisible’ (6:101), i.e. the moral 
counterpart to the juridical community which was the focus of ‘Idea for a Universal 
History’.  This, as we might expect, is a ‘sublime, never fully attainable idea’ (6:100), 
an ‘ultimate perfection’ in relation to which all humanity can achieve is ‘continual 
approximation [continuirliche Annäherung]’ (6:122, 6:131). Kant goes on to discuss 
the Christian expectation of an actual end to the world, with the establishment of the 
Kingdom of God (and not just its endless approximation).  In line with the general 
programme of Religion, he then attempts to give as rational account of this as possible:
As regards its guidance by Providence, the Kingdom of Heaven is finally represented in this 
history [Geschichte] not only as coming nearer, in an approach delayed at times but never entirely 
interrupted, but as being ushered in as well.  Now the Kingdom of Heaven can be interpreted as a 
symbolic representation aimed merely at stimulating greater hope and courage and effort in 
achieving it, if to this narrative there is attached a prophecy … of the consummation of this great 
cosmic revolution, in the image of a visible Kingdom of God on earth … so that the end of the 
world constitutes the conclusion of this story [Geschichte].  (6:134)
A little later, he refers to the ‘representation in a historical narrative of the future world’ 
as ‘a beautiful ideal’, which is what is aimed at in ‘the continuous progress
[Fortscheiten] and approximation toward the highest possible good on earth’ (6:135-
136).  The line of thought in these passages must be that human endeavours to 
approximate an idea of perfection are facilitated by an image of the realization of that 
perfection.  The ‘Kingdom of God on earth’ is thus an ‘ideal’, i.e. a symbolic 
instantiation of an idea of reason.  In contrast to the way in which the ideal of holiness is 
discussed in the second Critique, this new ideal is not presented as always beyond the 
human dimension (though it of course remains beyond human capacity).  Rather, God 
himself is imagined as intervening to bring it about.  The fact that it is a Kingdom of 
                                                
129 Hans Blumenberg has described the manner in which modernity’s anticipation of infinite progress can 
make the idea of a termination attractive (The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, pp. 85-6).  However, he 
sees this as motivating distinct conceptions of historical progress in which there is a definite end to the 
process (his example is Marx).  What I am suggesting is that in Kant this ‘countermove’ takes place 
alongside the idea of endlessness against which it is a reaction.
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God underscores the impossibility of a humanly achieved consummation of historical 
progress and thereby reminds us of the endlessness of our task.
A danger remains in that the invocation of divine agency can serve to curtail the 
sense of what humanity itself is called to do and is capable of doing.  Kant thus has to 
emphasize that all we can ever think that God might do is to provide, as it were, the 
finishing touches to our endeavours:
To found a moral people of God is, therefore, a work whose execution cannot be hoped for from 
human beings but only from God himself.  Yet human beings are not permitted on this account to 
remain idle in the undertaking and let Providence have free rein….  Each must, on the contrary, so 
conduct himself as if everything depended on him.  Only on this condition may we hope that a 
higher wisdom will provide the fulfilment of his well-intentioned effort.  (6:100-101)
In proving itself worthy of having its historical efforts consummated by God, humanity 
endlessly defers this apotheosis.  By contrast, expectations that the end of the world 
(and of history) is imminent are usually castigated by Kant as reflecting a view of 
humanity as depraved and deserving of punishment.  In ‘The End of All Things’, Kant 
addresses the ‘opinion about the corrupt nature of the human race, which corruption is 
great to the point of hopelessness; this makes for an end, and indeed a terrible one, the 
only end (for the greatest part of humanity) that accords with highest wisdom and 
justice….  Hence the omens of the last day … are all of a terrible kind’ (8:331).  If, on 
the other hand, one is more optimistic about the possibility of progress, this will 
‘nourish the hope that the last day might rather come on the scene with Elijah’s 
ascension than with the like descent of Korah’s troops into hell, and bring with it the 
end of all things on earth’ (8:332, translation amended: eher rendered as ‘rather’ instead 
of ‘sooner’).130 (In Religion, Kant even attempts to rescue this kind of apocalyptic belief 
for ‘religion within the boundaries of mere reason’: ‘the announcement of the proximity 
of the end of the world … expresses very well the necessity for us to be ready for it, yet 
(if we ascribe to this symbol its intellectual meaning) in fact always to consider 
ourselves as actually the chosen citizens of a divine (ethical) state’ (6:136).)
The possible (if somewhat problematic) utility of the ideal of a Kingdom of God on 
earth may be conceded.  But why should we take it to be anything other than entirely 
optional?  The suspicion will surely remain that Kant is merely doing the best he can 
with traditional Christian notions.  If one has been brought up believing these sort of 
things, then it makes sense to try to rationalize them as Kant does, but only as a means 
                                                
130 The Religion and Rational Theology version (‘sooner’ for eher) implies that the positive end is more 
likely to be nigh than the negative one, whereas surely Kant means to contrast the expectation of 
imminent catastrophe with the thought of a very distant fulfilment.  In their translations of ‘End’, 
Robert Anchor and Ted Humphrey both use ‘rather’ (On History, p. 75, Perpetual Peace, p. 97).
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of effecting a transition out of religion altogether.131  I have already indicated why such 
a response is inadequate in respect of this particular case.  A representation of an end to 
progress is needed in order to counter the imaginary sense of dissatisfaction engendered 
when individuals identify with the species as a whole, and an end is only thinkable by 
appeal to divine consummation.  Religion suggests a more general rationale for 
representing a conclusion of history.  Our ‘amphibious’ nature as both rational and 
embodied creatures means that we have a need for images and narratives, as well as 
mere thoughts, of the human vocation, ideals as well as ideas.132  It would be mistaken, 
though, to assume that ideas themselves cannot generate affective motivation: Kant 
holds that they can, in the form of the feeling of the sublime.  Accordingly, the 
‘aesthetics of progress’ would be primarily a matter of sublimity, as Kant suggests when 
invoking ‘the sublime, never fully attainable idea of an ethical community’ (6:100, 
underlining added for emphasis).  And yet sublimity by itself is just too strenuous; 
something more harmonious is also needed to complement it, in short, the ‘beautiful 
ideal’ of a consummated progress (6:135, underlining added for emphasis).133
                                                
131 This is Yovel’s approach – cf. Kant and the Philosophy of History, pp. 201-23, especially, pp. 214-5.
132 Guyer has done much in his recent work to emphasize this aspect of Kant’s thought – see for example, 
Kant and the Experience of Freedom, p. 31.
133 Writers on Kant’s philosophy of religion oddly fail to engage with the historical eschatology presented 
in Religion.  Michalson’s otherwise excellent account of the ethical community in Kant and the 
Problem of God (pp. 99-122) is a case in point.  According to Michalson, Kant’s ‘ “kingdom of 
heaven on earth” will be a kingdom designed and produced by our own hands, rather than one 
delivered by the divine hand’ (p. 99).  I hope to have shown that this is a false antithesis.  His apparent 
obliviousness to the issue of completion is symptomatically revealed in the claim that there is ‘a 
certain ambiguity about whether moral perfection will actually be achieved – or only increasingly 
approximated – through immanent human action’ (p. 101, cf. also p. 121).  I think it is obvious that 
there is no such ambiguity.  Anderson-Gold has attempted in Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral 
Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant to argue for the importance of God for the ethical 
community, but only as a sustaining ground and focal figure (pp. 48-52): she too ignores the role that 
the thought of God plays in making it possible to represent a finally perfected ethical community.  
Another recent treatment which I have found unsatisfactory in this regard is Hare, The Moral Gap: 
Kantian Ethics, Human Limits and God’s Assistance.  Hare at least recognizes that ‘Kant has a 
reading of traditional Christian eschatology’ (p. 271) but sees it as only contingently motivated: if 
people do have chiliastic beliefs, then these can be made useful, but are by no means necessary (p. 
273).  Despland, in his Kant on History and Religion, only sees in Religion the account of ‘progressive 
coming to earth of the Kingdom of God’, not its treatment of a final consummation (p. 238).
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Chapter Six: What is ‘disconcerting’ about progress?
We saw in Chapter One that one of Herder’s objections to the idea of progress was that 
it tended to consign earlier generations to the status of mere means, whose value is only 
the contribution they make to the happiness of their successors.  His criticism had two 
components: on the one hand, this picture isn’t true – the lives of earlier generations 
were not as benighted as the progressivists suppose; on the other hand, this picture can’t 
be true – for it imputes to God an injustice which is inconsistent with his providence.  
Kant’s theory of historical progress, first made public ten years after Herder had 
originally aired these and other thoughts on the topic, clearly seemed to his former pupil 
to fall foul of this criticism.  And so, as we saw in Chapter Five, much of Herder’s 
attack on ‘Idea for a Universal History’ amounts to an elaboration of the ‘merely means’ 
objection as he thinks it applies to Kant’s position.  Frustratingly, as I noted, Kant 
adverts to Herder’s criticism but then passes up on the opportunity to respond to it, 
blaming the length constraint his review was subject to.  It may be that he felt he had 
already taken sufficient cognizance of the ‘merely means’ charge, for the work Herder 
was reacting to itself displays an awareness of it.  This comes in the passage at the end 
of the Third Proposition where Kant admits that progress ‘always remains 
disconcerting’ and ‘puzzling’ because of the way it appears to discriminate against 
earlier generations (#3, 8:20).  (Herder has this passage in mind in his assault on the 
Kantian position in Book Eight of Ideas, borrowing its construction imagery.)  We have 
already briefly considered this passage (at the end of Chapter Four), but now I would 
like to examine it in more detail and assess Kant’s apparent confidence that he can 
brush off the Herderian objection.  Along the way, I will address and disagree with the 
ways in which contemporary Kantians tend to deal with the distressing character of 
progress.
Kant outlines in the Third Proposition of ‘Idea for a Universal History’ how 
humanity has to work itself up ‘from the uttermost crudeness [Rohigkeit] to the highest 
degree of skill, to inner perfection in his manner of thought and thence (as far as is 
possible on earth) to happiness’ (#3, 8:20, translation amended).  As the Second 
Proposition has stated, this task is necessarily historical, requiring ‘a perhaps 
incalculable series of generations, each passing its enlightenment onto the next’.  In 
concluding the Third Proposition, Kant then writes: 
What always [immer] remains disconcerting [or ‘strange’: befremdend] about all this is firstly, that 
the earlier generations seem to perform their laborious tasks only for the sake of the later ones, so 
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as to prepare for them a further stage from which they can raise still higher the structure [Bauwerk] 
intended by Nature; and secondly, that only the later generations will in fact have the good fortune 
[Glück] to inhabit the building [Gebäude] on which a whole series of their ancestors (admittedly, 
without any conscious intention) had worked without themselves being able to share in the 
happiness [Glück] they were preparing.  But no matter how puzzling [ratselhaft] this may be, it 
will appear as necessary as it is puzzling if we simply assume that one animal species was intended 
to have reason, and that, as a class of rational beings who are mortal as individuals but immortal as 
a species, it was still meant to develop its capacities completely. (#3, 8:20, translation amended 
[Nisbet omits to translate immer])
Kant therefore recognizes that his universal history depicts what Alexander Herzen 
called ‘chronological unfairness’.134  But exactly what is it that is seemingly unfair?
In general, the complaint that progress is somehow unfair can be put in two main 
ways.  One is to claim that the historical process is unfair to earlier generations; the 
other is to claim that it is unfair to all generations.  It is possible, of course, to run these 
two together: if, as Kant usually asserts, progress is infinite, then every generation will 
be, in time, earlier in relation to others.  Thus the objection that history is unfair to all 
generations can be expressed by reference to its unfairness to earlier ones.  I suspect this 
explains why the two types of criticism are not usually distinguished.  Herder’s 
objection is of the former variety: progress is pernicious because it treats generations 
differently.  It should be obvious from the passage under consideration that Kant is also 
entertaining the former thought: his explicit focus is on the apparent unfair way in 
which history treats earlier generations. Kant resists generalizing the plight of earlier 
generations in the manner just described; ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ do seem to be fixed by 
reference to some kind of event (the completion of the ‘building’).
The idea that earlier generations are disadvantaged can take different forms. One 
approach is to focus on a supposed uneven distribution across time of the burdens 
and/or benefits of the historical process of development.  The more forceful kind of 
complaint, as with Herder, claims this unfairness demonstrates that the earlier 
generations are reduced to the status of mere means, labouring only for the sake of 
benefits they produce for generations down the line.  Kant’s ‘disconcerting’ picture 
seems to present all these objectionable qualities: earlier generations undertake most if 
not all of the effort, yet themselves get no benefit from it; worse, they labour 
unintentionally, as if unwitting slaves to Nature’s plan.
Why does Kant consider that his account of historical progress should have these 
perplexing features?  According to the Third Proposition, they follow directly from the 
claim that human history is the history of the development of human capacities, 
                                                
134 Quoted in Berlin, Russian Thinkers, p. 226.
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whereby an original paucity of instinctual abilities is slowly transcended.  However, this 
simple model of history does not itself entail the ‘disconcerting’ and ‘puzzling’ picture 
Kant provides.  This picture we may summarize as follows: only earlier generations 
labour; they do so unintentionally; they receive no benefit from their labour; but the 
product of their labour builds up, until, at a certain stage, the work is complete and 
successive generations benefit from it without themselves having to contribute.  In this 
model, history appears as a two-stage process, a period of construction, undertaken 
unwittingly, followed by a period of habitation: hardship, then happiness.  Let us call 
this picture A.  Kant simply presents it as if it follows from the more general conception 
of history as a process of working up from crudeness to sophistication.  However, it 
should be evident that it does not.  The idea that history is a developmental process 
suggests a quite different story, in which: all generations labour; they do so 
intentionally;135 and receive benefit from their labour; which at the same time builds up; 
and this process does not terminate.  Let us call this picture B.  On this account, each 
generation would strive to improve its conditions, and would also benefit from its 
efforts (though nowhere near to the same extent as all its successors do).  Consequently, 
‘chronological unfairness’ of a sort remains, as each generation finds itself inheriting a 
higher level of development than its predecessors.  This ‘unfairness’ need only relate to 
the distribution of benefits, as we may assume not only that each age has to continue to 
work, but also to put in the same degree of effort.  The burdens therefore would 
therefore be equally shared, even if the benefits are always skewed in favour of the 
future.  Notice that on this model, the chronological unfairness would be one which 
affected all generations; if the process of working to develop capacities never 
terminates, then the benefits will keep on accumulating, ensuring that each generation 
will be less favoured than those which succeed it.  Picture B is to some extent true of 
Kant’s theory of progress.  For example, Kant endorses what he takes to be Herder’s 
observation that ‘inventors have often to leave it to posterity to reap greater benefits 
than they themselves enjoyed’ (‘Reviews’, 8:61).136
                                                
135 This leaves it ambiguous as to what it is that they intend, i.e. whether they simply intend to work in 
order to get the benefit themselves, with no thought for the future, or whether they are (in however 
vague a way) also labouring with an eye to posterity.
136 Herder’s point in this part of Ideas, IX.3 is in fact rather different: he wishes to highlight two types of 
unintended consequence which follow from inventions: (i) a profusion of inventions undermines 
inventiveness – ‘the easy access to inventions has to some extent blunted the European’s 
inventiveness’ (B 316 / 6:359-360); (ii) inventors cannot control the use their products are put to – ‘It 
was not in your power to determine how the world, how posterity, should apply your inventions … 
The inventor of gunpowder had no inkling of the destruction which the explosion of his black powder 
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Given that Propositions Two and Three seem to imply picture B, readers can be 
inclined to interpret the ‘disconcerting’ passage in ways which rely upon that picture 
and so dilute the force of the passage.  Some contemporary Kantians fall into this trap 
(indeed, the readiness with which they do so suggests that this fall is not altogether 
unmotivated.)  Robert Louden is a case in point: when discussing the passage from the 
Third Proposition, he manages to downplay the strangeness Kant highlights by (a) 
implying that the workers who do the ‘preparatory grunt work’ (i.e. the ‘earlier 
generations’) actively intend their contributions to the construction process (‘they do 
participate in promoting an ideal’ and ‘can experience [this] participation’), and (b) 
suggesting that the construction process never ends, so that in fact all generations must 
contribute to it (‘no individual or group participates fully in this destiny: we can only 
approximate it’).137  Louden therefore in effect attributes picture B to Kant.  On his 
reading, the apparent unfairness of the historical process can only relate to the uneven 
distribution of benefits: progress in the development of human capacities inevitably 
results in later generations benefiting more than earlier ones, simply by virtue of being 
later.  As well as disregarding the problem of the differential allocation of burdens, 
Louden also detracts from the worrying quality Kant finds by in effect demonstrating 
how all generations are in the same situation.  There is then no particular respect in 
which earlier generations are disadvantaged, as later ones also find themselves having to 
contribute to a process which brings about greater benefits for posterity: as Louden says, 
‘Each generation struggles so that future generations will have a better life’.  Notice 
moreover that this is a task generations seem to shoulder willingly – the sense Kant 
conveyed of them being unwitting agents is completely lost, and with it a considerable 
chunk of the ‘strangeness’.
Louden maintains that the remaining chronological unfairness in respect of benefits 
is still ‘disconcerting’ (indeed he has to, if he is to make good his claim to be accounting 
for Kant’s admission that the course of history is disconcerting), but one might well 
think that it is not.  To see this, we can look at how John Rawls addresses the issue in 
section 44 of A Theory of Justice.  Rawls there considers an analogous case of 
chronological unfairness in the context of his ‘savings principle’, whereby ‘each 
                                                                                                                                              
could cause…’ (B 317 / 6:361).  In the second review, Kant tries to charge Herder with contradiction: 
he cannot assert that inventions generate greater benefit for posterity than for their creators and at the 
same time deny that human aptitudes ‘were meant to be developed fully only within the species’ 
(‘Reviews’, 8:61).  But Herder is trying not to assert the first of these statements.
137 Kant’s Impure Ethics, p. 58.
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generation makes a contribution to later generations and receives from its predecessors.  
The first generations may hardly benefit at all, whereas the last, those living when no 
further saving is required, gain the most and give the least’.138  Rawls points out that ‘the 
question of justice does not arise’, even though we may feel that something is awry 
here, as nothing can be done retrospectively to improve the lot of those who came 
earlier: ‘We can do something for posterity, but it can do nothing for us’.139  Rawls 
indeed cites the passage from Kant we are considering to illustrate what he calls the 
‘natural [but] misplaced’ feeling that there is ‘chronological unfairness’ (he uses 
Herzen’s phrase), not noticing that Kant’s picture is much more unsettling than the one 
he presents.
On Rawls’ account, every generation is indebted to its predecessors, but can do 
nothing about this and so should not trouble itself with ‘disconcerting’ thoughts about 
the apparent unfairness of it all.  But his text suggests that to the extent that each 
generation is indebted to its predecessors, it best responds to this by in turn providing 
for its successors.  A kind of reciprocity is thereby established.  Nothing can be done for 
the preceding generations, but something can be done which addresses the justified 
sense of indebtedness, which is to do for future generations what earlier generations did 
for us.  The problem would arise again if there was little or nothing which could be done 
for posterity, i.e. if, in Rawls’ picture, the sum saved was such that it need not be 
increased, or, as in Kant’s picture, the ‘building’ was finished.  (Indeed, Rawls appears 
to suggest that this could be so, as his ‘last’ generations live ‘when no further saving is 
required’, or at least not very much (they ‘give the least’).140  Presumably generations 
living after this point had been reached, when no more saving was required, would still 
have duties in relation to their successors, namely not to deplete the sum saved (in 
Rawls’ terms) or degrade the building (in Kant’s terms), so they would still have to do 
(or rather not do) something.  Yet they would even then not be able to avoid the sense of 
                                                
138 I quote from the first, 1972, edition of A Theory of Justice (here, p. 290).  Section 44 is one of the 
parts of the text which Rawls revised for the second, 1999, edition (‘I revised §44 … trying to make it 
clearer’, p. xiii of the ‘Preface for the Revised Edition’).  His revisions do alter the tenor of his 
discussion and hence the pertinence of my comments on it, and I will note them as relevant in the 
footnotes.  In this instance, the last part of the quotation, the sentence beginning ‘The first 
generations’, is not found in the second edition (p. 254).
139 Ibid. p. 291.  In the second edition, the sentence beginning ‘We can do something’ is omitted (p. 254).  
I discuss this alteration on p. 93, n. 142.  The sentence itself seems to have in mind the words of the 
eighteenth-century Irish parliamentarian, Boyle Roche: ‘why should we put ourselves out of our way 
to do anything for posterity; for what has posterity done for us?’ 
140 But note that this element of the discussion was removed in the second edition of A Theory of Justice
(cf. n. 138 above).  It could well be that this was done in the light of considerations similar to those I 
go on to make in this paragraph.
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living off the achievements of the past.  In other words, chronological unfairness of the 
kind Rawls considers can be discounted not simply because, as he says, the ‘situation is 
unalterable’ but also because the situation is on-going, i.e. that generations continue to 
work for the future as well as for themselves.  If this were not the case, then the 
disquieting sense that earlier generations shouldered an unfair proportion of the burdens 
might well be appropriate, notwithstanding the unalterability of this situation.  Rawls is 
therefore right within the terms of his own argument to fend off the charge that progress 
is somehow problematic, but only to the extent that his account ensures that all 
generations continue to contribute to the process of development and thus share the 
burdens.  (This approach coincides with Louden’s strategy, yet also reveals how this has 
the effect of almost entirely eliminating the appearance of unfairness.)
What is absent from these two writers (and others) is any apparent recognition of the 
factors which go to justify the unsettling picture which Kant draws.141  Two in particular 
should be highlighted.  First of all, I noted earlier the difficulty of reconciling this 
picture with the basic account of the progressive development of humanity outlined in 
Propositions Two and Three: this indeed seems more congruent with the kinds of 
account proffered by Louden et al.  However, when we turn to the fuller story which
emerges over the essay as a whole, we discover, as we have already seen, that what 
characterizes human history (at least so far) for Kant is not so much labour as war, or 
rather, not only labour but also war.  Human individuals are self-seeking antagonistic 
creatures, always wanting to win out and lord it over their fellows.  It is this ‘unsocial 
sociability’ which drives them to work - without it they would be happy to live as 
Arcadian shepherds - but also into conflict with each other.  The primary task human 
beings are confronted with is thus that of constraining their own quarrelsomeness (i.e. 
not overcoming a state of natural scarcity of goods or an inadequate provision of 
instinctual capacities).  Kant thinks that this task has been substantially if imperfectly 
completed at the local (national) level in Europe, but has yet to be seriously engaged 
with on international plane.  Only when global peace has been securely established by 
means of a ‘federation of peoples’ (‘Idea’, #7, 8:24) will humanity be fully able to 
develop its capacities, free from the suffering and wrong-doing which had previously 
been its unavoidable and collateral accompaniments.  It is surely this narrative which 
the Third Proposition’s ‘disconcerting’ picture adverts to.  The building which the 
                                                
141 Included in ‘others’ here is Paul Guyer, who subjects the ‘disconcerting’ passage to a similarly 
distorted interpretation in Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness – cf. pp. 375, 376, 390-393.
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earlier generations are said to construct is not so much a symbol of the general level of 
cultural and technical development of humanity, but instead refers to the ‘universal 
cosmopolitan state’, in which, once initiated, all future generations will reside.  The 
work which members of the earlier generations put into its construction is the selfish 
and aggressive pursuit of their own ends, which in turn makes necessary the 
establishment of social order.
Kant describes the initial establishment of the universal cosmopolitan state as 
marking the half-way point in human development (Proposition Seven).  History thus 
has in this respect two stages: war followed by peace.  The early generations live 
through conflict and distress, slowly learning the hard way the need for and the means 
of constraining ‘unsocial sociability’ in its various aggressive manifestations.  Until this 
process is completed, there is no reason to suppose that there will be any lessening in 
the misery and destruction human antagonism causes; if anything, as this antagonism 
gets played out on an ever larger scale and with more developed resources, things will 
get worse.  Later generations, those whose ‘good fortune [Glück]’ it will be to live as 
citizens of the cosmopolitan federation will thereby benefit from the ‘sad [mournful, 
tragic: traurig] experience’ (Proposition Seven) of humanity up to the half-way point.
This picture is much more distinctly off-putting than the kinds of account proffered 
by Rawls and Louden.  The unfairness is not simply related to a chronological 
accumulation of benefits, but instead to a radical transformation in the circumstances of 
human life.  Later generations do not just have more of something, they have something 
quite different.  (Indeed, Kant in the Eighth Proposition goes so far as to invoke the 
Christian notion of the millennium to characterize the happy future awaiting humanity -
cf. pp. 51-52.)  Moreover, it is impossible to modify this picture so as to dilute its power 
to unsettle.  We saw earlier how Louden achieved such a dilution.  He suggested that 
historical progress need not be thought of as too disconcerting because (a) earlier 
generations can intend to contribute to the benefits accruing to later generations, and (b) 
later generations must themselves continue the construction process, as this is an 
endless task.  It should be clear now that neither of Louden’s moves is possible in 
respect of the ‘from war to peace’ story.  As we are to understand the effort which 
earlier generations put in and which helps bring about global peace as being the 
aggressive pursuit of private ends it would be incoherent to suppose that this could be 
entered into with the aim of promoting the cause of global peace.  The establishment of 
a cosmopolitan state can only be the unintended consequence of such actions.  At the 
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same time, this state is something which can come about: it is not merely an ideal which 
can only ever be approximated, but a possible reality.  Future generations will (we hope) 
have the good fortune to live in ‘this happy time’, not simply get ever closer to it.  They 
will no doubt have to work to maintain and perfect the constitutional arrangements, as 
well as continuing to develop rational capacities, but this work will be of quite a 
different order to the ‘labours’ of their predecessors.
The second factor feeding Kant’s sense that the historical process is perplexing 
which Louden and Rawls fail to register is of course the thought that the painful path of 
progress is what Nature has planned for humanity.  By the end of the Third Proposition, 
Kant has already if anything overemphasized the extent to which the construction of a 
progressivist universal history requires the thought of a teleological designer, so these 
writers are perhaps more culpable of neglecting to address this factor (though their 
tendency to dismiss the invocation of Nature as outdated or dogmatic no doubt explains
why they neglect it).  The idea that Nature is as it were the higher-order agent who uses 
the earlier generations as means is itself present in the ‘disconcerting’ discussion and 
helps explain what is troubling Kant.
In the absence of reference to such a higher-order agent, one who sets the plan 
according to which earlier generations unintentionally labour, it is not possible to 
protest that the idea of progress involves earlier generations serving merely as means for 
the benefits which later generations are to enjoy.  Who else could it be who uses them in 
this manner?  The argument would collapse into absurdity if it were to be alleged that it 
is the later generations themselves who abuse their predecessors.  As Rawls says, 
‘posterity can do nothing for us’; so too, it can do nothing to us.  But this is perhaps a 
little too quick: later generations surely can mistreat those who came before, not in fact, 
but, as it were, in the way in which they construe facts.  That is to say, it is possible for 
the past to be considered only in respect of how it has led to a superior present or even 
more glorious future, in which case it is all too easy for past generations to be viewed 
merely as means.142  This was one of Herder’s main objections to enlightenment 
philosophical history (cf. p. 15).  This tendency, however, should not be taken as 
vitiating the project of universal progressivist history but rather as something which is 
                                                
142 As noted p. 90, n. 139, Rawls removed the sentence ‘posterity can do nothing for us’ in the second 
edition of A Theory of Justice (p. 254).  Indeed, the paragraph in which it was originally placed was 
amended to make it explicit that the one-way flow between generations specifically involved 
‘economic benefits’ (p. 254, emphasis added), rather that the more general ‘exchanges’ which featured 
in the first edition (p. 291).  These changes, we may suppose, were motivated by considerations of the 
sort I have advanced here.
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counteracted both by universal history itself (in the positive story it tells about the 
development of human capacities, which all generations have contributed to) and by 
other forms of historiography, in which past generations can be considered in a more 
empathetic and commemorative manner.  (Kant makes clear at the end of the essay that 
universal history should not supersede what he calls ‘empirical history’, which we may 
take to include these other ways of engaging with past lives.)
There are therefore two key respects in which historical progress is disconcerting.  
Firstly, the process of regulating unsocial sociability will eventually mean that future 
generations will enjoy a world free of war, whereas their predecessors suffered its 
ravages and indeed it is only because of this suffering that progress towards peace is 
made.  Secondly, this process is one we have to think of as having been intended by 
Nature, who then appears to be a malign and arbitrary being.  Herder’s objection thus 
presses Kant at a vulnerable spot.  As we recall, there were two components to the 
criticism, which relate to the two respects just identified: on the one hand, this picture 
isn’t true – the lives of earlier generations were not as benighted as the progressivists 
suppose; on the other hand, this picture can’t be true – for it imputes to God an injustice 
which is inconsistent with his providence.
We have already noted the weakness of the first part of Herder’s case.  In Ideas he 
tries to rebut Kant’s insistence of the prevalence of hostility and aggression between 
human beings by appealing to their innate peaceableness (cf. p. 68).  Kant has good 
grounds for disregarding this kind of wishful thinking.  Herder may be right to highlight 
the extent to which progressivists consider previous cultures with disdain – witness 
‘enlightened’ contempt for the middle ages – but Kant’s claim here is not an instance of 
such ‘presentism’.  Herder’s position is doubly flawed, in that it fails adequately to 
register both the reality of the miseries the human species has brought upon itself and 
the desirability of progress to a better state.  Kant, on the other hand, can appeal to both 
these aspects, the factual and the normative, in support of his universal history.  Its 
plausibility, moreover, derives from the manner in which the two are yoked together: 
the suffering brought about by unsocial sociability itself generates ever greater degrees 
of civil order.  (And to that extent, picture A (p. 88) is misleading: the earlier 
generations do inhabit the building as they construct it.)
The second element of Herder’s objection claims that it contradicts our idea of the 
Creator to think that his plan uses earlier generations as mere means to the advantages 
enjoyed by later ones.  Part of the way in which Kant can deal with this is to insist, 
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against Herder, that the superintending agent to whom we attribute the plan of history is 
Nature, not Providence (or even God).143  Nature is to be distinguished from Providence 
precisely by virtue of its non-moral character: there is then no inconsistency in thinking 
of its plan as involving the mistreatment of earlier generations.  This is no mere ad-hoc 
device designed to get Kant off the hook in this respect, for Nature is characterized this 
way in natural teleology generally.  And yet this move can only block the Herderian 
objection to an extent, for Kant also wants, as we have noted, to see the course of 
human history as justifying Providence, that is, a much more clearly moral and fully 
divine conception of the creator.  As the distinction between Nature and Providence is 
ultimately dissolved in historical teleology, the disturbing quality of progress does seem 
to problematize the notion of Providence in a manner which invites Herder’s criticism.  
A further response which Kant might want to make to Herder is to deny that Nature 
or Providence ever treats earlier generations merely as means.144   Herder’s original 
formulation in This Too a Philosophy of History certainly rests upon this claim (Chapter 
One, p. 15) and it is implicit in the passages from Ideas where he targets Kant (Chapter 
Five, pp. 69-70).  Similarly, recent scholars, such as Galston, who think that ‘we must 
suspect that the mode of operation of history is in Kant’s own terms immoral’,145 do so 
because they take the treatment of earlier generations to infringe the third formula of the 
categorical imperative, the ‘Formula of Humanity’: ‘So act that you use humanity, 
whether in your own person or that of another, always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means’ (Groundwork, 4:429).146  All Kant need do to fend off this particular 
objection is to show that whilst Nature may treat some generations as means, it also 
treats them as ends.  This is straightforward enough: Nature’s plan is first and foremost 
for human beings to develop their own abilities, and this is something all generations 
participate in.  So, in a way, the response to the merely means objection is to point out 
the positive role earlier generations play in raising the species from ‘crudeness to the 
highest degree of skill’; it is their capacities, and not just those of their successors, 
                                                
143 Herder presses his objection with reference to God (cf. p. 15), Providence (cf. p. 69) and Nature (cf. p. 
70), not discriminating between these terms.
144 As noted by Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 389 n. 4.
145 Galston, Kant and the Problem of History, p. 28.
146 Cf. Galston: ‘Morality commands that every man be treated “always as an end and never as a means 
only”…. Yet the notion of the sequence of generations, each labouring for the last, appears to reduce 
men to means with equal thoroughness’ (ibid. p. 230).  Another commentator who makes this point is 
Booth, Interpreting the World: Kant’s Philosophy of History and Politics, p. 123; he is clearer than 
Galston that an agent is needed if this charge is to stick, and accordingly identifies ‘Nature or 
Providence’ as the culprit.
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which are developed.  It is here, therefore, that the developmental narrative suggested 
by Propositions Two and Three, i.e. picture B, is relevant.147  
Even if Nature (or rather Providence) is cleared of the charge of immorality which 
Herder and others have wished to press, we are surely still left with the sense that its 
plan displays considerable partiality towards later generations.  This is less of a problem 
than the one Herder and like-minded commentators allege,148 but is more of a problem 
than the one Louden and Rawls attempt to relay on Kant’s behalf.  As a result, progress 
‘always remains disconcerting’.  I would now like to summarize the reasons Kant has 
for affirming his idea of progress in the face of its troubling character.
Firstly, Kant is committed to the idea of progress as a result of the application of 
principles of natural teleology to the human species.  This is what he emphasizes in the 
Third Proposition itself: ‘no matter how puzzling this may be [i.e. the unsettling course 
of human history], it will appear as necessary as it is puzzling if we simply assume that 
one animal species was intended to have reason, and that, as a class of rational beings 
who are mortal as individuals but immortal as a species, it was still meant to develop its 
capacities completely’ (8:19).  There is thus a theoretical gain.  Secondly, as described 
in Chapter Four, universal history enables the individual to be reconciled with the 
course of history, mortality and humanity itself. It may be ‘puzzling’ that good can 
emerge from wrong-doing and suffering, but it would be much worse if wrong-doing 
and suffering were endlessly to be repeated without such progress.  Thirdly, the 
historical process should become much less problematic once the current state of 
international unsociability starts to become regulated.  This development both will 
enable and should be guided by increasing enlightenment: humanity will therefore begin 
to come together as a collective subject and appropriate the plan of history for itself.  
The unpleasant sense of human beings working unintentionally to Nature’s plan will 
then be dissipated.
                                                
147 Wood claims that ‘the end of developing the predispositions of the human species … (on Kant’s view) 
honours the dignity both of those in whom the capacities are developed and those whose effort and 
suffering serve as means to develop them’ (Kant’s Ethical Thought, p. 390 n. 4).  I fail to see how this 
can be so.  Wood here takes humanity as composed of two groups, one whose members have 
capacities which are enhanced, the other whose members do not, but who apparently strive instead for 
the sake of the first group.  This strikes me as quite inconsistent with the full picture offered in ‘Idea’, 
according to which the developmental process is one in which all individuals share (and benefit from, 
if disproportionately).  Wood here seems merely to reiterate the one-sided conception of historical 
progress which provoked the ‘merely means’ objection in the first place.
148 Beiner and Booth in their ‘Introduction’ to Kant and Political Philosophy describe Kant as displaying
‘revulsion’ in the Third Proposition of ‘Idea’.
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These factors outweigh the unsettling character of historical progress; they do not 
cancel it.  The unease and distress we are likely to feel in thinking of the fate of the 
earlier generations (indeed even our own and future ones) will remain.  Kant would 
urge, in the spirit of ‘authentic theodicy’, that we should not allow these feelings to 
undermine our confidence in Providence (cf. the conclusion to Chapter Four).  An 
obvious way in which they could be neutralized is by belief in an after-life, a continued 
existence in which (amongst other things) individuals could be compensated for the toil 
and suffering undergone in this world.  If this were so, then traditional religious beliefs 
would serve to shore up commitment to progress.  Although Kant never articulates this 
thought, it is one that has occurred to some of his commentators.149  Kant of course does 
provide a critical defence of the Christian belief in a life after death in a heavenly 
kingdom in all three Critiques (if to varying degrees) as well as in texts such as Religion
and ‘The End of All Things’.  It is therefore not implausible to assume that one of its 
functions could be to offset the disquiet we might otherwise feel about the fate of our 
predecessors.
Kant’s universal history is usually taken to exemplify the modern tendency of
secularizing human hopes, focusing them onto this world, not another.  To its advocates, 
this tendency registers the desirability of reconciliation over consolation (cf. p. 60). 
Kant himself adverts to this in ‘Idea’:
what is the use of lauding and holding up for contemplation the glory and wisdom of creation in 
the non-rational sphere of nature, if the history of humanity … is to remain a constant reproach to 
everything else?  Such a spectacle would force us to turn away in revulsion, and, by making us 
despair of ever finding any completed rational aim behind it, would reduce us to hoping for it only 
in some other world.  (#9, 8:30)
Philosophical history is recommended to us as a way of avoiding a despairing resort to 
other-worldly consolation.  This passage conveys Kant’s sense of the unsatisfactoriness 
of the appeal to heavenly compensation.  Yet what he objects to is the exclusive
recourse to this device – ‘hoping for it only in some other world’ (underlining added for 
emphasis).  This then allows for the possibility that such religious expectations could 
complement our mundane historical ones and even compensate for that which ‘always 
remains disconcerting’ about human history.
It may be conceded that practical faith in an after-life may help assuage the distress 
occasioned by the thought of those whom progress has left behind, but denied that it is 
in any sense mandatory.  If one already has such beliefs, then they are useful in this 
                                                
149 For example, see Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 385, Van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and Socialism, 
p. 131 and Reath, ‘Two conceptions of the highest good in Kant’, p. 603.
What is ‘disconcerting’ about progress? 98
regard, but this utility is not itself a reason for holding them in the first place.  The 
possible complementarity of philosophical history and traditional religious beliefs does 
not detract from their essential independence from one another.  (This response is 
similar to one we considered at the end of the previous chapter.)
This approach can try to treat the question of the perplexing character of progress in 
either of two ways.  On the one hand, it could simply note it and move on: the fate of 
earlier generations is not taken to be a problem to be addressed.  This clearly won’t do.  
Universal history is more than a merely theoretical construction, which we are to treat 
neutrally.  In engaging our hopes for the future, it must also provoke disquiet about the 
past.  We can’t have one without the other.  Consequently, the non-religious approach 
has also to recognize that there is a problem and then develop a response to it.
This task is typically undertaken by appeal to commemorative historiography, whose 
potential role in complementing universal history I have already referred to (pp. 95-6).  
Commemorative history is charged with promoting what has been called ‘anamnetic 
solidarity’.150  Remembering the fate of past generations is supposed to reinforce our 
commitment to assist in the process of overcoming the causes of suffering.  ‘The finality 
of human suffering does not weaken the resolve to seek a just society, but strengthens it; 
the very fact that this suffering cannot be redeemed makes it so much the more urgent to 
seek a society without suffering caused by social conflict.’151  However, as Harry van 
der Linden admits, it may not always work this way: the remembrance of past injustice 
and pain has the capacity ‘to overwhelm us’ and inhibit action in the present.  His 
solution is to recommend that when this occurs we should ‘turn our back’ on the past: 
‘forgetting’ must trump remembrance.152
Kant would agree, I think, that anamnetic solidarity will tend to be disabling – that is 
why we might think of its full achievement as being a job for God, not for us.  He would 
be skeptical about van der Linden’s proposed alternative.  Do we have the ability simply 
to block out those features of the human condition which might otherwise lead to 
feelings of hopelessness?  The discussion of ‘the righteous man’ in the Critique of 
Judgment suggests that we do not (§87, 5:452-453).  For Kant, mere strength of will is 
never enough.  Van der Linden’s strategy of active forgetting looks very similar to the 
righteous man’s attempt to ignore the reality of evil and death and, we may presume, is 
                                                
150 Cf. Habermas, ‘A reply to my critics’, pp. 246-247 and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 
14-16.
151 Van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and Socialism, p. 131.
152 Ibid. p. 132.
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no more likely to succeed.   There is reason, then, for thinking that the secular response 
is inadequate.  We can neither adequately commemorate nor effectively forget past 
suffering.  A religious response starts to look more than merely optional.153
                                                
153 The idea of ‘anamnetic solidarity’ derives in large part from Walter Benjamin.  ‘At any given time, the 
living see themselves in the midday of history.  They are obliged to prepare a banquet for the past.  
The historian is the herald who invites the dead to the table.’ (The Arcades Project, p. 481 [N15,2]).  
Yet Benjamin would not have wanted this to be understood in an exclusively secular manner.  In a 
related note he quotes from and then comments on a letter from Max Horkheimer as follows: ‘On the 
question of the incompleteness of history, Horkheimer’s letter of March 16, 1937: “… Past injustice 
has occurred and is completed.  The slain really are slain…  If one takes the lack of closure entirely 
seriously, one must believe in the Last Judgment…” … What science has determined, remembrance 
can modify … in remembrance we have an experience that forbids us to conceive of history as 
fundamentally atheological, little as it may be granted to us to try to write it with theological concepts’ 
(Ibid. p. 471 [N8,1] underlining and ellipses added for emphasis).  The experience may be religiously 
infused even if the practice of writing is not.  The invocation of the divine on the one hand and secular 
historiography on the other therefore need not be construed as ‘two alternative paths’, as Axel 
Honneth claims they are (‘A Communicative Disclosure of the Past: On the Relation between 
Anthropology and Philosophy of History in Walter Benjamin’, p. 91).  Benjamin was much influenced 
in this line of thinking by Hermann Lotze, from whose critique of the idea of progress in Microcosmus
(1864) he made many excerpts for The Arcades Project (esp. The Arcades Project, pp. 478-481).  
Pursuing a theme now familiar to us, Lotze urged the rejection of ‘the thought that the work of 
vanishing generations should go on for ever only benefiting those who come later, and being 
irreparably wasted for the workers themselves’ (Microcosmus, vol. 2, p. 173, excerpted by Benjamin, 
op. cit. p. 480 [N13a,3]).  Instead, we should hold to the ‘presentiment that we shall not be lost to the 
future, that those who were before us though they have passed away from the sphere of earthly reality 
have not passed away from reality altogether, and that in some mysterious way the progress of history 
affects them too’ (Microcosmus, vol. 2, pp. 173-174, from ‘in some mysterious way’ excerpted by 
Benjamin, op. cit. p. 480 [N13a,3]).  ‘[I]t is only by presupposing the truth of this belief that modern 
views can free themselves from the internal contradictions in which we found them involved’ 
(Microcosmus, vol. 2, p. 175; not excerpted by Benjamin).  Lotze in turn was evidently influenced by 
Herder, indeed going so far as to claim that Microcosmus was an attempt at a ‘repetition of the 
undertaking which we have so brilliant example in Herder’s Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit’ 
(vol. 1, p. xvi).
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Chapter Seven: ‘Theory and Practice’
In his 1793 essay ‘On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is 
Of No Use in Practice’, Kant defends the practicality of ‘moral’ theory – which states 
how things ought to be – in response to those critics who assert that ‘what sounds good 
in theory has no validity in practice’ (8:276).154  The essay ostensibly engages with three 
such thinkers, Garve, Hobbes and Mendelssohn, each of whom is presented as skeptical 
about prescriptive theories in relation to, respectively, ‘morals generally [Moral 
überhaupt]’, Staatsrecht and Völkerrecht.155  In fact, as Kant makes clear, Garve’s 
objections are focused on the practicality of the ‘doctrine of virtue’, which, in the 
typology Kant was developing in the 1790s, forms part of ‘morals’, along with the 
‘doctrine of right’, which in turn includes Staatsrecht and Völkerrecht.
MORALS
doctrine of virtue doctrine of right
      individual national     international 
what I ought to do how states ought to be organized how they ought to interact
The essay, we are told in the Introduction, will address each of these areas in turn, the 
doctrine of virtue in Part One, national right in Part Two and international right in Part 
Three.  However, Part Three deals for the most part with the issue of historical progress.  
This (and other considerations)156 can lead the reader to view the whole essay as a 
portmanteau collection, each of whose parts is best considered in relative independence 
from the rest.157  This would be a mistake, particularly from our point of view.   The idea 
of progress, which is the focus of Part Three, relates to the ‘theory and practice’ debate 
as a whole and is a fitting theme on which to conclude that debate. To see how this is 
so, I shall reconstruct, in rather schematic form, the debate between the anti-theorists 
and Kant.
                                                
154 These senses of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ do not line up with Kant’s distinction between theoretical and 
practical reason.  If anything, they are related inversely: ‘theory’ is practical reason, and ‘practice’ is 
the domain disclosed by the facts provided by theoretical reason – ‘the nature of things’ (8:313).  
(Indeed, for Kant, one could say that practice is more theoretical than theory, and vice-versa – cf. 
Critique of Judgment, 5:173.)  
155 Part Two is ostensibly directed against Hobbes, but in fact the targets are Burke, Gentz, Rehburg and 
others, all of whom had in the early 1790’s criticized the French revolution and republicanism 
generally (see the editorial comments in Practical Philosophy, pp. 275-276, and Henrich, ‘On the 
meaning of rational action in the state’).
156 Such as the fact that Kant had originally planned to publish what became the first part (written in 
response to Garve’s 1792 criticisms) separately (see Kant’s letter to Biester, 30th July 1792, 11:350).
157 As is indeed true of The Conflict of the Faculties, which will be examined in the next chapter.
‘Theory and Practice’ 101
The anti-theoretical appeal to ‘practice’ is in large part an appeal to history.  For 
Burke et al, it is obvious that the record of the past demonstrates the inapplicability of 
high-flown theoretical prescriptions.  Moral considerations should therefore be tailored 
to fit practical, historical realities rather than abstracting from or ignoring them.  This
line of argument takes two forms.  The weaker form focuses on the inapplicability of 
new-fangled ideas, which it will dismiss as utopian whilst admitting that they ‘sound 
good in theory’.  The stronger form denies even this: in appealing to the past it looks not 
just for empirical constraints on what can be achieved but also normative orientation.  
The proposals of republicans and others are accordingly held not even to be ‘good in 
theory’.   The situation is further complicated in that the two forms of appeal to the past 
are in principle independent of each other.  It is quite possible for someone to argue that 
the undesirability of ‘theory’ does not mean that it is unfeasible: with enough effort, its 
prescriptions could perhaps be put into effect.  Conversely, an anti-theorist could hold 
that theory is both undesirable and unfeasible.  There are thus three distinct positions 
which the anti-theorist can adopt: ‘theory’ is (i) unfeasible; (ii) undesirable; (iii) 
unfeasible and undesirable.  Only to the first of these can the ‘saying’ ‘it sounds good in 
theory, but…’ properly be attributed.  And yet those who hold the third position may 
also (if disingenuously) adopt the saying in order to put their case in two stages: ‘that 
may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice; and in any case, it isn’t even 
correct in theory’.
Kant’s explicit focus on those who assert that ‘what sounds good in theory has no 
validity in practice’ means that his primary concern is the issue of practicality.  His 
response to the anti-theorists’ historically based skepticism on this point can be 
supposed to come in two parts, the first looking at it in relation to ‘practice’, the second, 
‘theory’.  In relation to ‘practice’, Kant does not challenge the account of the past 
presented by the anti-theoreticians; indeed, he largely accepts it (or rather his own 
version of it).  His objections are rather to the inferences they make from it.  The anti-
theoreticians overstate their conclusions in two respects: they argue from the fact that 
something didn’t happen to the claims that (i) it could not have happened; and (ii) it 
could not happen.  The past could only have been the way it was, and the future can 
only be the same.  Kant will argue that in both instances an assertion of necessity is 
being made which empirical evidence can never justify.  In relation to ‘theory’, Kant 
argues that it states how one ought to act, and from this necessity the possibility of the 
action follows.  How I or others have acted in the past is irrelevant.  (This is as close as 
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he gets to dealing with the issue of ‘desirability’: normative orientation cannot be taken 
from historical facts.)
Kant’s first argument thus tells us that historical experience can give us no good 
reason for denying that moral principles are applicable; his second argument urges that 
the force of these principles itself gives us good reason for thinking that they are 
applicable.  Accordingly, the appeal to history made by the anti-theorists does not 
disconcert Kant.  Indeed, he frequently emphasizes the extent of his agreement with the 
facts they adduce.  For example, in Part One, we find reference to ‘the history of 
maxims’ (8:287) and ‘historical experience’ (8:288), which indeed display that what 
ought to have happened in fact rarely did: ‘experience proves, regrettably, that maxims 
for the most part flow from the latter principle (of selfishness)’ and not from moral 
principles (8:287).  Similarly, in Part Two, Kant is willing to admit that the ‘original 
contract’ presupposed by political right is one which ‘history’ does not show to have 
ever been entered into by anyone (8:297).  (Of course, it remains for him to explain why 
history has this character: see p. 105 below.)
The anti-theorists’ response to this line of argument then goes like this: to the extent 
that the ‘theorists’ recognize, as we have just seen with Kant, the gulf between the way 
things have been and the way (on their account) they ought to be, they will advocate 
abrupt historical transformation as the only way to overcome this.  Theory thus has a 
necessary affinity with revolution, this being the means by which it envisages its own 
realization, and revolution is obviously pernicious.
The anti-theoretical opposition to revolution takes two basic forms, depending on 
whether the appeal to the past is used to argue for the unfeasibility or the undesirability 
of theory (bearing in mind that it could be used to argue for both).  If it is asserted that 
theory simply can’t work, then any revolutionary endeavour will be assumed inevitably 
to fail, following which the temporarily interrupted historical practices and institutions 
will revive.  If, on the other hand, it is supposed that theory could be successfully 
implemented, then revolution is feared precisely because it will eliminate traditional 
practices and values.  In both cases, the critics will focus on the immorality of 
revolution, but in the first case its futility will also be stressed, whereas in the second the 
disastrous likelihood of its success will be emphasized.
‘Theory and Practice’ is one of the many texts in which Kant comes out strongly 
against any alleged right of revolution and so it is straightforward for him to deny that 
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his conception of theory is tainted with revolutionary tendencies.158  It would be a 
mistake, though, to assume that this is all he has to say here.  The issue for Kant is not 
just the immorality of acts of revolution, but also the impossibility of revolutionary 
transformation.  That is, he contests the very equation of theory and revolution which 
the anti-theorists find so intuitive.  They assume that the historical disparity between 
theory and practice means that the two can be conjoined only by means of a radical 
rupture at a point in time – revolution.  Kant, by contrast, takes the same disparity to be 
such that it can only be overcome by means of an endless approximation over all time.159
Kant’s response to the anti-theorists therefore comes down to the assertion of the 
possibility of progress in the implementation of moral principles, both at the individual 
and social levels.  His defence of theory attempts to take the wind out of the sails of its 
critics by showing that much of what they point out is in fact compatible with it.  Thus 
Kant can agree with Burke et al regarding ‘historical experience’ and the moral 
indefensibility of the French Revolution.  More importantly still, he concurs with them 
in respect of the necessary unfeasibility of theoretical principles as such, though for 
Kant this relates only to their absolute practicality. To that extent, theory can never be 
absolutely realized, but only progressively implemented.  In contrast to the critics’ 
fixation on the weight of the past, Kant adverts to the openness and endlessness of the 
future.
Although Kant does not make it explicit, the role of progress in mediating between 
morality and reality is detectable in Parts One and Two of ‘Theory and Practice’.  In 
respect of the doctrine of virtue, he writes: 
Perhaps no-one has ever performed quite unselfishly (without admixture of other incentives) the 
duty he cognizes and also reveres; perhaps no one will ever succeed in doing so, however hard he 
tries.  But … he can become aware of a maxim of striving for such purity; that he is capable of, 
and that is also sufficient for his observance of duty. (8:284-285, underlining added for emphasis)
                                                
158 Indeed, the irony is that most of the opponents of ‘theory’ are by no means as absolute as Kant is in 
rejecting any supposed right of revolution.  There are two reasons for this.  First of all, revolutions (of 
a certain sort) have taken place in the past, and are part of the tradition the anti-theorists frequently 
appeal to.  Secondly, and most importantly, the kind of revolution they approve of are partial and/or 
restorative (this being the original sense of revolution – even the restoration of the British monarchy in 
1660 was called a revolution).  So when the anti-theorists anathematize revolution, it is revolution of a 
total, transformative or utopian character that they have in mind, in other words the more modern 
sense of the term.
159 Practice is thus a matter of progressive reformation.  This does not mean that there is no place for 
revolution.  In Religion, published earlier in 1793, Kant argues that becoming morally good requires 
‘a revolution in the disposition of the human being’.  But this is a ‘revolution in the mode of thought’, 
which can only be implemented by ‘a gradual reformation in the mode of sense’ (6:47), i.e. ‘constant 
progress’ (6:48).  ‘Theory’ therefore is revolutionary, but only at its own level.
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As noted above, Part Two emphasizes that the ‘original contract’ cannot be ‘proved 
from history’.  Kant’s response to this is to argue that this does not in any way vitiate its 
practical possibility, given that it is mandated by reason.  At the same time, though, he 
does not go on to say that the ‘original contract’ could be entered into by anyone; rather, 
‘as a fact it is indeed not possible … [but] is instead only an idea of reason’ (8:297).  As 
such, it is something that can only be progressively approximated.
The central role accorded to progress is already touched upon in the Introduction to 
‘Theory and Practice’:
But in a theory that is based on the concept of duty, concern about the empty ideality of this 
concept quite disappears.  For it would not be a duty to aim at a certain effect of our will if this 
effect were not also possible in experience (whether it be thought as completed or as always 
approaching completion); and it is theory of this kind only that is at issue in this present treatise.  
(8:276-277, underlining added for emphasis) 
Kant does not deal explicitly with the idea of progress in the first two parts of the essay 
because the task of doing so is being left to the third.  This in turn is to be explained by 
the fact that whilst progress is his answer to much of what is urged by the opponents of 
theory, it is also one of the objects of their antipathy.  Progress may be part of the 
solution, but it is also part of the problem.
For Kant, the rift between theory and practice can be overcome (endlessly) by 
progress.  However, this proposal is not going to find favour with the anti-theorists, for 
much the same reasons as we have already seen.  The historical past, once again, will be 
invoked to demonstrate either the impossibility of progress, or its undesirability, or 
both.
As Kant has chosen to debate with those who concede (whether genuinely or for the 
sake of argument) that things ‘sound good in theory’, it is the first of these objections 
that he is primarily concerned with.  The arguments advanced earlier suggest the line he 
will adopt now: nothing the anti-theorists can adduce about the past can rule out the 
possibility of progress.  But this response is much less effective than it was before.  As 
progress is supposed to be a general historical dynamic, its apparent absence in the past 
matters more than the absence of a particular kind of event whose possibility we might 
wish to assert.  Utopian revolutionaries at least have this advantage, namely that their 
preferred means of realization involves a radical break with the course of history, and is 
less vulnerable to this kind of empirical skepticism.160 Evidently more is required if 
                                                
160 For example, Walter Benjamin: ‘Marx says that revolutions are the locomotive of world history.  But 
perhaps it is quite otherwise.  Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the passengers on this train –
namely the human race – to activate the emergency brake.’ (Selected Writings, vol. 4, p. 402).
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Kant is to provide a satisfactory response to the anti-theorists, and it is to this task that 
he turns in the third and final part of ‘Theory and Practice’.
Before we look at Part Three itself, it is worth noting that Kant does make some 
suggestive moves in Parts One and Two which do go at least a little way to countering 
the anti-theorists on this issue.  In particular, he provides a partial explanation of why 
the past displays little in the way of the implementation of theory and offers some 
indication that things are and will be different:
That historical experience up to now [Geschichtserfahrung bisher noch] has still not proved the 
success of the doctrine of virtue may well be the fault of just the false presupposition that the 
incentive derived from the idea of duty in itself is much too fine for the common concept, whereas 
the coarser incentive drawn from certain advantages to be expected, in this world or even in a 
future one, from compliance with the law (without regard for the law itself as the incentive) would 
work more powerfully on the mind, and that up to now [bisher] it has been made a principle of 
education and homiletics to give preference to the aspiration for happiness over that which reason 
makes the supreme condition of this, namely worthiness to be happy.  (8:288, underlining added 
for emphasis)
Kant alleges that it is the very presumption against ‘theory’ which has contributed to its 
failure, in other words that bad theory has helped to produce the actuality it claims to be 
merely pointing out.  However, the very fact that it now has to attack theory indicates 
that the latter has now attained a degree of explicitness which in turn bodes well for the 
future.  It should now be possible to reform ‘principles of education and homiletics’ in 
accordance with the purified principles of morality.  If this were to take place (Kant’s 
reference to ‘progress in religious insight’ (8:305) implies that it is now underway), 
‘human morality would soon be better off’ (8:288).  Progress in theory will facilitate 
progress toward that which theory prescribes.161
Part Three of ‘Theory and Practice’ is a particularly complicated Kantian text.  It deals, 
as the rubric of the essay states, with ‘theory’, but in a more complex way than the two 
preceding parts did.  In both Parts One and Two, the identity of the theory under 
examination was clear – in the first, Kant’s own doctrine of virtue, in the second, the 
doctrine of right as it applies to the state (republicanism).  We would accordingly expect 
the third part to address the doctrine of right at the global level, and indeed this is what 
Kant tells us in the Introduction (8:277-278).  However, issues of international right 
only come to the fore toward the end of Part Three, and the relevant ‘theory’ (the plan 
for perpetual peace proposed by Saint-Pierre and re-packaged by Rousseau) and its 
opponents (‘great statesmen’ and ‘heads of state’) are only introduced in the penultimate 
                                                
161 In a related manner, Kant accounts at the end of Part Two for the prevalence of ‘anti-theoretical’ 
political theory and its constricting effects (8:305-306).
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paragraph (¶10, 8:312-313).162  Up to then, the focus is on theory of another kind, 
namely the theory of progress.  As I have been arguing, this is what we should have 
come to expect, for the whole ‘theory and practice’ debate ends up turning on this very 
issue.  Matters are complicated still further by the fact that theory relates to progress in 
two ways: first of all, there are general hypotheses about the course of history as a 
whole (‘theoretical’ in a general, non-moral sense); secondly, there is the duty to make 
progress (which is ‘theoretical’ in the sense of the essay’s theme).163
After some preliminary paragraphs dealing with Mendelssohn, which I shall return to 
later, Kant gets going properly in the fourth paragraph (8:308-309).  He claims there 
that all human beings have an ‘innate duty … so as to influence posterity that it 
becomes always better’ (¶4, 8:309) and in this way to contribute to the progress of 
humanity.  Kant then makes his familiar argument against the anti-theorists:
It does not matter how many doubts may be raised against my hopes from history, which, if they 
were proved, could move me to desist from a task so apparently futile; as long as these doubts 
cannot be made certain I cannot exchange the duty (as something liquidum) for the rule of 
prudence not to attempt the impracticable (as something illiquidum, since it is merely 
hypothetical)…. (¶4, 8:309)
‘Historical experience’ is not only unable to dissuade me from attempting to do my 
duty; it is also unable to prevent me from hoping that things will improve.  The agent 
should have confidence that her own actions will be efficacious and also that other 
agents will contribute as well.  Kant invokes Mendelssohn at this point: the latter’s 
efforts on behalf of the ‘enlightenment and welfare of [his] nation’ must have involved 
the presupposition that others would also participate: ‘For he could not reasonably hope 
to bring this [enlightenment and welfare] about all by himself, without others after him 
continuing along the same path’ (¶5, 8:309).  This connection between my action and 
that of others is built into the very manner in which Kant construes the ‘innate duty’: 
one should promote progress ‘in such a way that this duty may be legitimately handed 
down from one member [in the series of] generations to another’ (¶4, 8:309).  My 
actions should aim to help inculcate the progressive outlook in others.  In contrast, 
therefore, to Lessing’s ‘divine education of the human race’ (¶2, 8:308, underlining 
added for emphasis), Kant emphasizes that progress depends (at least in part, as we shall 
                                                
162 References to the Third Part of ‘Theory and Practice’ throughout the rest of this chapter will also give 
the paragraph number, as here.
163 The title of Part Three invokes ‘the cosmopolitan point of view’ (8:307), and this already conveys 
some of the breadth of scope of the text, as ‘cosmopolitan’, in Kant’s hands, can refer either to matters 
of international right or the outlook of the progressively minded ‘world citizen’ (cf. Flikschuh, Kant 
and Modern Political Philosophy, pp. 184-188).  Both senses are involved here.
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see) ‘on the education we give the younger generation’ (¶6, 8:310, underlining added 
for emphasis).
The ‘hope for better times’ and ‘prospect that matters could become better in the 
future’ (¶5, 8:309) thus follow inevitably from reflection on the demands of duty.  Yet 
this does still seem to be an exiguous basis for a belief in progress.  For one thing, it 
only relates to the future: that there ought to be progress can only support belief in 
progress yet to come.  Kant is right to stress that ‘doubts raised from history’ cannot 
completely destroy such hope, but they can certainly seriously weaken it, especially for 
those of us who are not particularly heroic in our optimism.  This is where the 
opponents of theory will press their case: if there hasn’t been progress so far, why 
should we believe that the future will be different?  The strength of Kant’s position is its 
invulnerability to their inductivist skepticism, but this is, as it stands, also its weakness, 
in that it appears to concede the truth of their construal of the past.  
If historical progress is supposed to bridge the gap between theory and practice, 
between morality and reality, more is needed to convince us that this is a plausible 
prospect.  In particular, more is required in order to counter the skepticism of the anti-
theorists.  Kant therefore goes on to provide a number of supplementary arguments in 
defence of the claim that ‘empirical arguments against the success of these resolutions 
accomplish nothing here’ (¶5, 8:309).  In the first instance, he appeals to technical 
advances, such as the advent of hot-air ballooning.  Empirical, ‘historical’ arguments 
would have suggested that these too were impossible, simply because they had not been 
achieved in the past.  Kant’s analogy is flawed: yes, the particular feat concerned is no 
doubt novel, but the record of similar endeavours in the past does give us confidence 
that it could succeed.  Technical progress is a fact. 
Moving briskly on, Kant then refers to ‘a good deal of evidence … that in our age … 
the human race has made moral progress’ (¶5, 8:310).164  If progress were genuinely 
underway now, then our ‘hope for better times’ would certainly have more support.165  
The only evidence which is presented is, ironically, the prevalence of complaints about 
contemporary depravity.  Kant argues that the increased pitch of these complaints 
demonstrates not that human beings have got worse but that the standards used to 
                                                
164 Similarly in ‘The End of All Things’, published the following year, we read of ‘the experimental proof 
[Erfahrungsbeweisen, or ‘experiential evidence’] of the superior morals of our age as compared with 
all previous ones’ (8:332).
165 This line of argument is, as we shall see in the next chapter, developed in The Conflict of the 
Faculties.
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evaluate them have become more stringent.  The ‘moral progress’ he has in mind here is 
therefore progress in theory, i.e. enlightenment (cf. p. 105 above).   The purification of 
moral principles stands in two relations to historical progress: it is itself progress (if 
only essentially at the level of theory) and so gives us confidence that progress is 
possible; it means moreover that one ‘sees farther ahead’ (¶5, 8:310, underlining added 
for emphasis), i.e. one can start to envisage properly the progressive historical project of 
putting theory into practice.
As if this assertion of progress in the present were not striking enough, Kant 
concludes the paragraph by attempting to generalize it: ‘our self-reproach becomes all 
the more severe the more levels of morality we have already climbed during the whole 
course of the world that we have become acquainted with’ (¶5, 8:310).  This claim is 
puzzling: if past progress, ascending through ‘levels of morality’, was so 
straightforwardly assertable, why was this not done much earlier in the discussion?  
What in any case is the evidence for this, particularly if we are meant to take it that the 
present age outstrips all others in progressive dynamism?  The best way, I think, to read 
this sentence is less as an unjustified extension of the preceding argument and more as 
an anticipation of and transition to the next one.  For Kant immediately proceeds to 
open up a very different response to the anti-theorists, one moreover which is explicitly 
designed both to co-opt and to counter their non-progressive account of the past: 
If we now ask by what means this unending progress toward the better can be maintained and even 
accelerated, it is soon seen that this immeasurably distant success will depend not so much upon 
what we do … but instead upon what human nature will do in and with us to force us onto a track 
we would not readily take of our own accord. (¶6, 8:310) 
In a manner familiar to us from ‘Idea for a Universal History’, Kant goes on to explain 
how ‘human nature’, in particular the desire for power and status, generates a 
Hobbesian war of all against all, first of all at the individual level, resolved (or at least 
controlled) by the prudentially motivated agreement to submit to the ‘coercion of public 
law’ and then also at the level of states themselves.  Progress in respect of Recht has 
therefore been achieved in the past and is likely to continue similarly in the future 
because of human aggressiveness and selfishness.
Kant’s argument here is a brilliant rejoinder to the anti-theorists.  Instead of 
continuing, as they would like and expect, merely to emphasize ‘hope’ and ‘possibility’, 
he takes them on at their own game.  Kant accepts their jaundiced (in his eyes) view of 
human beings as mainly self-interested and short-sighted.166  He also adopts their 
                                                
166 Cf. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism, pp. 42-44.
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inductive method, extrapolating from past patterns into the future.  Putting the two 
together produces an account which does demonstrate humanity’s historical advance 
through ‘levels of morality’, even if this advance is not itself morally motivated.
This account enables Kant to broach the ostensible theme of this part of the essay, 
namely the ‘theory’ of cosmopolitan right, as represented by the plans of the Abbé de 
Saint-Pierre (and soon Kant himself – Perpetual Peace was to be published two year 
later).  International relations are in such a parlous state and military capacities so 
advanced that more war, and ever more costly war (in all senses), is inevitable.  This, it 
can be envisaged, will force states to enter into the slow process of regulating their 
relations by law and establishing lasting peace treaties.  An important element in this 
process will be played by continuing progress at the level of Staatsrecht: the increasing 
financial costs of war (brought about by technical progress) will oblige states to govern 
in a more republican manner, in order to obtain consent for taxes.  Yet the people will 
be reluctant to agree to these, and will slowly be able to constrain the rulers’ ability to 
wage war.  (The populace will also be motivated by the fact that it, not its rulers, bears 
the brunt of the other costs of war.)
The ‘natural’ mechanism described in Part Three thus undergirds the historical 
practicality of the principles of right at both the national and international levels and so 
directly relates to the concerns of Part Two as well.167  Kant holds back on introducing it 
until the end of the essay, partly as its future role relates more particularly to the 
international level and partly as it serves more generally to rebut anti-theoretical 
skepticism about progress.  Kant is careful not to overstate the doctrine: he calls it a 
‘mere hypothesis’ (¶9, 8:311), which in turn connects back to the type of ‘hypotheses’ 
and (epistemic) ‘theories’ about historical progress that Mendelssohn is reported as 
objecting to (¶2, 8:308).  
Kant’s response to the anti-theorists regarding progress is two-fold: (i) individuals 
have a duty to contribute to progress, and have good reason to view the future 
positively; (ii) there is in any case a historical dynamic which has been slowly realizing 
the principles of right and will probably continue to do so.  The first, moral argument 
relates to progress in both virtue and right, but only in the present and future; the second 
is restricted to right, but does have inductive support for its claims about the future.  
                                                
167 It also relates to the possibility of progress at the level of doctrine of virtue, the topic of Part One: the 
establishment of ever greater civil order goes hand in hand with developments in education and 
communication which help to remove some of the barriers to virtue.
‘Theory and Practice’ 110
This double strategy, in particular as it applies to cosmopolitan right, is emphasized in 
the concluding paragraph:
For my own part, I nevertheless put my trust in theory, which proceeds from the principle of right, 
as to what relations among human beings and states ought to be, and which commends to earthly 
gods the maxim always so as to behave in their conflicts that such a universal state of nations will 
thereby be ushered in, and so to assume that it is possible (in praxi) and that it can be; but at the 
same time I put my trust (in subsidium) in the nature of things, which constrains one to go where 
one does not want to go…. (¶11, 8:313)
The moral argument takes precedence, given its stronger force: what ought to be must 
be possible.  The historical argument is subsidiary, but nonetheless vital.  Together, the 
two are mutually reinforcing.  However, interpreters tend either to deny or to disregard 
this positive interaction.  Those who do the former argue that the historical argument 
cuts against the moral argument.  Those who do the latter take Kant’s ‘trust in theory’ to 
stand in no need of any supplementation at all.  I will now address both approaches in 
turn.
The suspicion that Kant’s ‘trust in theory’ and ‘trust in the nature of things’ are in 
tension is a familiar one.  The point is forcibly put by Honneth: Kant’s ‘speculations 
about natural mechanisms and empirical constraints actually render every morality 
superfluous’.168 There are in fact two distinct charges, which are not usually separated 
out: (i) belief in natural mechanism weakens the moral motivation to bring about 
progress; (ii) the lack of scope for moral action encourages the belief in natural 
mechanism.  In principle, these are independent processes, though of course it is easy to 
imagine them mutually reinforcing each other.  In what follows I will focus on 
Frederick Beiser’s prosecution of the case against Kant.  He presses both charges, 
though he does not explicitly distinguish them as I have done.  
Beiser states the first allegation succinctly: ‘The Kantian subject need not do 
anything to realize the republican constitution because, regardless of individual
decisions and actions, the mechanism of unsocial sociability will realize it for him.’169  
Accordingly, ‘trust in nature’ cuts against ‘trust in theory’ and generates an undesirable 
passivity (the section from which this sentence comes is titled ‘Kant’s Conservatism’).  
I believe this objection is mistaken, for the following three reasons.
Firstly, naturally generated progress is not at all inevitable.  For Beiser to make his 
objection stick, he has to exaggerate the certainty with which Kant presents his ideas 
about the mechanism of self-interest.  Note in the sentence quoted just above his use of 
                                                
168 ‘Is Universalism a Moral Trap?’, p. 162.  Similarly, Williams, ‘Kant’s Optimism’, pp. 12-14, and 
Krasnoff, ‘The Fact of Reason’, p. 29.
169 Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism, p. 55.
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‘will realize’; similarly, when glossing the earlier presentation in ‘Idea for a Universal 
History’, he comments that ‘this plan must be realized’.170 However, Kant makes it 
clear in ‘Theory and Practice’ (and elsewhere) that it is merely a ‘mere hypothesis’ and 
an ‘uncertain’ one at that (¶9, 8:311), and thus does not in any way guarantee the 
realization of the principles of right.171
Secondly, even if it were, ceteris paribus, inevitable, it is by no means desirable.  
Even to the extent that it is efficacious, the course which unsocial sociability is likely to 
take is highly unattractive, and indeed serves to encourage moral intervention to try to 
mitigate its unpleasantness and achieve a more direct and less painful approach to the 
better.
Thirdly, ‘Nature’ can only be effective in relation to progress at the level of legality.  
However much ‘unsocial sociability’ achieves in the political realm, individuals will 
continue to have moral responsibilities, including ones which overlap with and subtend 
concerns of Recht.
The second charge is that the lack of scope for moral action encourages the belief 
that ‘Nature’ will produce progress in any case.  According to Beiser, Kant’s restricted 
conception of political agency means that for most people, and in some cases all, 
activity is not possible, even if they were motivated to undertake it.  Accordingly, 
quietism is in effect enforced, which in turn leads individuals to place faith instead in 
‘the natural of things’.  This objection is in some ways more effective, in particular 
because it does not rely upon an over-stated construal of the natural mechanism thesis.  
The Kantian subject may be quite aware of the mere probability that ‘Nature’ will bring 
about a continual approximation of theory, but this will not detract from her clutching to 
this prospect if it is the only way of conceiving how this might be possible.  (Indeed, the 
need to have some means of understanding how the gap between theory and practice 
might be closed could well offset some of the uncertainty afflicting the ‘hypothesis’.)  
The weakness of the charge relates instead to its assumption that Kant has a very 
restrictive conception of political agency.  This relies on the application of either an 
anachronistic understanding of political activism (evident in Beiser’s references to trade 
                                                
170 Ibid. p. 54, underlining my emphasis.
171 In Perpetual Peace, published two years after ‘Theory and Practice’, Kant does say that ‘Nature 
guarantees perpetual peace through the mechanism of human inclinations itself’, but goes on to add 
that this is ‘with an assurance that is admittedly not adequate for vaticinating [weissagend] the future 
(theoretically) but that is still enough for practical purposes and makes it a duty to work toward this 
(not merely chimerical) end’ (8:368 [translation amended – cf. p. 144, n. 223 below]).  Nature thus 
only guarantees perpetual peace to the extent that its mechanism facilitates the effectiveness of moral 
action.  The guarantee is that our efforts will not be fruitless.
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unions and the like) or one which allows for the legitimacy of revolution.  If, though, 
one agrees with Kant regarding the illegitimacy of revolution and recognizes, as he 
does, that opportunities for activism are constrained by circumstances, then his position 
looks far less ‘conservative’.  In the context of ‘enlightened despotism’, there isn’t 
much that the progressively minded individual can do – which isn’t to say that it is not 
vital to strive to accomplish it.  Accordingly, Beiser has to push his case to the extreme, 
and ask ‘What if the monarch refuses to heed the grievances of his subjects and 
introduces censorship?’  He argues that in this case, ‘the oppressed’ would, on Kant’s 
account, have but ‘one source of solace’, namely recourse to Kant’s ‘trust in the nature 
of things’.172  Such censorship would of course have to be total for it to deprive subjects 
completely of the ability to act, that is, quite unlike the censorship Kant was suffering 
from at the time of writing ‘Theory and Practice’.  In these extreme circumstances, 
‘solace’ might certainly be sought in appeals to ‘Nature’s plan’ or ‘Providence’, but 
there is nothing to suggest that they are particularly likely to come about or likely to be 
more than relatively temporary states of affairs.
Beiser’s argument would have more force if he noticed that the efficacy of political 
action is a problem even when the scope for it is relatively unconstrained.  Even if you 
and I and ‘others continuing along the same path’ (¶5, 8:309) do all that we possibly can 
to help the cause of progress, there will still be a huge gap between what we can 
envisage achieving and the demands that theory makes of humanity as a whole.  There 
are two reasons for this gap: (i) experience (history) tells us that most people will not 
intentionally participate in the progressive project; (ii) even to the extent that they do, it 
will not be possible for them maximally to co-ordinate their activities (‘humanity’ 
cannot yet act as if a single agent).  Kant adverts to both of these points when explaining 
why we appeal to ‘Nature, or rather Providence’:
people in their schemes set out only from the parts and may well remain with them, and may be 
able to reach the whole, as something too great for them, in their ideas but not in their influence, 
especially since, with their mutually adverse schemes, they would hardly unite for it by their own 
free resolution. (¶6, 8:310)
Consequently, the idea of the natural dynamic is attractive because it makes up for the 
inevitable deficiencies of human agency (fractured and frequently selfish), not its 
complete impotence or absence.  A further discussion of this point comes a page later.  
The teleological ‘hypothesis’, we are told, 
is uncertain, like all judgments that want to assign for an intended effect not entirely within our 
control the only natural cause adequate to it; and even as such, it does not involve a principle for 
                                                
172 Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism, p. 54.
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the subjects in an already existing state to enforce it … but only for uncoercible heads of state….  
Thus it can be considered an expression not unbefitting the moral wishes and hopes of people 
(once aware of their inability) to expect the circumstances required for these from Providence, 
which will provide an outcome for the end of humanity as a whole species, to reach its final 
destination by the free use of its powers as far as they extend, to which end the ends of human 
beings, considered separately, are directly opposed. (¶9, 8:312, underlining added for emphasis)
This is the one passage that comes close to confirming Beiser’s allegation that 
‘Providence’ and political passivity go hand in hand.  His interpretation fits if we take 
‘inability’ (in the fifth line) to refer to the putative inability of ‘subjects in an already 
existing state’ to put pressure on their leaders to abandon militarism (this being 
something the leaders can only come to through natural ‘coercion’).  However, Kant 
has already described in the phrase underlined what the ‘people’s’ inability amounts to.  
The ends of humanity as a whole constitute ‘an intended effect not entirely within our 
control’, and this is why appeal is made to Providence.  In any case, Kant’s claim that 
‘subjects in an already existing state’ are unable to assist in the process of the realization 
of the principles of international right is peculiar.   This process will of course be 
undertaken by the ‘uncoercible heads of state’, and not their subjects, but Kant’s 
prediction as to how this will happen appears to give quite an important role to the 
latter.  Advances in national and international right are to proceed in tandem, with the 
costs of militarism encouraging republican reform, and increasing republicanism 
undercutting the ability of states to go to war.  It is Kant’s expectation that the subjects’ 
preference for peace will over time progressively constrain their leaders’ penchant for 
war.
Beiser’s charge of ‘quietism’, in both its forms, fails.  I will now turn to the other 
reading of ‘Theory and Practice’ I mentioned, namely the one which over-emphasizes 
the moral argument.  This interpretation need not deny that Kant also appeals to ‘the 
nature of things’, but is prone to ignore this part of his argument.  To the extent that its 
role is recognized, it is minimized: the ‘nature of things’ provides welcome support for 
the idea of progress, but is not necessary for it.
The demands of morality are directly linked to the belief in progress.  ‘Theory’ 
(practical reason) tells us that humanity ought to make progress toward realizing its 
prescriptions.  As this is ‘not demonstrably impossible’, we are allowed to believe that it 
is possible that humanity will make such progress.  (This belief is further encouraged if 
evidence can be found that progress is currently underway.)  This ‘hope for better times’ 
follows inevitably from the consideration of the demands of theory as they relate to 
future time.  Kant’s optimism in this respect is, as noted above, rather shaky.  We look 
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to the future in this way precisely because the past seems to reveal theory and practice 
to have always been at odds.  The circumstances in which hope becomes possible also 
render it problematic: maintaining faith in the future in the face of the dispiriting record 
of the past is no doubt admirable and heroic, but only because it is so difficult.  Kant 
frequently implies that such heroism, while conceivable, is not really an option for most 
of us.173
It is often assumed that Kant’s response to this problem is to argue that morality 
itself directly licenses us to believe in progress, future, present and past, 
notwithstanding evidence to the contrary.  On this reading, practical reason generates a 
‘need to believe in human progress’,174 which is held to be as it were self-authorizing.  (I 
have to believe in progress, therefore I can.)  Justification for this is taken to be found in 
Kant’s theory of the postulates; indeed, despite the fact that neither the term is used nor 
the doctrine referred to in ‘Theory and Practice’, it is claimed that this text presents 
historical progress as a postulate.175  It is frequently further alleged that this ‘postulate’ 
functions as a substitute for the official religious postulates presented in the second 
Critique.176
I believe that this interpretation is incorrect.  It is true that Kant appears to be 
presenting a postulate-type argument in the opening stages of the third part of ‘Theory 
and Practice’.  Having described in the third paragraph the pernicious effects of a non-
progressive conception of history, he starts the fourth as follows: ‘I shall therefore be 
allowed to assume that ... the human race is ... to be conceived as progressing toward 
what is better with respect to the moral end of its existence, and that this will indeed be 
interrupted from time to time but will never be broken off.’  (¶4, 8:308-309, underlining
added for emphasis).  However, the warrant for this claim is then stated to be the duty 
each of us is under to contribute toward humanity’s progress, i.e. the argument 
described earlier (p. 106 above).  As we have seen, this only justifies belief in future 
progress, and leaves the problem of the past untouched.  More importantly, the omitted 
                                                
173 Cf. the Critique of Judgment’s ‘righteous man’ (5:452-3), discussed in Chapter Six.
174 Neiman, The Unity of Reason, p. 179.
175 Lindstedt: ‘Kant begins the third section of ‘Theory and Practice’ by indicating that the assumption of 
universal history is made for moral reasons … Kant believed the progress of the human race to be a 
necessary postulate of practical reason’ (‘Kant: Progress in Universal History as a Postulate of 
Practical Reason’, p. 144).
176 Neiman: ‘Might this very minimal postulation of God’s existence be replaced by the postulate that the 
world as a whole is progressing toward the best?  There is some reason to think so ... [‘Theory and 
Practice’] presents a moral argument for the need to believe in progress … strongly suggesting that 
practical reason could substitute faith in progress for faith in God.’ (The Unity of Reason, p. 179.)
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parts of the sentence just quoted invoke a separate premise, namely the fact that ‘the 
human race is constantly advancing with respect to culture (as its natural end)’.177  The 
rest of the paragraph does not clarify what role this premise plays in the warrant we 
have to assume progress; nor does it even seem to refer to it.  But it should at least be 
obvious that Kant is not appealing solely to the dispiriting consequences of a pessimistic 
view of history in justifying this warrant.   Knowing as we do how Part Three proceeds, 
the reference to constant cultural advance is most plausibly understood as an 
anticipation of the identification in paragraphs six to nine of a ‘natural’ mechanism 
which generates political progress.178  Kant’s assumption of progress thus rests on the 
two arguments presented earlier, and not on the mere untenability of the opposite view 
of history.  Neiman is right to assert that practical reason generates a ‘need to believe in 
progress’, but not one that can produce that belief out of itself.  Instead, the ‘need to 
believe’ is answered by the combination of morality’s ‘hope for better times’ and the 
theory of the mechanism of Nature.  As the former only functions in respect of the 
future, the burden of dealing with the difficulty of the past falls on the latter.
Kant’s strategy, here and elsewhere, is not simply to assume that humanity has made 
progress because it would be too depressing to think otherwise; on the contrary, it is to 
show that, despite appearances, humanity has made progress.  The pessimistic picture 
would produce despair, if it were the whole story – but it isn’t.  The challenge Kant 
faces therefore is to provide an alternative construal of the facts.  We have already seen 
how he delivers this: yes, he says, history does reveal a continuous parade of violence 
and stupidity, but there is at the same time and as a direct result a gradual advance in 
political conditions.  The failure of moral theory to make much headway is conceded, 
but explained in part by the slow rate with which progress in such theory has itself been 
achieved. 
                                                
177 The full sentence therefore reads: ‘I shall therefore be allowed to assume that, since the human race is 
constantly advancing with respect to culture (as its natural end) it is also to be conceived as 
progressing toward what is better with respect to the moral end of its existence, and that this will 
indeed be interrupted from time to time but will never be broken off.’  (¶4, 8:308-309).
178 This is not to deny that it could be interpreted differently.  In particular, a more natural reading of the 
sentence in question could go like this: the progress humanity has made in respect of some of its ends 
(the ‘cultural’ ones) allows us to believe that the rest of them (the ‘moral’ ones) will also be realized.  
Cultural progress partially confirms the teleological hypothesis that all human ends should be realized 
historically (cf. ‘Idea’, 8:18-19), and so encourages the expectation of full confirmation.  However, 
this argument, which does feature in ‘Idea’, is out of place in the context of ‘Theory and Practice’ –
nothing else in the text suggests it – and in any case does nothing to justify belief in past moral 
progress.
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That Kant’s strategy does take this form is, I hope, clear.  I would now like to 
demonstrate that it has to: the idea that progress could be a postulate is in any case 
untenable.  The doctrine of the postulates succeeds (if at all) because the entities or 
states postulated transcend the world of experience.  The idea of the immortality of the 
soul, for example, is neither contradicted nor confirmed by it.  As a result, practical 
reason can support belief in immortality, as with this idea it becomes possible to 
conceive of the satisfaction of the demands of the moral law.  Practical reason can 
override theoretical reason and engage in such postulation only in relation to the domain 
of the non-empirical, where theoretical reason is obliged to renounce its claims to 
knowledge.  The doctrine thus explicitly denies that practical reason can postulate 
empirical objects or states of affairs in accordance with its needs.  Yet this is precisely 
what Neiman and Lindstedt claim takes place in ‘Theory and Practice’.  Plain 
irrationality results: theoretical reason informs us that progress hasn’t taken place; 
practical reason insists that it has.  This clearly cannot be what Kant intends.  The 
process of postulation is supposed to overcome the inadequacy of our knowledge, by 
leaping over its limits; it is not supposed to contradict what we in fact know.179
There is a further, more subtle difficulty with the ‘progress as postulate’ 
interpretation.  The official postulates stand in relation to moral demands as the 
conditions of possibility of their satisfaction.  What is not postulated is the process of 
their satisfaction – that is what remains for us to undertake.  For example, belief in God 
and the immortality of the soul make it possible for us to conceive of an individual’s 
endless progress toward holiness.  This progress itself is not postulated.  If it were, the 
very point of postulation would be undermined.  Moral faith is supposed to help sustain 
the thought of what I ought to do, not predict that I will do it.180
Two points can then be seen to emerge in relation to the issue of historical progress.  
First of all, progress (past or future) is the wrong kind of thing to postulate – not just, as 
before, because it takes place in the world, but also because as postulated it would take 
on a programmatic quality or inevitability contrary to the very purpose of a postulate.181  
Secondly, if anything were to be postulated in relation to progress, it would be its 
conditions.  Lindstedt ultimately recognizes this: although he asserts throughout his 
                                                
179 Guyer highlights the difference between the ‘noumenal realities’ involved in the religious postulates 
and the mundane character of historical progress, but does not see that this prevents the description of 
the latter as a postulate.  (Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness, p. 428.)
180 This point is somewhat qualified by what I go on to say at the top of p. 120.
181 Guyer makes a similar point in Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness, p. 429.
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paper that ‘the fact that the human race is progressing is a postulate necessitated by pure 
practical reason’, his more considered position is that ‘two postulates ... are needed,
analogous to the postulates of immortality and God’.182  Accordingly, what is apparently 
required in order to dispel the anxieties occasioned by the gloomy historical record is 
the postulation of the necessary conditions of historical progress, which are (i) the 
assumption of the infinite continuation of the human species (analogous to the 
immortality of the individual soul), and (ii) the idea of ‘Nature’ as a world-designer.  
Lindstedt then connects these putative postulates with those passages in ‘Idea’ which 
mobilize similar ideas.183  He is of course entirely correct to assert that these two ideas 
are essential to the project of universal history, but overlooks the fact that they are 
entirely legitimate theoretical propositions.  Re (i): the assumption of the continued 
existence of the species is a perfectly plausible empirical prediction, quite unlike the 
thought of the immortality of the soul.  (And, as such, not certain: on a number of 
occasions Kant mentions the possibility that the species itself could become extinct.)184  
Re (ii): the invocation of a world-designer is, as we saw in Chapter Two, defended in 
the first Critique as a necessary presupposition of empirical enquiry, that is, as a 
regulative idea.  (To be sure, in so far as we think of a world-designer as sustaining the 
efficacy of our moral endeavours (individual or collective), we will construe it as a 
moral being, i.e. as God.  To that extent, postulation does enter the picture.  But what is 
postulated is just God, not something ‘analogous’ to him, still less ‘progress’.)  In any 
case, Lindstedt’s soi disant postulates are in themselves insufficient to counter the 
thought, prompted by a pessimistic understanding of the historical record, of the futility 
of progressive action.   Re (i): the thought of the ‘immortality’ of the species will only 
deepen one’s despair if one already takes the past to demonstrate the divergence of 
‘theory and practice’.  Indeed, Kant suggests that such a pessimistic view tends to go 
hand in hand with apocalyptic expectations of the imminent end of history (cf. ‘End’, 
8:330-332).  Re (ii): wielding the regulative idea of ‘Nature’ in itself will do nothing to 
assuage our anxieties unless the facts allow themselves to be regulated by it.  Once 
again, we find Lindstedt showing some awareness of this: ‘the question soon arises, 
nonetheless, as to how the possibility of these two postulates of practical reason might 
be attested to in the world .... Kant can, or perhaps must, offer a more detailed 
                                                
182 Lindstedt, ibid. pp. 144, 143, underlining added for emphasis.
183 Ibid. p. 143 – the relevant passages are ‘Idea’, #3, 8:20. #6 n., 8:23 and #9, 8:30.
184 For example, The Conflict of the Faculties, 7:89; cf. also, Critique of Judgment, 5:427-428.
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account’.185 His ‘postulates’ as such resolve nothing, but merely describe (and mis-
name) the moves theoretical reason makes in setting itself the task of establishing 
whether or not progress can be identified in history.  Only if a certain degree of success 
is made in this enquiry can the threat posed by the negative portrayal of the past be put 
to rest.186
Neiman emphasizes what she takes to be Kant’s anti-Enlightenment pessimism about 
the course of history.  This is of course of a piece with her claim that progress is a 
postulate: moral belief in it is only necessary if there is some problem with what 
theoretical reason tells us about history.  I have already argued that this reading renders 
Kant’s position incoherent.  I now wish to contest Neiman’s claim that Kant does take 
such a bleak view of history.187  The ‘evidence’ she adduces is remarkably weak.  For 
example, she invokes Kant’s dismissal of his 1759 essay on ‘Optimism’ in support of 
her denial that his Critical position is itself optimistic.188  The fact that the Leibnizian 
optimism he defended in 1759 (this is the best of all possible worlds) is quite distinct 
from the historical optimism Kant subsequently developed (this is gradually becoming
the best of all possible worlds) is passed over.  Neiman’s main evidence comes from 
Religion, which she claims ‘dismisses “modern optimism” ’.189  This purported 
quotation derives from a phrase in the old Greene and Hudson translation, in which 
‘optimistic’ renders heroische (6:19).190  The problem with the material she cites is that 
all it does is indicate that ‘the history of all times’ (6:20) shows human beings to have
remained at the same (rather miserable) level of individual morality throughout: the 
progress it denies is progress in virtue.  It would be good-natured (gutmüthige), even 
heroic (heroische) of us to think otherwise, but incorrect.  All that Kant is rejecting here 
(and even then mildly) is a form of retrospective optimism regarding virtue.  Ironically, 
if there is anything in Kant’s works which resembles the ‘postulate of progress’, it is 
just this assumption:  The ‘heroic opinion … that the world steadfastly … forges ahead 
                                                
185 Lindstedt, ibid. p. 143, underlining added for emphasis.
186 Neiman similarly slides, though in her case explicitly, into issues of regulativity when trying to 
expand upon the ‘progress as postulate’ claim.  She writes: ‘that the world is in progress toward a 
better state’ is a ‘regulative principle’ (two pages previously it was a postulate), by which she means 
that it expresses the ‘demand that the world come to meet the claims reason advances’ (The Unity of 
Reason, p. 181).  Presumably it is at least in part up to the world whether it responds to these claims.
187 Neiman writes of Kant’s ‘denial that experience confirms the idea that the world as a whole is 
progressing toward a better state’; ‘we have every reason to doubt it, [i.e. that] the world [is] 
progressing to a better state’ (ibid. p. 180).
188 Ibid. p. 184 n. 30.
189 Ibid. p. 180.
190 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 15.  The translation in Religion and Rational Theology 
itself uses ‘optimistic’ a few lines later, but for gutmüthige (6:20).
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[in respect of] moral good … (not just growth in civilization)’ is described by him as ‘an 
well-intentioned [gutmüthige] presupposition on the part of the moralists, from Seneca 
to Rousseau, intended to encourage the indefatigable cultivation of that seed of 
goodness that perhaps lies in us’ (6:20, translation amended).  Yet Kant reminds us that 
‘the history of all times attests far too powerfully against it’.  But this is not to deny that 
there is ‘growth in civilization’, nor that this progressively ratchets up levels of Recht, 
nor indeed that the present is witnessing genuine moral progress.
I would not want to claim that the belief in progress bears no resemblance to a 
postulate.  In an important respect it is very much like one, inasmuch as Kant does seem 
to think that the moral requirement that there be progress gives us additional reason to 
affirm the theoretical hypothesis that there has been and will continue to be progress.191  
(Indeed, the diligence with which theoretical reason develops its hypothesis no doubt in 
part reflects the interest of practical reason.)  But the hypothesis must have some 
empirical plausibility in order for practical reason to be able to reinforce it.  The official 
religious postulates are also essentially dependent upon the contributions of theoretical 
reason, as practical reason can only exercise its primacy in relation to the material 
supplied to it, such as the metaphysical idea of God.  But, as noted earlier, theoretical 
reason is constitutionally incapable of justifiably affirming whether there is a God or 
not, and so practical reason’s intervention is necessary in order to get belief in the 
existence of such an entity off the ground in the first place (as opposed to the mere 
thought of one).192  The question of progress, on the other hand, is one which theoretical 
reason is able to tackle.  Of course, its competence varies depending on the particular 
domain involved.  The past is obviously more tractable than the future, issues of Recht
more so than Tugend.  And yet the opacity of both the future and the moral dispositions 
of past individuals does not preclude enquiry into them.  (I discuss this issue in a little 
more detail in the following chapter.)
                                                
191 This certainly seems to be the implication of ‘Idea’, #9, 8:30.
192 To clarify: the resemblance between the two cases is not that in both practical reason adds to the 
reasons one has for affirming x, for, in the case of the religious postulates, there is no other reason for 
doing so.  The similarity involves the manner in which the primacy of practical reason allows it to 
make more of the relevant contributions of theoretical reason.  In the case of the religious postulates, 
this addition is quite dramatic: practical reason can give objects to the mere ideas of speculative 
reason (this is what ‘postulation’ means in this context), if only from a practical point of view.  
Practical reason’s role is necessarily more circumscribed in relation to historical progress, the reality 
of which is primarily a matter for theory.  A difficulty is that Kant only ever describes the operations 
of the primacy of practical reason in terms of ‘postulation’, whereas in this case a different term is 
evidently called for.  The absence of this other term no doubt helps explain the willingness of 
commentators to latch onto the idea of a postulate when seeking to characterize the interaction of 
practical and theoretical reason in Kant’s account of progress.
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It is also true that one component of the belief in progress resembles a postulate.  
This is the expectation, discussed on pp. 106-7 above, that others will participate in the 
historical task of realizing the demands of morality.  This functions like a postulate in 
that it helps to counter the sense of futility that might otherwise afflict the progressively-
minded individual.  Moreover, it is formally similar to a postulate in that the opacity of 
the future, which enables practical reason to project into it, is analogous to the 
unknowability of the supersensible.  But these are only resemblances.  In particular, the 
future is, as already indicated, not forbidden territory to theoretical enquiry.  Indeed, it is 
to counteract the vulnerability to inductivist skepticism of the ‘hope for better times’ 
which practical reason generates that Kant puts together his own theoretical 
prognosis.193
Moses Mendelssohn is the representative ‘anti-theorist’ Kant invokes in Part Three of 
‘Theory and Practice’.  Given that I have been able to reconstruct Kant’s line of thought 
with only passing reference to Mendelssohn, it might well appear that the latter’s role is 
rather perfunctory.  Indeed, when one compares the third part with the first, one is 
struck by the extent to which the first is structured around Garve’s objections, whereas 
Mendelssohn’s observations are merely used as a starting point for Kant’s own 
argument.  This is not altogether surprising: Mendelssohn’s doubts about theory relate 
to the idea of progress; he has nothing specifically to say about cosmopolitan 
federations and the like, and so only engages with part of the ‘theory’ with which Kant 
is concerned.  In addition, his objections are aimed at Lessing’s conception of historical 
progress, not Kant’s.  I have already had opportunity to note Kant’s subtle articulation 
of the difference between his idea of progress and Lessing’s (cf. p. 106).  Neither here 
nor anywhere else do we find him attempting to establish any affinity with the project of 
the ‘divine education of the human race’.  
Mendelssohn’s skepticism about the doctrine of historical progress is well conveyed 
in the excerpts Kant provides in the second paragraph of Part Three: ‘An individual 
makes progress, but humanity constantly vacillates between fixed limits; regarded as a 
whole, however, it maintains in all periods of time roughly the same level of morality, 
the same level of religion and irreligion, of virtue and vice, of happiness and misery’ 
                                                
193 Cf. The Conflict of the Faculties, where Kant denies that belief in progress is ‘just a well-meaning and 
a commendable proposition in a practical respect’ (7:88).  This passage is quoted more fully on pp. 
141-2 below.
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(¶2, 8:308).194  Kant, as we have seen, will go on to challenge directly this view of 
history: there is ‘unending progress toward the better’ (¶6, 8:310).  His immediate 
response to Mendelssohn, though, is to argue that the non-progressive conception of 
history is untenable in itself.  It leads to moral despair, in that inductive extrapolation 
from the past makes us think that the demands of morality are unrealizable.  
Accordingly, Kant holds, we have to try and construct an alternative account.
This argument presupposes that historical progress is (at least in part) the way in 
which we have to think of the fulfilment of moral demands.  But this clearly begs the 
question.  For Mendelssohn, the demands of morality are addressed solely to the 
individual, and are to be thought of as realizable by virtue of an appeal to the 
immortality of the soul (in a manner similar to Kant’s claims in the Critique of Practical 
Reason).  Religious belief, not universal history, is the means of averting despair.  
‘Progress [Fortgang] is for the individual man, who is destined by Providence to spend 
part of his eternity, here on earth’.195
Mendelssohn should certainly be faulted with failure to engage with issues of Recht, 
in effect shrinking morality to Tugend, and this, it would seem, would constitute part of 
Kant’s more considered reply to him, as is evident from the rest of Part Three.  Yet the 
direct accusation evidently misses the target.
The circularity of Kant’s criticism is apparent in the very manner in which he 
presents Mendelssohn’s account.  Kant imposes on it qualities of struggle and failure 
which are simply not present.  He claims that it shows a Sisyphean process, where the 
effort to advance is always frustrated, and provides a view of the world ‘as a place of 
atonement for ancient sins’ (¶2, 8:307-308).  But, as Alexander Altmann says, ‘nothing 
of this sort is found in Mendelssohn’.196  These characterizations would perhaps be 
appropriate if humanity was attempting to make the kind of progress Kant thinks it 
ought, but only managed to achieve ‘in all periods of time roughly the same level of 
morality’ (Mendelssohn’s words, cited in ¶2, 8:308).  This distortion of Mendelssohn’s 
views is required in order that they articulate the ‘what sounds good in theory has no 
validity in practice’ position.  For Mendelssohn to play the role accorded him, he must 
be supposed to think that the species ought to be making progress.  As a result, the 
                                                
194 Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or On Religious Power and Judaism, originally published in 1783.  
The two paragraphs from which Kant takes his citations are to be found at pp. 96-97.
195 Jerusalem, p. 96 (not quoted by Kant).
196 Alexander Altmann, ‘Commentary’, Jerusalem, p. 212.
‘Theory and Practice’ 122
apparent fact that it doesn’t means that history is seen as a ‘tragedy’ and ‘in the long 
run, a farce’ (¶3, 8:308).
Mendelssohn’s actual view of history is in fact much closer to Herder’s.  Rather than 
being a pessimistic progressivist of the sort just outlined, he appears to advocate a 
positive pluralism like that of This Too a Philosophy of History.  Its attraction for him is 
not hard to discern: given his desire to defend Judaism against conversion approaches 
from both Christians and rationalists, the pluralism and traditionalism to be found in 
Herder would have suggested themselves as very useful resources.  Thus we read in the 
paragraph immediately preceding the two from which Kant quotes, the following highly 
Herderian thought: ‘all the inhabitants of the earth are destined to felicity; and the 
means of attaining it are as widespread as mankind itself’, whose suitability to 
Mendelssohn’s apologetic purposes is evident.197  The point is emphasized in the
concluding paragraph of Jerusalem: against those who urge that there should be ‘only 
one flock and one shepherd’, Mendelssohn claims that ‘diversity is evidently the plan 
and purpose of Providence’.198
What unites Mendelssohn and Herder is a Leibnizian pluralism, according to which 
human perfections are so manifold as to prevent their compatibility.  It is surely 
something like this which ultimately underpins much of the skepticism about ‘theory’ 
which Kant is dealing with in ‘Theory and Practice’.  ‘Theory’, in picturing its ideal 
state, the goal of progress, either operates with a reduced set of possible perfections, 
jettisoning the rest, or assumes that incompatible perfections can in fact be combined, or 
both.  What is envisaged is therefore not even ‘good in theory’.199
Kant does not engage with this line of thought in ‘Theory or Practice’, nor indeed 
anywhere else in his published work.  The only place where he does address the 
Leibnizian idea of the incompatibility of all perfections is in his very early set of 
reflections on optimism, from 1753–1754, in which Kant devotes a long paragraph to 
expounding its untenability.  ‘What is it which causes the essential determinations of 
things to conflict with each other when they are combined together, so that the
perfections, each of which on its own would increase God’s pleasure, become 
incompatible with each other?’ (R3705, 17:236).  Kant holds that Leibniz has no answer 
to this question.  In addition to the metaphysical unacceptability of Leibniz’s position, 
                                                
197 Jerusalem, p. 94.
198 Ibid. p. 138.
199 Cf. Aurel Kolnai, The Utopian Mind, pp. 29, 38, 41-3.
‘Theory and Practice’ 123
Kant clearly thinks that it is in any case unsatisfactory, given that it encourages 
acceptance of a view of the world as being less than fully perfect: we ‘remain troubled’ 
(R3704, 17:233).  Pope’s attitude, ‘everything is good’, is far preferable (even if less 
plausible).
It should not be thought that Kant is completely deaf to the historicists’ praise of 
diversity.  One of the interesting features of his work in the 1790s is a willingness to 
recognize both the existence and value of cultural diversity.  In 1785 Herder argued that 
a global state was impossible because of the extent of geographical, linguistic and 
cultural differences between nations.200  In both Religion and Perpetual Peace, Kant 
appropriates this argument: differences in languages and religion will thankfully prevent 
the formation of a ‘universal monarchy’ (8:367; cf. 6:123 n.).  But this diversity does 
not go deep.  In both texts, Kant also asserts that ‘there can only be one single religion’ 
(8:367 n.; cf. 6:107-8), of which the different ‘religions’ are merely vehicles.  
Presumably the same is true of language.  It seems that Kant can learn from Herder (and 
Mendelssohn), but only to an extent.   Their disagreement about progress is based upon 
more fundamental philosophical commitments.
                                                
200 Ideas, VIII.5, C 78 / 6:334-5 (this passage comes between those from which Kant quotes in the second 
of his ‘Reviews’ at 8:64 and 8:61).
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Chapter Eight: The Conflict of the Faculties
The Conflict of the Faculties, published in 1798, stands, perhaps by accident, as Kant’s 
final philosophical publication.201  It is, as a whole, a curious work, composed of three 
separate essays, notionally linked by the theme of the relationship between philosophy 
and the three ‘higher’ faculties of the traditional university structure, namely theology, 
law and medicine.  As the work unfolds, the significance of this theme becomes 
progressively attenuated: in the preface and the first part, on philosophy’s relation to 
theology, it is very prominent; in the second part, titled ‘The conflict of the philosophy 
faculty with the faculty of law’ (7:77), it makes an appearance but is by no means 
central to the piece; whilst the third part, dealing with medicine, does not engage with it 
at all.  The use of the theme of ‘the conflict of the faculties’ as a mere linking device to 
piece together the parts for publication is also underscored by the clearly distinct 
motivations Kant had for writing each part: in the first instance, to respond to recent 
religiously inspired attempts at censorship in Prussia; in the second instance, to re-
examine the question of progress in the light of current events; and, in the third, to 
respond to the gift of a book and consider his own ever more apparent physical frailty.  
Kant had in fact written what became the second part as a separate essay, under the title 
‘An old question raised again: is the human race in constant progress toward the 
better?’, which in due course became the sub-title of the published version (7:79).  He 
tried to get this published in a journal towards the end of 1797, only to have this attempt 
blocked by the Prussian censor.  Its appearance the following year, alongside the other 
two essays, was only possible because of the death in November 1797 of the reactionary 
Frederick William II and the consequent lifting of the censorship regime he had 
instigated.  Even then, Kant did go to the trouble of seeking legal advice and sending 
The Conflict of the Faculties to Halle for publication, thereby bypassing the Berlin 
censor.202
                                                
201 The same year also saw the publication of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, but this was 
entirely based upon lecture materials Kant had written many years earlier, and so whilst Kant did 
devote time in 1796 and 1797 to working these manuscripts up into a publishable form, it is 
reasonable to suppose that he was not re-working them in a substantial way.  As we shall see later, the 
Anthropology is relevant to an understanding of the second part of The Conflict of the Faculties (pp. 
143-4, n. 222).
202 On these events, see Kant’s letter to Tieftrunk, 5th April 1798, 12:240-1 and Kuehn, Kant, pp. 403-
405.  The editors of Religion and Rational Theology claim that the essay was ‘apparently written in 
1795’ (p. 235), presumably on the basis of Kant’s letter to Tieftrunk of the 13th October 1797, where 
he writes of two essays he has in a bureau that ‘one of them is complete, the other almost so, and they 
have lain [there] for more than two years’ (12:208; the editor of Correspondence also thinks that the 
‘completed essay’ is ‘An Old Question’ – cf. p. 529).  Yet in the April 1798 letter Kant refers to ‘An 
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Of the three essays, the second is the most significant, and is certainly the one that 
has attracted most attention ever since (even if this attention has tended to be too 
narrowly focused on the famous central passage in which Kant discusses the French 
Revolution, to the neglect of complex arguments weaved around it).  Its significance for 
Kant is indicated both by the considerable amount of draft material he generated in the 
years in which he was working on it and by the efforts he made to ensure its 
publication.203  However, the polemical and conjunctural reasons Kant may have had for 
composing ‘An Old Question’ are difficult to discern, particularly in comparison with 
‘Idea’ and ‘Theory and Practice’, where the relevant motivations were evident.  For one 
thing, why did Kant feel that the ‘old question’ needed to be asked again, given that he 
had already addressed it in ‘Theory and Practice’?  Indeed, the question as formulated in 
1798 – ‘is the human race in constant progress toward the better [im beständigen 
Fortschreiten zum Besseren]?’ (7:79, translation amended) – is almost identical to that 
raised in 1793 – ‘[will the human race] always progress toward what is better? [immer 
zum Bessern fortschreiten]?’ (8:307).  That it had to be asked again implies that Kant 
thought that the answer given in ‘Theory and Practice’ was less than fully satisfactory. 
In what follows we shall see that Kant certainly does try to improve upon the arguments 
discussed in the last chapter, in particular by strengthening the case for the assertion 
‘that in our age … the human race has made moral progress’ (8:310).  And yet the spur 
to do so seems more likely to have come from some of the reactions generated by 
Perpetual Peace, published in 1795.  In that work, as noted previously, Kant 
emphasized ‘Nature’s guarantee’ that a global federation and with it perpetual peace 
would come about (8:360-368).  To many of his more radical readers, this approach 
seemed to leave too little room for intentional endeavours to promote these ends (along 
                                                                                                                                              
Old Question’ as a ‘recent work’, not one which by then was three years old.  In any case, the 
identification of either of these two essays with ‘An Old Question’ is untenable, given that in a draft 
of the October letter Kant also refers to an essay which he has just sent to Berlin for publication, and 
this can only be the version of ‘An Old Question’ which was rejected by the censor (13:464; for more 
detail, see Reinhard Brandt, ‘Zum “Streit der Fakultäten” ’, pp. 65-66).  There is therefore no reason 
to think that ‘An Old Question’ was complete before late 1797.  It is of course also possible that Kant 
worked on it again in 1798, prior to its publication as part of The Conflict of the Faculties.
203 As Peter Fenves comments: ‘Kant wrote out a surprising number of versions of what was to become 
[‘An Old Question’], each of which has its own character and addresses slightly different thematic 
concerns.  The multiplicity of versions testifies both to the difficulty and to the overall significance of 
the question itself: indeed, [‘An Old Question’] turns out to be not only Kant’s last major published 
work of philosophy but one of the most intricately devised and revised of his texts.’ (A Peculiar Fate: 
Metaphysics and World-History in Kant, p. 171 n. 1).  These drafts are to be found at 15:650-651, 
19:604-612, 22:619-624 and in Kant-Studien 51 (1959-1960), pp. 3-13.
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the lines of the criticism put forward by Beiser and discussed on pp. 110f above).204  
Kant’s emphatic reference to ‘Nature’s guarantee’ certainly exposed him to this charge, 
even though, as I suggested, his closing comments in the ‘First Supplement’ are an 
attempt to rectify this impression (8:368, cited p. 111, n. 171).  One German writer who 
criticized Kant on this score was the young Friedrich Schlegel.  In his ‘Essay on the 
Concept of Republicanism Occasioned by the Kantian Tract “Perpetual Peace” ’, 
published in 1796, Schlegel refers to Kant’s invocation of ‘Nature’s guarantee’ and then 
comments: ‘I still frankly want to confess what I find missing in it.  It is not enough to 
show the means of its possibility, the external occasions of fate that lead to the gradual 
realization of perpetual peace.  One expects an answer to the question whether the inner 
development of humanity leads to it.’205  What Schlegel wants is some indication of a 
positive moral-political momentum toward the realization of republican and pacific 
ideals, not just the negative path of prudential rationality.  Kant certainly knew of 
Schlegel’s essay,206 and it seems likely that he would have read it.  As we shall see, ‘An 
Old Question’ does strive to counter the supposition that Kantian progress is wholly or 
mainly a matter of some ‘hidden hand’ mechanism.
The objection can be taken to involve two elements.  Firstly, progress ought to 
engage humanity’s moral character – without this, it does not really count as progress.  
Secondly, only to the extent that it does do we have sufficiently strong warrant for 
asserting future progress.  Critics such as Schlegel therefore consider that Kant’s 
concentration on the non-moral grounds of historical advance both detracts from the 
value of progress and makes it appear less likely.  The criticism is of course misplaced.  
Kant’s hopes for the future explicitly rely upon, if not exclusively, his trust in 
individuals’ ability to undertake enlightened moral action.  And yet it is true that this is 
somewhat underplayed in ‘Theory and Practice’ and certainly less than obvious in 
Perpetual Peace, with its emphasis on ‘Nature’s guarantee’.  It may be supposed to be 
in view of this that Kant felt it necessary to address the ‘old question’ once again and 
reiterate the double basis of his belief in progress.
                                                
204 One such critic was the English radical and chemist, Thomas Beddoes, who, reviewing Perpetual 
Peace in the London Monthly Review in 1796, wrote that he was ‘disappointed’ with the passivity of 
Kant’s approach.  See Micheli, ‘The Early Reception of Kant’s Thought in England, 1785–1803’, pp. 
276-277.
205 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘The Concept of Republicanism’, p. 109.  The suggestion that Schlegel’s review 
was instrumental in prompting the writing of the second part of The Conflict of the Faculties was 
made by Klaus Reich in 1956 (see Kleingeld, Fortschritt und Vernunft, p. 68 n. 2).
206 At the end of R6340 (otherwise unrelated), Kant notes the title of the essay, the name of its author and 
its place of publication (18:666).
The Conflict of the Faculties 127
Kant’s central contention in the essay certainly serves as a response to Schlegel’s 
demand.  The argument is introduced in section five: ‘There must be some experience in 
the human race which, as an event, points to the disposition and capacity of the human 
race to be the cause of its own advance toward the better, and (since this should be the 
act of a being endowed with freedom), toward the human race as being the author of 
this advance’ (7:84).  The necessity here should presumably be understood as 
conditional upon the requirements outlined in the previous paragraph.  That is, ‘there 
must be some experience ...’ given that progress ought to involve humanity’s moral 
character and/or given that such evidence is needed in order to sustain a suitably 
confident expectation that humanity will make progress.  The desired degree of 
expectation is indicated by Kant's reference in the heading of the fifth section to ‘the 
prophetic history of mankind’ (7:84, underlining added for emphasis): evidence that the 
species is acting as ‘the author’ of its ‘advance toward the better’ will enable us to 
foretell progress with a greater assurance than speculations about the likely course of 
prudential self-interest allow.  (I shall return at the end of this chapter to consider Kant’s 
use of the language of prophecy.) 
Kant proceeds in the next section to describe ‘an occurrence in our time which 
demonstrates this moral tendency of the human race’:
This occurrence consists neither in momentous deeds nor crimes committed by human beings 
whereby what was great among human beings is made small or what was small is made great, nor 
in ancient splendid political structures which vanish as if by magic while others come forth in their 
place as if from the depths of the earth.  No, nothing of the sort.  It is simply the mode of thinking 
of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this game of great revolutions [Umwandlungen], 
and manifests such a universal yet disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against those 
on the other....  Owing to its universality, this mode of thinking demonstrates a character of the 
human race at large and all at once: owing to its disinterestedness, a moral character of humanity, 
at least in its predisposition, a character which not only permits people to hope for progress toward 
the better, but is already itself progress in so far as its capacity is sufficient for the present.  (§6, 
7:85)
The rest of the section goes on to explain that the relevant mode of thinking is that 
which manifests itself in support for republican revolution in France.  The most striking 
difficulty with this argument (and the one which has generated nearly all of the attention 
that ‘An Old Question’ has received) is this: how can Kant commend as moral 
‘participation’ in the revolution, given that he is adamant that revolution is always 
unjust.207  (Indeed, he reiterates this position in his second footnote to §6, 7:87.)  
Alongside this difficulty is the problem of understanding how this ‘occurrence’ 
                                                
207 Cf. ‘Theory and Practice’, 8:297-8; The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:318-22.
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demonstrates ‘the disposition and capacity of the human race to be the cause of its own 
advance toward the better’ (§5, 7:84). 
The most straightforward way to resolve the first of these issues is to recognize that 
the enthusiasm Kant identifies is essentially an enthusiasm for republicanism, not 
revolution.  The ‘moral character of humanity’ would therefore be demonstrated by the 
identification of and commitment to the principles of right on the part of impartial 
spectators.208  This is doubtless correct, as far as it goes, but to leave it at that unduly 
disconnects the spectators from the events they are viewing: given their moral 
commitment to republicanism, how then do they stand in relation to the revolution in 
France?  Kant writes that ‘it may be filled with misery and atrocities to the point that a 
right-thinking human being, were he boldly to hope to execute it successfully a second 
time, would never resolve to make the experiment at such a cost’.  Even still, he 
continues: ‘this revolution, I say, nonetheless finds in the hearts of all spectators … a 
wishful participation that borders on enthusiasm’ (§6, 7:85).
One may agree with its ideals, yet in so far as one must condemn its means, there 
would appear to be no room for ‘wishful participation’ in the revolution.  Krasnoff 
suggests that the way to resolve the tension is to admit that the spectators were wrong to 
show enthusiasm but that notwithstanding this, their response still demonstrates a 
‘moral character’, just one which happened to be misdirected.  This is implausible: 
surely in this case, their enthusiasm would be, like that of the revolutionaries, immoral, 
even if ostensibly aimed at the good.209
This is not to say that a ‘right-thinking human being’ would find nothing 
encouraging in the French Revolution.  To the extent that it reveals republican 
principles to be ones which can be realized – they are not, as the anti-theorists are prone 
to allege, simply utopian – the revolution would be cause for optimism.  In addition, as 
republican states are in principle pacific, the existence of the French republic gives 
grounds for hope that the pressures for war can be reduced (cf. §6, 7:85-86).  Kant of 
course has to be careful here: he would not want it to be thought that revolution was the 
only or the most effective way of achieving the implementation of republican principles.  
The ‘right-thinking human being’ must therefore wish instead for an evolutionary 
approach, this being both itself moral and more likely to produce stable results (§7, 
                                                
208 For example, Nicholson, ‘Kant, Revolutions and History’, p. 261.
209 Krasnoff, ‘The Fact of Politics: History and Teleology in Kant’, p. 31.
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7:87-88 and §6 n., 7:87).  (The likely uncertainty of the revolutionary path is hinted at 
more than once by Kant.)
Reasons of this sort are sometimes adduced by commentators wishing to reconcile 
Kant’s apparent endorsement of the spectators’ approval of events in France with his 
condemnation of revolution.  For example, Yovel writes: ‘Kant’s final position [i.e. in 
‘An Old Question’] is that one cannot justify any revolution a priori, but that there are 
revolutions that are beneficial a posteriori, that is, once they have occurred.’210  This is 
perfectly consistent with Kant’s general understanding of the historical process, 
whereby good can emerge from wrong-doing.  However, it is irrelevant in this context, 
as Kant is not attempting to account here for a detached, retrospective judgment but 
rather for an enthusiasm for events which are still underway.  (The judgment could be 
made whilst the events were still on-going, but would have to appeal to the anticipated 
beneficial consequences.)
To summarize the discussion so far:  Kant claims that the spectators display a moral 
enthusiasm in relation to the French Revolution, but he also rejects revolution as 
immoral.  As a result, various strategies have been devised to resolve the appearance of 
inconsistency.  The first of these emphasizes the onlookers’ commitment to the 
principles of right (e.g. Nicholson).  This reading preserves moral enthusiasm, but 
disconnects it from the revolution, and so fails to accord with Kant’s text.  The second 
approach concedes that the spectators are wrong to ‘participate’ in the revolution, but 
that this can be discounted: their hearts are in the right place (e.g. Krasnoff).  This 
interpretation does latch on to a form of enthusiasm for the revolution, but one which is 
in fact only pseudo-moral, so it too should be discarded.  The third tack appeals to those 
features of the revolution, or rather its results, which a ‘right-thinking’ observer would 
recognize as good (e.g. Yovel).  Accordingly, it identifies a positive, retrospective moral 
evaluation of the revolution, but one which completely lacks any sense of ‘wishful 
participation’.  Each of these interpretations therefore loses one of the elements of 
Kant’s ‘occurrence’; taking them in reverse order, the enthusiasm, the morality and the 
connection to the revolution.  Matters are complicated inasmuch as the three spectator 
positions identified in these readings are not altogether exclusive; in particular, it would 
be quite possible for a Nicholson-type spectator also to adopt the perspective of a 
Yovel-type viewer as well.
                                                
210 Kant’s Philosophy of History, p.215 n. 15; cf. also p.153 n. 28.
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Clarification comes in the (usually neglected) final paragraph of section six:
… genuine enthusiasm always moves only toward what is right, and it cannot be grafted to self-
interest.  Monetary rewards will not elevate the adversaries of the revolutionaries 
[Revolutionirenden] to the zeal and grandeur of soul which the pure concept of right produced in 
them; and even the concept of honour among the old martial nobility (an analogue of enthusiasm) 
vanished before the weapons of those who kept in view the right of the nation to which they 
belonged and of which they considered themselves the guardians; with what exaltation the 
uninvolved public looking on sympathized then without the least intention of assisting.  (7:86-87, 
translation amended [‘revolution’ replaced with ‘revolutionaries’])
Kant here describes the revolutionaries themselves as displaying moral enthusiasm, with 
the enthusiasm of the spectators being generated as its reflection.  How can this be 
squared with the moral condemnation of revolution?   One obviously unsatisfactory way 
of doing so would be to treat the rebels as suffused with moral enthusiasm, such that we 
praise their commitment to the cause whilst objecting to their actions.  This is evidently 
unacceptable because it is this so-called commitment to the cause that led to their 
carrying out crimes in the first place; enthusiasm of this sort is completely wrong.  (In 
other words, this interpretation would treat the revolutionaries in the same way that 
Krasnoff treats the spectators.)  The difficulty is, however, easily resolved when we note 
that the ‘revolutionaries’ Kant discusses in this passage are in fact not rebelling against 
authority (which is always illegitimate) but rather defending the (new) state against 
‘counter-revolutionary’ attack.  As this new state approximates ‘the pure concept of 
right’, it is a worthy stimulus of ‘genuine enthusiasm’.
It should be clear by now that Kant uses the term ‘revolution’ in a rather elastic 
sense.  In its strict form, it refers to the violent overthrow of government.  When 
discussing revolution in this sense, Kant is always unambiguously hostile.  This is 
evident not only in texts such as The Metaphysics of Morals but even, as noted earlier, 
in ‘An Old Question’ itself, where we find Kant telling us that ‘revolution … is always 
unjust’ (§6 n., 7:87).  The ‘French Revolution’ according to this use of the term signifies 
the events of 1789.  At the same time, Kant also uses ‘revolution’ to refer to the broader 
process of change initiated by and including successful rebellion.  Accordingly, ‘[t]he 
revolution of a gifted people which we have seen unfolding in our day’ (§6, 7:85, 
underlining added for emphasis) is the on-going sequence of events started in 1789 but 
running on throughout the 1790s.  This ‘French Revolution’ signifies (primarily) the 
establishment, development and defence of the republic subsequent to the toppling of 
the old regime.  It is the ‘revolutionaries’ of the later phase whom Kant adduces as 
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manifesting moral enthusiasm, not their predecessors, whom we might call the actual 
revolutionaries.211
This strategy smacks of a forced compartmentalization.  How can Kant be so sure 
that the criminality of the revolution is located only in the initial moment of rebellion?  
His mention of ‘misery and atrocities’ could mean that he does not think this, but if this 
were so, then the revolutionaries of the second, republican phase could hardly be 
claimed to show a ‘passionate participation in the good’ (§6, 7:86).  It is more plausible 
to assume that Kant takes the ‘misery and atrocities’ attending the revolution in the 
second stage to be those inflicted by the counter-revolutionary forces of the rest of 
Europe, and in response to which the ‘revolutionaries’ display their ‘zeal and grandeur 
of soul’.
The claim that events reveal a ‘moral tendency’ is likely to provoke suspicion.  How 
can Kant be sure that republican enthusiasm is morally motivated given his frequently 
expressed insistence that one cannot infer from acts to motives?  The mere fact that 
republicanism accords with morality is insufficient, as it also accords with the self-
interest of most, if not all, people.  Nevertheless, Kant is justified in proceeding as he 
does, for two reasons.  Firstly, he emphasizes those aspects of republican sentiment 
which make it more plausible to think of it as emanating from a ‘moral character’.  In 
the case of the spectators, he can appeal to (a) their impartiality, as evidenced for 
example when it is expressed by, say, Germans, in support of republicans in far away 
places such as France – ‘more than a hundred miles removed’! (§6 n., 7:86); (b) the 
dangers (censorship, calumny etc) faced by those making republican declarations; (c) 
the very gradualism with which republicanism is urged.212  All three factors cut against 
the imputation of self-interest.  Similarly, one of the reasons why revolutionary soldiers 
are claimed to display ‘genuine enthusiasm’ is that they are prepared to die in defence 
of the principles of right (cf. Critique of Judgment, §28, 5:263 on the sublimity of war).  
Secondly, Kant describes the ‘proof’ of the moral character in decidedly weak terms: 
                                                
211 This interpretation is similar to those advanced previously by Seebohm, ‘Kant’s Theory of 
Revolution’, and Brandt, ‘Zum “Streit der Fakultäten” ’.  Brandt writes that: ‘The French Revolution 
to which Kant refers does not relate to the events of 1789, as is usually supposed, but rather the 
revolutionary process, or ‘evolution’ of the 1790’s’ (p. 50, my translation).  However, Kant seems 
much more taken with the ‘revolutionary’ defence of the republic.  Seebohm similarly neglects this 
feature.
212 Kant emphasizes the disinterestedness of progressivists in ‘Theory and Practice’: ‘the mind is 
nevertheless cheered up by the prospect that matters could become better in the future, and indeed 
with unselfish benevolence, since we shall be long in our graves and shall not harvest the fruits we 
have helped to sow’ (8:309).
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the sought-for occurrence merely ‘points to’ the moral character, in the manner of a 
‘sign’ or ‘intimation’ (§5, 7:84).  This accords with Kant’s concession that there are 
circumstances in which we have to make judgments about underlying moral character, 
in which case we have no option but to ‘read it off’ from empirical actions.213  
We can now understand why Kant holds that the spectators display a moral 
enthusiasm with regard to the revolution.  It is, as noted earlier, essentially an 
enthusiasm for republicanism, but one which is inspired by the moral enthusiasm 
displayed by the defenders of the French Republic.  Why then does Kant only appeal to 
the spectators as revealing the ‘moral tendency’ when section six makes it clear that 
some of the ‘actors’ do as well (and indeed that the spectators’ enthusiasm is dependent 
on that of these actors)?  To address this issue, we first need to look at the second 
difficulty mentioned above, namely the question of how the ‘occurrence’ of the 
revelation of the spectators’ mode of thinking stands in relation to the question of 
progress.
What Kant is looking for is some sign of a ‘moral tendency’ which would amount to 
the ‘disposition and capacity of the human race to be the cause of its own advance 
toward the better’.  The occurrence which section six appeals to seems inadequate in 
this respect.  Is there not a serious mismatch between what it reveals and what Kant 
requires for his assertions about progress?  The moral tendency of the spectators may be 
genuine, but does it in fact amount to a capacity to move humanity forward?  It seems 
instead to issue merely in the hope for progress, rather than the action which would 
deliver on this hope.  Indeed, if one were looking for representatives of humanity’s 
ability to advance toward the better, would one not be far more likely to opt instead for 
the obviously active revolutionaries in France – and is this not what the enthusiasm of 
the spectators itself indicates?  In this case, the spectators’ moral hope for progress 
would be invoked and sustained by the progressive agency of the French republicans.
We can start to resolve this problem by recalling that the response of the spectators is 
manifested ‘publicly [öffentlich]’ (§6, 7:85).  The onlookers are characterized as passive 
in contrast with the active revolutionaries (‘the uninvolved public [Publicum] looking 
on … without the least intention of assisting [Mitwirkung]’ (§6, 7:87), but this does not 
mean that they are wholly contemplative in their response.  On the contrary, they 
actively engage in public debate about the significance of the revolution, the validity of 
                                                
213 Cf. Religion, 6:71-7, and, for commentary, Louden’s discussion, Kant’s Impure Ethics, p. 148, which 
follows that of Kleingeld, Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants, pp. 72-75.
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the principles of right and the attitude of other states to the new republic.  It is only by 
virtue of this activity that the spectators demonstrate their moral mode of thinking.  We 
should not therefore be misled by Kant’s use of the term ‘spectator’ into thinking that 
the ‘uninvolved public’ is wholly passive.214
It remains the case that their activity is fairly modest in comparison with that of the 
revolutionaries.  More to the point, it is still not at all clear how the former agency is 
connected to ‘the disposition and capacity of the human race to be the cause of its own 
advance toward the better’ (§5, 7:84).  If we suppose that the spectators’ mode of 
thinking is publicly expressed in the form of hope for (non-revolutionary) progress, or a 
belief that humanity ought to make such progress, then the original problem returns.  
Hope no doubt reveals a moral character, but not one which can yet deliver on this hope.
Kant’s response must be to stress that the spectators are doing more than just 
declaring their hope for progress: they are themselves pressing for and thereby helping 
to engineer that very progress.  The public interventions they make serve both to secure 
increased public endorsement of the principles of right and to encourage the powers that 
be to take heed of these principles (cf. §8, 7:89).  Kant touches in particular on the latter 
point in the two footnotes to section six.  The first of these discusses ‘the grumbling of 
the subjects, provoked not by the internal policy of the government but by the conduct 
of the latter toward foreigners, if perchance that conduct should hinder them [i.e. the 
foreigners] in their republican tendencies’ (§6 n., 7:86, translation amended).  This must 
surely refer to those ‘spectators’ who take it upon themselves to protest about their 
government’s penchant for military ventures against the French republic.  The second 
footnote touches on the even more delicate topic of ‘internal policy’: ‘A being endowed 
with freedom … can and should therefore … demand no other government for the 
people to which he belongs than one in which the people are co-legislative’ (§6 n., 7:87, 
underlining added for emphasis).   This demand, though, has to be addressed as a 
request to the existing authorities to govern ‘in a republican way, that is, in the spirit of 
republicanism and on an analogy with it’ (Kant having had to add here the vital 
qualification that republican government ‘may not come to pass through revolution 
which is always unjust’).
The spectators’ efforts are thus directed toward the peaceful promotion of 
republicanism, primarily at home, by encouraging republican reform, but also, by trying 
                                                
214 Cf. Krasnoff, ‘The Fact of Politics: History and Teleology in Kant’, p. 32.
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to influence the home state’s foreign policy, abroad.  This action is aimed at bringing 
about progress and does directly demonstrate the moral causality required to produce it.  
At the same time, this action itself indicates an actual advance, given that such public 
clamour had not been in evidence previously.  The present therefore reveals much more 
than a mere moral call for progress; on Kant’s account it displays the endeavour to 
make progress, which is itself progress.  Accordingly, he writes that the ‘moral 
character of humanity’ demonstrated by the spectators ‘not only permits people to hope 
for progress toward the better, but is already itself progress in so far as its capacity is 
sufficient for the present’ (§6, 7:85).  Our desire for evidence of humanity’s ability to 
act as the ‘author’ of its advance toward the better is thereby fully met.  Indeed, Kant 
seems to want to suggest that we could ask for no more progress than that which the 
spectators have made and are making.
The problem remains: the progress that the spectators themselves want and are 
pressing for has yet to occur.  We may accept that it is progress for them to be pressing 
for it, and even allow that circumstances may be propitious, such that it is not 
unreasonable to expect that it will come about.  Yet until it does, the evidence that 
humanity is able to make progress must be judged to be exiguous.  To put the point 
another way: Kant can certainly refer to his ‘occurrence’ in order to show that humanity 
has a ‘moral character’ but not that it is the ‘author’ of its advance toward the better.  To 
make the latter claim is to anticipate the intended effects of the spectators’ actions.  
Perhaps this is a little too harsh; the spectators could be said at least to be trying at 
present to act in an authorial role, i.e. displaying the ‘disposition’ if not the ‘capacity’.  
However, the issue of the possible effectiveness of their efforts remains open.
We can now return to the question of why Kant does not refer to the moral 
enthusiasm of the second-phase revolutionaries in support of his identification of a 
‘moral tendency’.  He omits to mention them, not because their actions fail to reveal 
genuine enthusiasm (for they do reveal this), but instead because their behaviour, unlike 
that of the spectators, does not provide a satisfactory model of progressive agency.  
Change must come about gradually and peacefully, and so whilst the ‘zeal and grandeur 
of soul’ of the revolutionary soldiers can inspire the spectators, it is not what they 
should aspire to.
Kant’s interpretation of the present is meant to provide the basis for an answer to the 
‘old question’.  And yet the question itself is somewhat ambiguous.  As conveyed in the 
sub-title, it would seem that the entirety of humanity’s historical existence is at issue.  
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Accordingly, we could express it as ‘is the human race always in constant progress 
toward the better?’  However, Kant starts the essay by declaring that our interest in the 
question relates explicitly to the future: ‘We desire a fragment of human history and 
one, indeed, that is drawn not from past but from future time’ (§1, 7:79).  The question 
could therefore be put as follows: ‘will the human race henceforth be in constant 
progress toward the better?’  This bifurcation is then replicated in the ways in which 
Kant builds on section six.  One direction he takes is to argue that because humanity has 
the ‘disposition and capacity’ to make progress, we can assert that it ‘has always been in 
progress toward the better and will continue to be so henceforth’ (§7, 7:88), that is, to 
answer affirmatively the maximal version of the question.  The other route he follows is 
to focus on the present occurrence and use this to provide warrant for a strong claim 
about the future: ‘I predict [the human race’s] progress toward the better, which, from 
now on, turns out to be no longer completely retrogressive’ (§7, 7:88), i.e. to engage 
with the question in its restricted form.  Not only are there these two distinct lines of 
argument, but they appear to be in conflict.  I will proceed to deal with them in turn, 
looking first at the argument for the claim about the future.
In section seven, Kant argues that the progress initiated in the present will continue 
indefinitely into the future because of the historical singularity of the current 
‘occurrence’:
That is, I predict [humanity’s] progress toward the better, which, from now on, turns out to be no 
longer completely retrogressive [rückgängig].  For such a phenomenon [§6’s ‘occurrence’] in 
human history will not be forgotten, because it has revealed a tendency and faculty in human 
nature for improvement [zum Besseren] such that no politician, affecting wisdom, might have 
conjured out of the course of things hitherto existing....  (§7, 7:88)
According to this quite remarkable claim, what guarantees the course of future progress 
is the revelation in the present of humanity’s ‘disposition and capacity’ to make 
progress.  Not only does the moral engagement of the spectators demonstrate this to the 
philosophical interpreter, it does so to a wider audience as well.   Presumably, Kant 
takes it that the spectators themselves understand their comportment to reveal 
humanity’s ability to advance toward the better (this would help explain their 
‘enthusiasm’); if the revelation is unforgettable, it must certainly be apparent to those 
for whom it is contemporary no less than to those who will be able to look back on it.  
The assertion of ‘unforgettability’ also requires that the present demonstrates a break 
with the past, ‘the course of things hitherto’: the ‘disposition and capacity’ could not 
have been apparent prior to its manifestation in the present (had it done so, the latter 
would not be particularly remarkable).
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The unforgettability of the ‘phenomenon’ serves to secure future progress by 
providing a permanent stimulus to renewed attempts to make progress.  It matters, 
therefore, because future progress will not be a straightforward linear ascent.  Instead, it 
is quite likely that there will be reverses and set-backs, in which case recourse to the 
recollection of this original moment of progressive impetus will be vital to getting 
things back on course.  The assertion that humanity will continue to make progress does 
not exclude the possibility of moments of retrogression or stagnation, but claims that 
there is now a guarantee that these will not derail the process.  Accordingly, the extent 
to which Kant can answer the ‘old question’ positively with regard to the future is 
already somewhat qualified: he cannot justifiably forecast constant future progress, but 
rather progress overall.
There is a weaker form of this argument, with which Kant’s should not be confused.  
This weaker version would simply state that any progressive period can serve to inspire 
future generations to continue along the same path.  Appeal is made in this weaker 
argument to the possibility that any such period could be recalled subsequently.  Kant, 
by contrast, is making the stronger claim that his era will not be forgotten.  It therefore 
underwrites future progress, rather than merely making it more likely.  The weaker 
version also fails to accord priority to any particular period, whereas Kant implies that 
his is unique, and so will not be superseded in this respect by subsequent periods, even 
if greater progress is achieved during these.
What, though, of the memorability of the revolution itself?  Kant does mention it in 
the context of the ‘unforgettability’ argument:
But even if the end viewed in connection with this occurrence should now not be attained, even if 
the revolution or reform of a national constitution should finally miscarry, or, after some time had 
elapsed, everything should relapse into its former rut (as politicians now prophesy), that 
philosophical prediction still would lose nothing of its force. - For that occurrence is too important, 
too much interwoven with the interest of humanity, and its influence too widely propagated in all 
areas of the world to not be recalled on any favourable occasion by the nations which would then 
be roused to a repetition of new efforts of this kind…. (§7, 7:88, translation amended)
This passage has been cited by those who want to argue that Kant’s ‘occurrence’ is in 
fact the revolution, not the attitude of the spectators.215  It has to be said that Kant’s 
precise meaning here is not clear.  Is he really asserting that the memorability of the 
revolution will stimulate the future revolutionary ventures?  This is plausible enough, 
but hardly consistent with what he has urged elsewhere.  It is more likely, I suggest, that 
Kant is trying here to convey his recognition that the establishment and defence of the 
                                                
215 E.g. Van der Linden, Kantian Ethics and Socialism, pp. 168-9.
The Conflict of the Faculties 137
French Republic will also function as an ‘unforgettable’ spur to renewed efforts at 
implementing republican principles, though of a different kind.
Kant takes issue in ‘An Old Question’ with conceptions of historical progress that 
rely upon a putative increase in the ‘quantity of good’ in individuals’ predispositions 
from generation to generation (§3, 7:81-2), or the enlargement over time of the ‘moral 
foundation in humanity’ (§9, 7:91-2).  The ‘moral character’ which section six identifies 
must therefore be one which pertains to humanity as a whole and at all times, not just its 
current, ‘enlightened’ members.  The question then arises as to why this ‘character’, or 
‘disposition and capacity’ to make progress, was not apparent before.  Kant presumably 
must hold that only now have conditions proved to be propitious for it.  Such conditions 
would include the general social and political level of development.  One particularly 
important factor would be the existence of a public sphere in which the spectators can 
air their views and suggest reforms to the authorities.216  Kant is therefore not committed 
to the claim that enlightened spectators are more moral than their ancestors.
The fact that circumstances are right now gives us reason to assume either that they 
will remain so, or, less ambitiously, that they can become so again.  Kant’s stress on the 
function of the unforgettability of the initial ‘occurrence’ suggests that he thinks that 
conditions will fluctuate in the future, being ‘favourable’ at some times, and not at 
others (cf. the passage from §7, 7:88 cited on the previous page).  Yet such alterations 
will be relatively superficial, given that we are meant to take it that they will not 
seriously impact upon the existence and continued development of the international 
public sphere which is one of the conditions both for the continuing memorability of the 
‘occurrence’ and for the exercise of the ‘tendency for improvement’ itself.
However, Kant cannot allow himself to be too confident.  Conditions may be right 
for the expression of the moral tendency, and developments in France may encourage 
the belief that republican constitutions are not impracticable, but circumstances do not 
yet bode well for republican reform.  In particular, the powers that be do not seem 
receptive to the recommendations of their enlightened subjects.  Consequently, it is not 
yet clear that pressure for reform will bear fruit.  For this to happen, conditions will 
have to become still more propitious.217
                                                
216 This sphere is constituted in large part by journals such as the ones in which Schlegel’s and Beddoes’ 
articles (and those of Kant’s discussed in the previous chapters) were published.
217 Cf. Kleingeld, Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants,  p. 76.
The Conflict of the Faculties 138
As well as arguing that the ‘occurrence’ justifies optimism about the future, Kant 
also attempts to use it to demonstrate the actuality of progress in the past: ‘the human 
race has always been in progress toward the better and will continue to be so
henceforth’ (§7, 7:88).  Section Five, which outlines the general argument into which 
section six’s ‘occurrence’ is then fitted in order to generate the conclusions drawn in 
section seven, makes it explicit that it is intended to demonstrate the actuality of 
progress, present, future and past:
There must be some experience in the human race which, as an event, points to the disposition and 
capacity of the human race to be the cause of its own advance toward the better, and (since this 
should be the act of a being endowed with freedom), toward the human race as being the author of 
this advance.  But from a given cause an event as an effect can be predicted [only] if the 
circumstances prevail which contribute to it.  That these conditions must come to pass some time 
or other can, of course, be predicted in general, as in the calculation of probability in games of 
chance; but that prediction cannot enable us to know whether what is predicted is to happen in my 
life and I am to have the experience of it. – Therefore, an occurrence must be sought which points 
to the existence of such a cause and to its effectiveness in the human race, undetermined with 
regard to time, and which would allow progress toward the better to be concluded as an inevitable 
consequence.  This conclusion then could also be extended to the history of the past (that it had 
always been in progress) in such a way that that occurrence would have to be considered not itself 
as the cause of progress, but only as an intimation, a historical sign (signum rememorativum, 
demonstrativum, prognostikon) demonstrating the tendency of the human race viewed in its 
entirety....  (§5, 7:84, translation amended and underlining added for emphasis)
The basic argument is straightforward enough.  If humanity is to progress toward the 
better, it must have the ability to bring this about, in an intentional and therefore moral 
fashion.  If it has this capacity (and conditions are right), it must be possible to detect 
that it has it via an ‘experience’ which ‘points to’ it.  Once we have such an experience, 
then, as we have seen, future progress can be safely asserted (conditions allowing).  The 
problems arise with the supplementary move Kant makes, extending this ‘conclusion’ to 
‘the history of the past’.  There are two ways in which this could be achieved.  On the 
one hand, it could be supposed that if the experience is not one which is peculiar to its 
time but rather one which could reasonably be assumed to be available at any time, then 
past progress could also be asserted.  On the other hand, as the capacity in question is 
one which inheres in humanity as such, and so is one which past generations possessed 
as well, it can therefore be assumed that they too were making progress, even if this was 
not and is not apparent.  These additional arguments are evidently inadequate.  The first 
is valid, but nothing Kant says suggests it and it is in any case contradicted by section 
seven.  The second argument appears to be what section five is attempting to convey, 
but is invalid: the possession of a capacity is not equivalent to its exercise.
The key phrase comes in the very middle of the paragraph, the qualification of ‘its 
effectiveness [den Act ihrer Causalität]’ by ‘undetermined with regard to time 
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[unbestimmt in Ansehung der Zeit]’.  This would seem to be the element which Kant 
thinks entitles him to the subsequent extension of the initial conclusion.  It is very 
difficult to see how it follows from the preceding consideration of ‘conditions’ in the 
second and third sentences.  The line of thought here is that progress claims must be 
based on an experience which indicates the functioning of a moral tendency and not on 
predictions about when future circumstances might be right for it.  Kant admits that it is 
possible to attempt such predictions, but states that they are insufficiently accurate (he 
uses the analogy of predictions based on probability).  More simply, one might think, 
the problem with prediction is that in the absence of the progress which would reveal 
humanity’s ability to bring it about, it is impossible to state exactly what the appropriate 
conditions for it would be.  This discussion of ‘conditions’ and ‘circumstances’ seems 
pertinent to the task of explaining the historical singularity of the sought-for occurrence, 
along the lines I suggested earlier.  It is therefore all the more difficult to see how it can 
issue in the characterization of the event as one which indicates a causality whose 
effectiveness is ‘undetermined with regard to time’ and so which allows of attribution 
across all historical time.  The only way in which Kant could squeeze this out of the 
materials he has to hand is as follows: because I cannot predict when conditions will be 
right, what I must look for instead is an occurrence which is not dependent on 
circumstances, and therefore indicates a capacity which is, has been and always will be 
effective.  But this hardly succeeds: if Kant does find an ‘experience’ which points to 
humanity’s ability to make progress irrespective of conditions, then he would have to 
explain why this remarkable capacity had not been apparent before.  And if it hadn’t 
been apparent before, then the claim that it was in any case always operative is all the 
more perplexing.  Kant’s extension to ‘the history of the past’ in sections five and seven 
is unfounded.  The fact that morally motivated progress is taking place now can at the 
very least give grounds for hope in the future, but it does nothing more than suggest that 
such progress could have occurred in the past.  Moreover, section seven’s main 
argument implies that current moral progress provides grounds for optimism precisely 
because it is novel, thus cutting against the claim that the species has ‘always been in 
progress’ (§5, 7:84).  The priority Kant attributes to the present undermines the attempt 
to give a positive answer to the maximal form of ‘the old question’ and helps explain 
why he directs his attention to future history.  
Kant’s optimism about the future is in better shape than his retrospective assertions 
about the past, but only relatively.  He tries to extract a considerable amount out of what 
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is strictly speaking only as yet pressure for progress, not progress itself.  That public 
support for evolutionary republicanism demonstrates a moral capacity of humanity is 
plausible; whether, and under what conditions, this tendency could become genuinely 
and continuously effective is another question.  
As if in recognition of these problems, in the last third of the essay Kant provides 
another line of argument to shore up his position.  The key section in this regard is the 
ninth, which considers the progress the species can make by means of ‘an increase in 
the products of legality in dutiful actions whatever their motives’ (7:91, underlining
added for emphasis).  In a manner familiar to us from ‘Idea’ and ‘Theory and Practice’, 
Kant outlines the way in which non-moral motivations can generate ‘progress toward 
the better’.  Kant projects this dynamic into the future:
Gradually violence on the part of the powers will diminish and obedience to the laws will increase.  
There will arise in the body politic perhaps more charity and less strife in lawsuits, more reliability 
in keeping one’s word, etc., partly out of love of honour, partly out of well-understood self-
interest.  And eventually this will also extend to nations in their external relations with one another 
up to the realization of the cosmopolitan society. (§9, 7:91-2)
Although, as stressed earlier, the weakest part of Kant’s main argument was its 
extension to include the past, the new argumentative move is explicitly made with 
regard to claims about the future, what ‘will’ be the case.  Again, therefore, the essay’s 
express concern with the future comes to the fore.  The ‘prophetic history’ (of the 
future) may be less vulnerable than the account of the past, but its weakness clearly 
matters more.  At the same time, though, the appeal to prudential and other non-moral 
motivations made in section nine does allow of application to the past.  Indeed there is 
no reason to assume that these factors were not operative in the past and (at least to 
some degree) generated progress then.  In fact Kant must hold that both these things are 
true as otherwise he would have no basis for predicting, as he does, the efficacy of these 
mechanisms in the future.  It is therefore plausible to assume that there has been and 
will continue to be non-morally motivated progress toward the better, independently of 
whatever contribution the ‘moral tendency’ may make to the process.  
The mechanism of self-interest has until now been most effective in spreading 
legality within national communities.  At the level of ‘nations in their external relations 
toward one another’ (§9, 7:92), self-interest, honour, etc, continue to tend to result in 
‘violence on the part of the powers’ (§9, 7:91).  Kant states his expectation that the 
‘negative wisdom’ (§10, 7:93) of prudential rationality will eventually serve to bring an 
end to war.  Human beings, he writes, ‘will see themselves compelled to render the 
greatest obstacle to morality – that is to say war which constantly retards this 
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advancement – firstly by degrees more humane and then rarer, and finally to renounce 
offensive war altogether’ (§10, 7:93, underlining added for emphasis).  This compulsion 
will take the form of the ever-increasing costs, in human and material terms, of 
international conflict.  Kant believes that as the European nations are currently incurring 
these ever-increasing costs as a result of their penchant for counter-revolutionary war, it 
is likely that they will soon be brought to this state: in the conclusion, we read that ‘the 
painful consequences of the present war can compel the political prophet to confess a 
very imminent turn of humanity toward the better that is even now in prospect’ (7:94).
The course of prudential progress proceeds, like that of moral progress, ‘gradually’ 
(§2, 7:91) and ‘by degrees’ (§10, 7:93).  At the same time, the present holds out the 
prospect of a prudentially motivated ‘turn’ toward the better (§C, 7:94), in that an end to 
war – ‘the source of all evil and corruption of morals’ (§6, 7:86) – can now be 
anticipated.
The path of progress is painful, according to the argument of the last third of the 
essay.  Human beings learn the hard way the need for and the means of control over 
their selfish and violent tendencies.  In fact, the process is getting increasingly painful, 
as a result of the ever-increasing destructiveness of warfare.218  To think that this process 
was going to continue in the future would be as much a cause for ‘despair’ (§C, 7:93) as 
hope.  Humanity would then be in the position of a patient who is always told that he is 
improving despite obvious signs to the contrary, and who could only exclaim ‘I’m 
dying of sheer improvement [Ich sterbe vor laute Besserung]’ (§C, 7:93).  ‘No pain, no 
gain’, the doctor might reply, but this is itself unlikely to reassure the patient if the pain 
shows no indication of lessening.  What the patient needs to hear is that the treatment is 
imminently going to turn around and acquire a more straightforwardly progressive 
character.  This then is what Kant tells those of his readers worrying about ‘the health of 
humanity and its progress toward the better [zum Besseren]’ – it will not die in the 
course of its ‘improvement [Besserung]’ (§C, 7:93).
Kant’s answer to the old question is emphatic: ‘the human race has always been in 
progress toward the better and will continue to be so henceforth’ (§7, 7:88).  He 
describes this ‘proposition’ as ‘valid for the most rigorous theory, in spite of all 
skeptics, and not just a well-meaning and a commendable proposition in a practical 
                                                
218 Kant does not explicitly make this point in ‘An Old Question’, but it is implicit in his supposition that 
the consequences of the present war may be so painful as to provoke a reaction away from war 
altogether.
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respect’.219  The proposition rests upon two separate arguments.  The first appeals to a 
moral tendency for improvement, the second to non-moral factors, in particular 
prudential rationality.  The placing of his ‘proposition’ at the end of the exposition of 
the first argument can suggest that he means the answer to rely exclusively on this.  (It 
has certainly proved possible for some commentators completely to ignore the presence 
of the second line of argument in the text.)220  Yet Kant does articulate the non-moral 
argument very explicitly in the closing sections and makes it the focus of his 
conclusion. 
Kant’s ‘belt and braces’ approach serves to shore up the weaknesses of each 
argument considered on its own.  The ‘moral tendency’ argument fails to justify any 
retrospective assertions of progress and works in relation to the future in large part 
because it is the future and so has yet to happen.  The argument from self-interest is 
much more successful in respect of the past, and thereby can claim warrant for its 
claims about the future, only it deals with a rather erratic and rough kind of progress, the 
kind one wouldn’t wish for.  The ‘very imminent turn of humanity toward the better’ 
which Kant promises in the final sentence of the essay should therefore involve the 
interaction of the two dynamics, which, when working together, should be able to 
achieve consistent and increasingly pain-free progress.   In particular, the ‘moral 
tendency’ will be able to work with the mechanism of self-interest, for example in the 
form of encouragement given to rulers ‘to govern in a republican … way’ (§8, 7:91) 
through appeals to what is in their interest, in particular when this is not immediately 
apparent to them.  Morality can thus mould self-interest in its own image.
It is therefore not just the ‘question’ which Kant repeats from ‘Theory and Practice’: 
the answer too is, in the end, largely the same, if with extra emphasis on the moral 
dynamic.  And yet the manner in which Kant brings in the second part of his answer 
appears to cut against the first part.  Section nine claims that ‘the profit (result) of the 
human being’s striving toward the better can be assumed to reside alone in the good 
deeds of human beings, which will become better and better and more numerous’ (§9, 
7:91).  Kant seems to be saying here that non-morally motivated progress – an increase 
                                                
219 Note the clear implication that belief in progress is not a (quasi-)postulate, ‘valid’ only ‘in a practical 
respect’.
220 For example, Krasnoff alleges that we find in ‘An Old Question’ that ‘Kant has broken sharply with 
the assumptions of “Idea for a Universal History” ’, i.e. the argument that progress depends upon 
prudential responses to violence (what Krasnoff calls ‘the thesis of exhaustion’).  (‘The Fact of 
Politics’, pp. 29-30.)
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in (mere) legality – is all we can justifiably expect.  But what of the ‘moral cause’ which 
Kant enthused about in sections five to seven? 221
There are two lines of thought adduced in section nine in support of the restriction of 
progress to mere legality.  The first stresses that we should not appeal to an ‘ever 
growing quantity of morality with regard to intention’ (§9, 7:91) as either the driving 
force of progress or its outcome.  The advance toward the better will occur ‘without the 
moral foundation of humanity having to be enlarged in the least; for that, a kind of new 
creation would be necessary’ (§9, 7:92).  Notice that Kant does not deny either that 
humanity has a ‘moral foundation’ or that this could be a cause of progress, but only 
that such progress requires or results in its enlargement.  Consequently, a contradiction 
between sections six and nine would exist only if the earlier passage relied upon this 
idea of moral expansion.  As I argued earlier, the moral tendency demonstrated in 
reaction to the revolution does not derive from a sudden increase in humanity’s moral 
basis; instead, it reveals a character that had always been there, yet which can only be 
expressed given certain conditions.
The second, and more pertinent, line of thought invokes Kant’s doctrine of the 
inscrutability of moral or ‘intelligible’ character (cf. A551/B579).  Given that we cannot 
infer from the fact that an action accords with the demands of morality that it was 
performed for that reason, it would seem that there should always be a presumption in 
favour of supposing that such actions are carried out for non-moral reasons.  (This 
would also seem to accord with the doctrine of ‘radical evil’ developed in Religion.)  
Accordingly, our hopes for the future, if they are to remain reasonable, should limit 
themselves to what can be expected from the operation of self-interest, honour, etc.  The 
cautiousness of this approach certainly seems to be in tension with the ‘enthusiasm 
[Enthusiasm]’ (§6, 7:85-6) expressed in the middle sections of the essay.  To see how 
this tension is resolved, or at least managed, we need to consider Kant’s analysis of the 
various ways in which one can try to make judgments about the future.
Kant starts the essay in section one by distinguishing between three types of forecasts 
about the future.  These are what he calls predictive, prophetic and vaticinatory history 
(§1, 7:79).222  Prediction (Vorhersagung) is that manner of knowledge of the future 
                                                
221 Robert Louden identifies ‘an ambiguity within [Kant’s] own presentation’, in that §9 ‘seems to 
contradict directly’ §5 (Kant’s Impure Ethics, p. 147).
222 All three adjectives are emphasized by use of spaced type in Kant’s text, though this is not followed 
through in the Robert Anchor/Mary Gregor translation.  The original version of this, by Anchor alone, 
(published in On History, ed. L. W. Beck) fails to emphasize any of the three words; the latest version, 
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which is based upon induction from past regularities – the example Kant gives is 
astronomical predictions of eclipses.  Prophecy (Wahrsagung) is a non-inductive yet 
(purportedly) empirically based foretelling of the future, as traditionally when sooth-
sayers interpret current and unusual natural occurrences as portents of things to come.  
Vaticination (Weissagung) is also non-inductive, but claims to take its lead from divine 
inspiration, rather than particular facts about the world.223
The reader will inevitably suppose that Kant introduces prophecy and vaticination 
simply in order immediately to dismiss them and turn instead to prediction, which 
would seem to be the only rational way to make claims about the future (Hume 
notwithstanding).  Yet consider the impact this would have on Kant’s endeavour to 
answer the ‘old question’.   Future progress could then only be asserted on the basis of 
past progress, and there would be no room for the kind of argument attempted in 
sections five to seven, whereby future progress is taken to be guaranteed not by 
                                                                                                                                              
Anchor’s text adopted and slightly revised by Gregor (published most recently in Religion and 
Rational Theology) italicizes the first and third term, but not the second (which turns out to be the key 
one).  It has to be conceded that Kant’s syntax is not as clear as we might want it to be in the first
sentence of section one, such that it is possible to interpret it as saying that all claims about the future 
are predictions, of which inductive claims (on this reading not given a specific label), prophecies and 
vaticinations are all versions.  (This is the way R. Makkreel takes it in Imagination and Interpretation 
in Kant, p. 148.)  However, this is not consistent with the way in which Kant goes on to use the three 
terms; in particular, ‘prediction’ (Vorhersagung) is for the most part quite clearly used in connection 
with empirical induction (e.g., §9, 7:91).  The clinching factor supporting my reading of the passage is 
the fact that the three part distinction between prediction, prophecy and vaticination is also made (this 
time somewhat more clearly!) by Kant in §36 of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
(7:187-188).  This book was of course published in the same year as The Conflict of the Faculties 
(1798) and we know that Kant worked on preparing it for publication over 1796 and 1797.  It is 
therefore appropriate to take the two passages in tandem.
    Kant may have been prompted to utilize and develop Anthropology’s account of prediction, 
prophecy and vaticination in ‘An Old Question’ by Schlegel’s review, in which Kant’s use of 
weissagen in Perpetual Peace (8:368 – this text is quoted on p. 111, n. 171 above) is picked up 
(‘Essay on the Concept of Republicanism Occasioned by the Kantian Tract “Perpetual Peace” ’, p. 
129).
223 The Robert Anchor/Mary Gregor translation of The Conflict of the Faculties (included in Religion and 
Rational Theology), translates the German terms in a manner which obliterates the significance of the 
distinctions Kant is drawing.  Taking them in reverse order: weissagend is translated at first as 
‘premonitory’ (§1), but the cognate terms weissagen and weissagenden are subsequently rendered as 
‘prophesy’ and ‘prophetic’ (§§2-3).  In section one and the first paragraph of section two, wahrsagend
and related words are translated by ‘divinatory’, ‘divination’, etc, but then ‘prophesy’ again takes over 
(§2, third and fourth paragraphs, §5 heading, §7 heading and §C).  The translation sticks almost 
entirely to using ‘prediction’ for Vorhersagung, except for the third paragraph of §7, where it is given 
as ‘prophecy’ (and, in the previous line, ‘predict’ is given for wahrsagern!).  It has to be admitted that 
the choice of ‘prophecy’ for Wahrsagung, which I too adopt (though consistently), is slightly 
awkward given that Kant does use the Latinate term prophetisch as a synonym for weissagend in the 
opening section (and we also find the cognates Propheten and Prophezeiung in the third and fourth 
paragraphs of §2 respectively).  Finally, it should be noted that Sehergeist is translated as ‘prophetic 
insight’ in §7.  The version of the essay by H. B. Nisbet included in Kant: Political Writings is 
slightly more careful in respect of marking the distinctions, though this is spoilt by the inexplicable 
failure to translate the key phrase in the opening section where Kant introduces and describes 
Wahrsagung.
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previously experienced regularities but by a presently experienced novelty.  Indeed, the 
character of the forecast made in the essay’s central sections looks rather similar to 
section one’s ‘prophecy’: both involve the interpretation of something new as providing 
the basis for knowledge of the future.  And so it should in fact come as no surprise that 
Kant explicitly uses the language of prophecy to describe the claims he makes there 
about the future.  The headings for sections five and seven both assert that what they are 
providing is ‘prophetic history [wahrsagend Geschichte]’, and we further find reference 
to the ‘historical sign [Geschichtszeichen]’ (§5, 7:84) and ‘aspects and omens [Aspecten 
und Vorzeichen]’ (§7, 7:88) on which it is based.  This apparently rhetorical device 
might seem rather dangerous: why align oneself with the spurious practice of prophecy 
when it would surely be possible to find or create different terms to characterize the 
forecasts one wants to make?  Won’t the skeptic feel encouraged to protest that Kant’s 
prophecies are as subjective and deluded as those of the sooth-sayer? 
In fact, Kant proceeds in section two to claim, in a most subtle way, that prophecy is 
or at least can be perfectly rational.  The future can be known in a non-inductive way if 
what is claimed will happen is being brought about by human action, in particular by the 
action of the ‘prophet’ himself:
HOW CAN WE KNOW IT? [i.e. whether humanity will progress in the future]  As a prophetic 
[wahrsagende] historical narrative of things imminent in future time, consequently as a possible 
representation a priori of events which are supposed to happen then. – But how is history a priori 
possible? – Answer: if the prophet [Wahrsager] himself makes and contrives the events which he 
announces in advance. (§2, 7:79-80, translation amended)
The prophet knows what is going to happen because he is making it happen.  
Wahrsagen is therefore the mode of expectation appropriate to end-directed agents in 
respect of their projects.  Kant then explains how instances of traditional prophecy and 
indeed vaticination also do fit this model, despite appearances to the contrary.  He 
considers three examples: ancient Jewish prophets foretelling doom and gloom, 
contemporary politicians prophesying disaster if republicanism takes hold and, last of 
all, the apocalyptic anticipations of enthusiastic ecclesiastics.  In each case, the claim 
made has some validity, though not because of alleged supernatural communication (as 
in the first and third examples) or worldly insight into human nature (as in the second).  
Rather, this element of truth rests upon the (no doubt disavowed) efforts made by their 
authors to ensure that their prophecies come about.  Kant thus suggests that purportedly 
non-teleological prophecies (whether naturally or supernaturally based), in so far as they 
have any plausibility, do so by virtue of being in fact teleological Wahrsagung, 
according to which the prophets in fact create the states of affairs they foretell.
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Ecclesiastics, too, occasionally vaticinate [weissagen] the complete destruction of religion and the 
imminent appearance of the Antichrist; and in doing so they are performing precisely what is 
requisite to call him up.  This happens because they have not seen to impressing on their parishes 
moral principles which lead directly to the better, but rather fabricate into essential duty 
observances and historical beliefs which are supposed to effect it indirectly….  But then they 
complain about irreligion, which they themselves have caused and thus could have announced in 
advance [vorherverkündigen] even without any special prophetic gift [Wahrsagergabe]. (§2, 7:80, 
translation amended)
The explicit purpose of section two is to expose and poke fun at the duplicity of the 
anti-progressivists, with Kant’s irony very much directed against the reactionaries of his 
own day, both the Prussian clerics who had earlier had his own work censored and the 
political opponents of republicanism, such as Edmund Burke.   Yet his characterization 
of prophecy as ‘history a priori’ is surely not merely ironic, as some have claimed.224  As 
we have seen, Kant himself uses the term ‘Wahrsagen’ later in the essay.  How then do 
the claims of sections five to seven fit the account of ‘prophecy’ given in section two?  
In general terms, quite well.  Prophecy requires the production of future events, so in 
cases where a teleological endeavour is underway, prophecy is possible.  In the earlier 
passage, the ‘prophet … makes and contrives the event which he announces in advance 
[zum Voraus]’ (§2, 7:80); subsequently, we read that the desired ‘prophetic history’ is 
only possible if humanity becomes ‘the author of [its] advance [Fortrücken]’ (§5, 7:84).  
Accordingly, Lewis White Beck is right to identify Kant’s answer to the ‘old question’ 
in these central sections with ‘history a priori’: ‘the Idea of history will be realized only 
if we act in the faith that it can be realized, and produce those events which will 
exemplify it’.225
At the same time, Kant’s ‘prophecy’ is importantly dissimilar to those he dissects in 
section two.  Firstly, the prophets there themselves produce the events they foretell, 
                                                
224 Booth, ‘Reason and History’, p. 63; Fenves, A Peculiar Fate, p. 185.
225 On History, p. xxv.  Peter Fenves has urged that we should not apply §2’s analysis of prophecy to 
what Kant is himself trying to provide in the essay (A Peculiar Fate: Metaphysics and World-History 
in Kant, p. 188 n. 9).   If Fenves’ point were simply that Kant’s ‘prophecy’ is in some particular 
respects unlike those made by the ecclesiastics and politicians, then he would be correct but not 
thereby able to deny the reflexive application of the general model of prophecy which is advanced in 
§1 and §2.  Fenves’ claim, however, rests upon the argument that Kant’s §7 forecast cannot count as a 
teleological prophecy because ‘the decisive moment of [‘An Old Question’] it is not at all the 
“production” of an event but, rather, the event as a reception’ (p. 188 n. 9; cf. pp. 256-257 also).  
Fenves is clearly confused here.  It would appear that he takes Kant’s focus on the response of 
spectators to an event (the French Revolution) to mean that the relevant capacity of humanity which is 
identified thereby is not a productive one (in contrast to the evidently productive capacity of the 
revolutionaries).  But Kant clearly intends for us to understand the spectators’ responses to have 
intended effects (getting rulers to govern in a more republican way and to make moves toward 
perpetual peace).  In other words, they do indicate a productive causality which is meant to fit into the 
template of ‘history a priori’.  Fenves is in all probability led astray by his aestheticized approach to 
Kant, which inclines him to view the spectators as if they are merely spectators, looking on as if in a 
theatre, whereas for Kant they are supposed to be agents in the public sphere.
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being in a position to do so, with the power appropriate to their status as leaders.  Kant, 
on the other hand, is appealing to the agency of ‘humanity’ as a whole.  Secondly, 
traditional prophets are false prophets – not because what they say isn’t true, but 
because they merely pretend (consciously or not) to be receiving supernatural 
inspiration or reading signs and omens.  Kant, by contrast (and paradoxically), is a true 
prophet,226 and for two reasons: (a) he avows the teleological agency on which the 
prophecy rests; (b) he attempts a genuine interpretation of the ‘aspects and omens of our 
day’ (§7, 7:88) in order to be able to detect the agency involved.   In short, he does both 
what traditional prophets can’t do and what they merely pretend to do.
Traditional prophecies of the kind analyzed in section two are self-fulfilling, in that 
getting other people to believe in them is part of what is required to make them come 
true.227  Of course, the members of the laity under the influence of ‘inspired’ 
ecclesiastics, for example, who believe in the forecast do so for the wrong reason, that 
is, they take it to be a supernaturally guided vaticination, and not, as Kant tells us it in 
fact is, a teleological prophecy.  Kant’s prophecy is also to an extent self-fulfilling, 
though in a transparent manner.  Its truth likewise depends on its being believed, but in 
this case because the belief sustains the agency which is making the prophecy true.228
Kant’s prophecy is based upon his identification of the appearance in the present of a 
‘moral tendency’ from which future progress can be forecast.  What, then, about his 
second argument, which bases its forecast on the mechanism of self-interest and other 
supposedly ‘physical’ causes?  Here, we should not be surprised to find, Kant uses 
Vorhersagung: ‘we have only empirical data (experiences) upon which we are founding 
this prediction’ (§9, 7:91, underlining added for emphasis).  Unlike the ‘prophetic 
                                                
226 Compare Hegel, for whom ‘prophecy [Prophizeien] not the business of the philosopher’ (Lectures on 
the Philosophy of World History, p. 171).
227 The phrase ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ was coined by the sociologist Robert Merton in 1948.  He used it 
to describe the syndrome whereby a false belief evokes behaviour which in turn makes the originally 
false conception come true (Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 477).  The phrase in fact fits Kant’s 
account of Wahrsagen more accurately, as in this making the belief public, actually prophesying, is 
necessary to the process, whereas with Merton’s instances it is not.
228 The only commentator I have come across who has attempted to engage with Kant’s claim to be 
providing ‘prophetic history’ is Rudolf Makkreel, in Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, pp. 148-
151.  However, he identifies ‘prophecy’ solely with the practice of divination, the reading of ‘signs’, 
‘aspects and omens’: ‘Wahrsagende history thus involves a reflective art of interpreting historical 
events rather than a determinant science of explaining them.’ (p. 149).  Admittedly, Makkreel does see 
that teleology enters into Kant’s prophecy (cf. pp. 148-149, 151) but not prophecy as such.  (In other 
words, he relies only upon §1’s characterization of wahrsagen, and passes over §2’s.)  In addition, he 
does not notice the important contrast between prophecy and prediction.
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history’ of sections five to seven, which was able to eschew reference to the past, the 
prediction of non-morally motivated progress is explicitly grounded by it.229
Kant’s answer to the ‘old question’ is therefore achieved by means of both prediction 
and prophecy.  The predictive approach examines the historical record cautiously and 
inductively, presuming neither to infer moral motivation nor to take the present as 
opening onto a different future.  Prophecy, by contrast, seeks to interpret current events 
in such a way as to adduce the ‘moral character’ of humanity and to declare a new 
epoch for it.
                                                
229 Conversely, ‘prediction’ is a wholly inappropriate schema to use in relation to moral progress (cf. p. 
137), as Kant explains in §§3-4 (7:81-4) – note especially the use of Vorhersagung in the first 
sentence of §3 (7:81) and the emphasized use of vorhersagen in the first paragraph of §4 (7:83). 
    (Unfortunately, Kant’s use of ‘prophecy’ and ‘prediction’ terms is not always as clear-cut as my 
presentation would have it, although for the most part it is.  In particular, we find ‘predict’ and 
‘prediction’ employed in §7 to elaborate on what the heading assures us is ‘prophetic history’ (§7, 
7:88).)
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Chapter Nine: Secularization
It is commonly thought that modern philosophical history of a positive, progressivist, or 
teleological character (which I will henceforth refer to simply as philosophical history) 
should be understood as a secularization of religious beliefs, in particular Christian 
ones.  At its most basic level, this claim asserts that philosophical history translates 
theological notions of a hoped-for end state for humanity into a purely mundane 
dimension.  What I would like to do in this final chapter is: (i) assess this interpretative 
and evaluative strategy in general terms; (ii) consider two notable contributions to the 
debate about ‘secularization’; (iii) examine the applicability of the thesis to Kant’s 
philosophy of history.
The secularization thesis appears in many forms, and these themselves can be classified 
in a number of different ways.  To start off, it will be helpful to make some basic 
distinctions.  The most important one of these is also the simplest: does the proponent of 
the thesis think that the secularization identified in the philosophical history in question 
is a good thing or a bad thing?  Is the fact of secularization to be praised or criticized?  
The usual tendency is to suppose that the process is pernicious, often because the use of 
the hypothesis is taken to show that there is something disingenuous or deluded about 
the philosophical endeavour being examined: the critic is pointing up something which
the philosopher would not want or be able to avow.  However, the secularization 
interpretation is by no means the sole preserve of the enemies of philosophical history, 
even though the term itself has come to prominence in their hands.  As we shall see, 
philosophical history usually understands itself, in various ways, as a secularization of 
religion, and indeed takes this as one of its strengths.  Consideration of the thesis must 
therefore commence with the recognition that it can be advanced in both a positive and 
a negative fashion, both from within (or on behalf of) philosophical history and from 
without.  A second level of distinction relates to the extent to which the process of 
secularization establishes significant distance from religion.  For some advocates, the 
interpretation reveals that philosophical history remains effectively religious, and so 
there is an underlying continuity between what went before and what follows.  On the 
other hand, it is also possible to stress the degree of transformation achieved by means 
of secularization, such that there is still a genetic reference back to the theological 
antecedents, but one which has become vestigial.  Putting these two distinctions 
together, four basic positions within the secularization debate can be identified:
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Philosophical history:
Good Bad
Stress on continuity Position A Position C
Stress on discontinuity Position B Position D
Table 1
Position A.  According to this version, secularization would be a good thing, 
maintaining continuity with the religious ideas and needs which it took over.  Hegel’s 
philosophy of history can be interpreted as achieving a secularization of this kind, 
according to which Christianity fulfils itself in the historical realm.  The dimension of 
the divine is not dissolved in the process, but preserved and realized.230  
Position B.  Post-Hegelian philosophers, from Feuerbach to Habermas, are also 
prone to claim that the transformation of religion into philosophical history is a good 
thing, but in their eyes because it does eliminate what was essentially religious.  In 
being brought fully down to earth, Christian expectations and historical schemas are 
thereby given truth-value, but in the process are rendered irreligious.231
Position C.  If Hegel and others think that their accounts of human history have value 
by virtue of the way in which they retain a religious quality, the contrary and critical 
claim is possible as well.  Indeed, this position, using the secularization hypothesis to 
identify a continuity with religion which then is used to condemn the intellectual project 
in question, is undoubtedly the most popular.  It certainly goes back to Nietzsche and 
crops up frequently to characterize and dismiss speculative philosophy of history.232  
Position D.  Finally, the secularization claim can be utilized to criticize philosophical 
history as a perversion of religion.  According to this position, translating religious 
schemas into the mundane, historical realm traduces and falsifies them.
The table can be given a different spin if we make the vertical axis reflect the 
positive and negative attitudes towards religion involved:
                                                
230 Thus K. L. Michelet, Hegel’s pupil and disciple, writing in 1843: ‘The goal of (Hegelian) history is 
the secularization of Christianity’ (cited by Löwith in From Hegel to Nietzsche, p. 403).
231 Thus Jürgen Habermas: ‘might not secularization in the sense of demythologization bring out the 
moment of truth in myth? … Secularization is then admittedly the progressive critical appropriation of 
traditions which are the sole source for the logos of a humanity that is to be realized through the 
historical mediation of nature with the human world.’  (‘Karl Löwith: Stoic Retreat from Historical 
Consciousness’, pp. 92-3.)
232 For example, Michael Forster: ‘As Nietzsche implies in The Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life, the popularity of this sort of historicism [teleological universal history] is all too easily explained 
in terms of its perpetuation in a modified guise of recently discredited theological dogmas, and 
gratification thereby of the culturally habitual emotional wants formerly satisfied by them.’ (Hegel’s 
Idea, p. 294 n. 10)
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Philosophical history
Good  bad
Religion: good Position A Position D
Religion: bad Position B Position C
Table 2
Notice here that C and D have swopped places.
For positions A and B, then, secularization is a legitimizing term; for C and D, by 
contrast, it serves as a delegimitizing term.233  Positions A and B therefore relate directly 
to types of philosophical history, and the labels can be used to refer to these, whereas C 
and D have philosophical histories in general as their targets. 
Do positions A and B exhaust the range of relevant philosophical history?  It seems 
plausible to assume that they do, given that between them they cover a very wide 
continuum, from the explicitly theological to the completely irreligious.  In particular, 
position B can take in theories which concede only the most vestigial, rhetorical or 
tactical similarity to religion.  Even those which do not even claim this much can 
reasonably be described in terms of secularization if only as a way of responding to and 
rebutting those who seek in a hostile manner to diagnose in them the lingering remnants 
of Christianity.234  
One reason why philosophical historians are prone to articulate their theories in ways 
which either implicitly or explicitly advert to secularization is that the process can be 
seen as an instance of the progress which the theories seek to describe.235  Philosophical 
history can thereby reflectively account for its own historical advent.  Conversely, its 
critics can also see it as part of a wider process of secularization, but one which is 
interpreted as decline.  Indeed, some come close to constructing an inverse image of the 
object of their criticism, a Verfallsgeschichte.236
Accordingly, we can take modern philosophical history as coming in either A or B 
form, with critical positions C and D aligned alongside them.  Table 2 above reveals a 
level of lateral affinity between the critical versions of the secularization thesis and their 
objects.  Of course, both C and D will take equal exception to A and B together, but the 
varying attitudes toward religion which separate them mean that each has a particular 
                                                
233 Cf. Robert Pippin, Idealism as Modernism, pp. 269-271.
234 Could a philosophical history credibly disavow any historical or philosophical connection with 
religious belief?  This is just about conceivable, but does not seem to be a genuine possibility in the 
modern Western context.  Certainly all the key instances of the genre do evince the requisite relation 
to religion.
235 For example, as with the Habermas citation in n. 231 above.
236 Habermas, ‘Karl Löwith’, p. 83.
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force with regard to one of the types of philosophical history.  Thus position C attacks 
both A and B for being religious, but as B-type philosophical history denies that it is 
(still) religious, the C-critic has a more interesting case to make, that is, uncovering the 
latent presence of religious elements in theories which assert their freedom from them.   
In doing so, it can appeal to its affinity with position B, for both are anti-religious.  Its 
strategy is in effect to deny that there is a distinction between A and B, that B in fact 
collapses back into A.  The converse is true for D.  It shares with A a positive valuation 
of religion, as opposed to B and C, but exploits this commonality to reveal to A its fall 
away from true faith.  A’s claim to be in some fashion realizing Christianity is shown to 
be deluded; it in fact degrades religion, such that it is on a par with B-type theories.  
Consequently, the basic thrust of position C is to claim that philosophical history is 
essentially continuous with religion (i.e., as per A), notwithstanding the efforts made to 
disguise this (B).  Position D argues the other way, that philosophical history is 
essentially irreligious (i.e., as per B), even if some try to assert the contrary (as in A).  
The affinity in each instance is with the position which ostensibly shares the critic’s 
view of religion; the dialogue which this enables is then turned into a diagnostic 
unmasking.
It is also possible for these lines of affinity to work the other way.  Each type of 
philosophical history may want to distinguish itself from the other and, to this end, can 
line up with the critical position which shares its relation to religion.  Most notably, 
irreligious philosophical history (B) can choose to link up with position C to the extent 
that it wants to distance itself from A-type constructions.  Conversely, A can share with 
D the latter’s objection to B (but not to itself).237  
Laying out the positions in this rough and ready way inevitably distorts some of the 
complexities and subtleties found in the actual engagement with philosophical positions.  
For example, the distinction between positions C and D can blur in practice.  If, for 
example, a proponent of the C approach claims that the residues of religion in 
philosophical history are disavowed by the latter (i.e. as in B), then that history can be 
charged with both being as bad as religion (i.e. C) and worse than it (i.e. D).  The 
Nietzschean suspicion that philosophical history is a hiding-place for religion can be 
sharpened by pointing out its dishonest and cowering character, sarcastically contrasting 
                                                
237 An instance of this strategy can be found in Walter Benjamin’s utilization of religious criticism of 
secular theories of progress to ‘reinfuse’ Marxism with the theology it may have thought it had 
successfully dissolved.
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it with the sublime faith which it timidly attempts to continue.  Conversely, position C 
could blur into B: philosophical history may fail on its account because it involves the 
secularization of religion, but could nonetheless be applauded for at least trying to 
construct a rational schema for the interpretation of history.
The secularization thesis can be applied in ways which demonstrate the genetic 
fallacy.  This occurs when the critic takes the ‘historical origin (or sustaining causes)’ of 
a doctrine to reveal its falsity.238  The readiness to detect the prevalence of this fallacy 
can go hand-in-hand with an insistence on the distinction between the ‘history of ideas’ 
and philosophy proper.  But it would be wrong to dismiss the idea of secularization as 
‘unphilosophical’.  In most instances, it is wielded to identify and focus on the content 
and character of philosophical histories, not merely their origins.  Of course, merely to 
establish that a philosophical doctrine contains or expresses religious ideas is not 
automatically to condemn it: we need to be told (and convinced) why those ideas are 
cause for rejection.  In some cases, this is left unstated, as if it just goes without saying, 
which in turn can attract the suspicion (in fact unwarranted) that the genetic fallacy has 
been committed.239
Karl Löwith is a prominent exponent of the secularization thesis in its negative, critical 
form.  He prosecutes the case in Meaning in History: ‘the following outline aims to 
show that the philosophy of history originates with the Hebrew and Christian faith in a 
fulfilment and that it ends with the secularization of its eschatological pattern’.240  On 
his account, there are two stages to this process of secularization.  In the first place, the 
desired-for future state of fulfilment is transferred to the mundane realm, in history as 
opposed to beyond it.  In the second place, history is shown to be leading toward this 
state, rather than it coming about as a result of apocalyptic intervention from without.  
The eschaton thereby becomes respectively both a historical finis and a historical telos.  
Löwith is aware that both these moves have been made within Christianity, almost from 
the outset, thereby paving the way for the (further) modern secularization of 
eschatology in irreligious philosophy, but argues that they are in essence alien to it.  
What he calls ‘genuine Christianity’ expects nothing from history other than its 
                                                
238 The quoted phrase comes from Forster, Hegel’s Idea, p. 445.
239 Forster helpfully outlines ways in which genetic considerations can contribute to the discrediting of 
doctrines: ibid. pp. 445-6.
240 Meaning in History, p. 2.
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cessation, this being the condition for a transition to a radically different domain.241  The 
forms of religious belief that allow of metamorphosis into philosophy of history only do 
so because they are already essentially secular.  In addition to this particular process, 
whereby the Christian idea of consummation is brought down to earth, as both end and 
goal of history, secularization, as already indicated, also denotes the general process of 
the elimination of religious beliefs.  A fully secular philosophical history would thus 
embody the secularization of the eschaton within an atheistic framework (historical 
materialism probably being the most perfect example for Löwith).  
What genuine Christianity and its various secularized forms have in common is a 
faith in the future.  This goes hand in hand with, in fact is motivated by, dissatisfaction
with the present, past and likely future.  Such hope, ‘living by expectation’,242 is 
contrasted unfavourably with ancient conceptions, in particular Stoicism, which urge an 
affirmative acceptance of the repetitive cyclicality of human life and history: ‘Who 
would be prepared to deny that the classic view is sober and wise, while the Hebrew and 
Christian faith, which erected hope into a moral virtue and religious duty, seems to be as 
foolish as it is enthusiastic?’243  All the same, Löwith articulates a clear preference for 
the genuine Christian conception of hope over its secularized versions (whether 
‘Christian’ or not).  In appealing to a radical and transcendent redemption, it does not 
require the believer to delude herself that things are getting better and that mundane 
satisfactions would be sufficient, nor does it lead to the inevitable pains of 
disconfirmation.  ‘Faith in things invisible cannot be invalidated by any visible 
evidence.’244  ‘Hence hope can never be refuted by so-called “facts”; it can neither be 
assured nor discredited by an established experience.  Hope is essentially confident, 
patient, and charitable.  It therefore releases man from wishful thinking as well as from 
resignation.’245  The purer and more extreme the eschatology, the better – though it 
would be better still, it seems, if it were possible to abandon it altogether.246  
Consequently, he characterizes the secularizations of Christianity, whether ostensibly 
within the tradition or claiming to break with it, as ‘perversions’.247  The two levels of 
                                                
241 For ‘genuine Christianity’, see ibid. pp. v, 28, 29 and passim.
242 Ibid. p. 204.
243 Ibid. p. 205.
244 Ibid. p. 205.
245 Ibid. p. 206.
246 Ironically, as Löwith presents it, pure Christian faith comes close to converging with paganism in its 
ability both to recognize and accept the mundane cyclicality of suffering and death, though as a fallen 
condition, not a natural one.  See his discussion of Augustine, pp. 163, 170.
247 This word and its cognates crop up regularly, e.g., pp. 17, 44, 159, 192.
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contrast, on the one hand between futural expectation and Stoicism and on the other 
between unworldly and worldly forms of futural expectation, enable Löwith to engage 
with philosophical history both in terms of its underlying continuity with Christian 
eschatology and in terms of its transformation (perversion) of it.  This double register 
allows him to criticize philosophical history along the lines of both position C and 
position D simultaneously.
One might wonder at this point whether Löwith has not exaggerated true 
Christianity’s indifference toward history.  Salvation may be expected beyond history, 
but the guarantee of this is an historical event, namely Christ’s incarnation.  Human 
history, as well as having a beginning and end, also has a centre, as Christian Anno 
Domini chronology demonstrates.  It is possible to fill in the stretches of time on either 
side of the central event, as decline followed by advance,248 but Löwith resists 
attributing such narratives to the original church:  ‘Seen in the light of the faith that God 
is revealed in the historical man, Jesus Christ, the profane events before and after Christ 
are not a solid chain of meaningful successions but spurious happenings whose 
significance or insignificance is to be judged in the perspective of their possible 
signification of judgment and salvation.’249  Nevertheless, the fact of the incarnation, 
something radically new, ruptures the historical pattern of sin and death in a way which 
does lend itself to the thought of further transformations.  Löwith alludes to this himself 
in one of his appendices: ‘The mere fact that Christianity interprets itself as a new
Testament, superseding an old one and fulfilling the promises of the latter, necessarily 
invites further progress and innovations.’250  At the same time, the fact that ‘the word 
became flesh’ can suggest that redemption could or even must occur in this world.251  
Consequently, the central fact on which Christianity bases itself can easily be 
interpreted in ways that encourage both the belief in a historical process leading to a 
final consummation and a historical, secular conception of that consummation.  The 
double secularization of pure Christian expectation is thus not as internally unmotivated 
as Löwith wants to claim.
                                                
248 Ibid. pp. 182-183.
249 Ibid. pp. 184-185.
250 Ibid. p. 212.  This is the theme developed by Joachim and subsequently by Lessing.
251 This is for instance how Hegel saw it: ‘For because it is God who appears in human existence, for all 
that he is universal in himself too, this reality is not restricted to individual immediate existence in the 
shape of Christ; it is unfolded into the whole of humanity in which the spirit of God makes itself 
present….’  (Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 521.)
Secularization 156
Löwith’s work provides us with a useful example of the negative use of the 
secularization theory, as it attempts to straddle both of the modes identified earlier, i.e. 
C and D.  I shall now try to evaluate the criticisms he advances in a little more detail.
In the first instance, Löwith charges philosophical history with being continuous with 
eschatology.  At its heart, he urges, is an unquestioned faith in the future, which retains 
its religious character.  That is to say, it is essentially irrational, a refusal to accept 
reality in its repetitiveness.  The expectation that the future ought to be better than the 
present usually goes hand in hand with an intense dissatisfaction with the present; the 
future is looked to as an open realm in which release from current distress can 
(miraculously) be granted or obtained.  The characterization of this kind of orientation 
toward the future as religious and irrational (though understandable) is plausible.  What 
Löwith seems to assume is that all forms of future orientation are ultimately of this kind, 
such that if we think of the future as different from and superior to what precedes it, our 
comportment toward it must be based on faith.  
It certainly helps Löwith in his identification of this underlying attitude of unfounded 
faith when he can adduce instances in which philosophical history incorporates the 
characterization of the present as a time of suffering and misery.  This explains in part 
the attention he gives to Proudhon, for whom the future is anticipated in religious 
fashion as a time of salvation because current conditions are terrible.252  Or, in the words 
of Orosius (a pupil of Augustine), ‘Future events, which become desirable because of 
our feeling of disgust for the present, we always believe will be better’.253  However, this 
feature is in fact uncommon in philosophical history, as Löwith himself recognizes 
when considering other thinkers (e.g. Comte).  Unfortunately, he does not allow this 
recognition to influence his basic schema, which he continues to use to label all 
philosophical history as eschatological.  This is particularly clear in the following 
programmatic statement: ‘the starting-point of the modern religions [i.e. philosophies] 
of progress is an eschatological anticipation of a future salvation and consequently a 
vision of the present state of mankind as one of depravity’.254  If, as seems reasonable, 
we take this as a succinct account of the eschatological position, and, following Löwith, 
we identify philosophical history as essentially eschatological, then in every instance of 
philosophical history we should expect to find ‘a vision of the present state of mankind 
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253 Quoted by Löwith on p. 178.
254 Ibid. p. 61
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as one of depravity’.  But we do not.  Far from incorporating an eschatological denial of 
the present, progressivist philosophical histories usually view the present positively.  
Things could of course be better, but the indications are that they will become so.
The progressivist’s confidence in the future typically has a double basis.  First of all, 
the past is supposed to demonstrate a positive dynamic which is then extrapolated into 
the future.  Secondly, the present allows for action to be undertaken to produce 
improvements.255  Theory and practice can thus combine to sustain a suitably measured 
teleological optimism.  This can seem sufficiently removed from the eschatological 
futurism Löwith invokes as to block his description of it in terms of the latter.  The real 
question is how plausible this optimism is: merely to point out that it shares an 
orientation towards the future with irrational religious beliefs does not automatically 
reveal it to be irrational as well.
The second strand of Löwith’s critical account of philosophical history is the claim 
that it is also discontinuous with religion, ‘perverting’ it in various ways.  Here the 
other-worldly extremism of authentic Christian expectation works to its advantage, 
enabling it to transcend the vicissitudes of this world.  Philosophical history, by 
contrast, immerses itself in them, and consequently falls foul of them.  At this level, 
Löwith’s account becomes rather diffuse, covering a variety of criticisms, some better 
than others.  I shall focus on what I take to be the three most important.
The most prominent instance of philosophy’s ‘perversion’ of religion is its 
secularizing of the end-state for humanity.  Religion, unconstrained by reality, can 
envisage the state of salvation in the most glorious (and incredible) ways.  Philosophy, 
by contrast, has to work with mundane possibilities and so inevitably produces banal 
conceptions of the fulfilled life, limited to ‘earthly happiness’.256 ‘No secular progress 
can ever approximate the Christian goal if this goal is the redemption from sin and death 
to which all worldly history is subjected.’257  This objection only works if one accepts 
the underlying assumption that the only progress worth having would be one that 
                                                
255 For Löwith, it seems that if I want things to be better, this can only be an irrational refusal to accept 
things as they are, which leads to the expectation that some other (and mythical) agent –  God, 
‘history’ – will bring about the desired-for transformation.  However, it is of course also possible to 
want things to be better and to do something about it.  The future does not have to considered as either 
just the endless repetition of the past or an arena in which we wait and hope for radical change from 
on high.  It is also the dimension in which our projects unfold and in these we can attempt and 
sometimes succeed to buck the patterns of the past.  Human teleology thus provides the basis for a 
third perspective on the future.
256 Ibid. pp. 46, 111
257 Ibid. p. 189.
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radically overcame the mundane condition (however characterized), that is, if one 
accepted a deeply negative (i.e. Christian) attitude toward the world.  But the secular 
progressivist, religious or irreligious, will have, one would have thought, already 
rejected this attitude.  Löwith’s objection makes more sense if we suppose that he thinks 
that philosophical history is still in thrall to the desire for ‘redemption from sin and 
death’, yet tries to fob it off with this-worldly projections.258  But in secularizing the 
answer, isn’t the philosophical historian often also transforming the question as well?  
Löwith is on stronger ground when pointing up the crassness of much progressivist 
utopianism, but he disregards the extent to which this does not exhaust the range of 
philosophical histories. 
A second instance of ‘perversion’ relates to the disregard the philosophers display 
towards individuals.  Löwith articulates the criticism in the following passage:
Comte, like all philosophers of history, thinks in terms of generalities but not of individuals or 
persons ... the universality of history and its continuity are overemphasized at the expense of the 
finite and personal character of human life ... It is the crux of all philosophies of history of a 
secular and positive tenor that they adopt the universal element of the Christian understanding of 
history but eliminate the Christian concern about persons….  (p. 88)
Given the polemical tone of Meaning in History, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
we are meant to take it that it is but a short step then to eliminating persons 
themselves.259  Löwith is clearly right to point out the way in which, as a result of the 
very nature of the theoretical endeavour, philosophical history tends to overlook 
individuals.  This does not entail, though, that the requisite ‘concern about persons’ is 
thereby necessarily lost. Two points need to be made: on the one hand, philosophical 
history can itself register this absence, such that it manifests that very concern; on the 
other, philosophical history does not have to be all that a philosopher engages in.  It is 
only if philosophical history is taken on its own or in a one-sided way that the issue can 
become a problem, theoretical and practical.
Finally, there is the allegation of wishfulness in the portrayal of the past.  Löwith 
claims that philosophical history, like authentic Christianity, indulges in wishful 
thinking about the future.  Yet of the two, only the former applies this retrospectively as 
well.260  The results are implausible progressivist narratives.  This line of attack does at 
                                                
258 Cf. ‘the secular drive toward a final solution of problems which cannot be solved by their own means 
and on their own level’, ibid. pp. 158-159.
259 Cf. p. 89, and the use of ‘final solution’ in the passage cited in the previous footnote.  See also Elster, 
Making Sense of Marx, pp. 116-8 for similar thoughts.
260 Löwith characterizes this endeavour as one in which ‘the interpretation of the past becomes a 
prophecy in reverse’ (ibid. p. 6), echoing Friedrich Schlegel’s 1798 definition of the (philosophical) 
historian as a ‘prophet [Prophet] facing backwards’ (‘Athenaeum Fragments’, §80, p. 27).
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least recognize that the philosophical historians try to provide their expectations with 
some sort of inductivist basis, which are therefore not eschatological in quite the same 
way as the hopes of the genuine Christian.  However, Löwith thinks that these attempts 
always fail, so that rather than sustaining the belief in a better future, they are 
themselves sustained by it.  Only in this way can he mount his double level critique, 
whereby philosophical history is condemned for being both like Christianity and unlike 
it.
Löwith’s assertion that progressivist accounts of the past do not square with 
historical reality relies upon his own construal of that reality, in which it demonstrates 
the transience of all human achievements and the ineliminability of suffering.261  This 
tendentious account is itself open to challenge.  He evidently has a point in certain 
instances, given the ability (which Herder addressed) of some progressivists to rewrite 
history in accordance with their ideals.262  Yet the obvious implausibility of some 
philosophical histories does not mean that all of them display this failing, or that 
Löwith’s inverse view of things is any more credible.  At times, it can seem as if Löwith 
is simply assuming that any historical account which supports an optimistic view of the 
future must be empirically unfounded just because it is used in this way.  This would 
surely be, once again, to beg the question.  The argument has to proceed in the opposite 
direction: having shown the falsity of the historical narrative, one can then adduce 
motives which may have led to its being held to be true.263  
Löwith’s strategy of contrasting philosophical history with Christianity to the 
detriment of the former certainly hits some targets.  It does seems that some ‘modern 
religions of progress’ are guilty of providing banal conceptions of humanity’s destiny, 
promoting a dangerously instrumental attitude toward individuals and producing partial 
and implausible constructions of history itself.  But this is not to say that all
philosophical histories are necessarily vulnerable to criticism on these scores.
                                                
261 ‘An unprejudiced view of this play of human passions and sufferings, irrationality and violence, 
provides neither a basic idea nor a rational goal in the history of the world.  It is a “confused heap of 
rubble” and a “shambles” upon which the fortune of peoples, states and individuals is sacrificed.’  
(From Hegel to Nietzsche, p. 216.)
262 The figure he considers of whom this may be said is Comte, whose ‘outlook on history cannot but 
falsify historical reality’ (Meaning in History, p. 89).
263 Again, see Forster’s helpful discussion of genetic arguments in Hegel’s Idea, pp. 445-6.  Presumably 
Löwith might feel that having uncovered enough instances where optimism and implausibility went 
hand in hand, it was reasonable to assume a causal link between the two and infer from the former to 
the latter.  He would though have to ensure that his examples included the most sophisticated versions 
of the genre, and not just those which prove the point he wants to make.
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We will see later how Kant fares against Löwith’s attack on the philosophy of 
progress.  Before that, I would like to consider another important contribution to the 
debate about secularization.  Hans Blumenberg is a noted critic of the whole 
secularization approach, both as it relates to modern conceptions of history as well as to 
other intellectual, cultural and political domains.  The first part of The Legitimacy of the 
Modern Age is devoted to its critique, taking Löwith amongst others as its target.  
Blumenberg’s focus is not so much philosophical history, though he turns towards this 
in due course, but rather the idea of progress which is central to it.  His argument 
involves the following three moves: (i) a direct argument against the secularization 
thesis; (ii) an alternative genetic account; (iii) a consideration of philosophical history, 
showing how the secularization hypothesis could ever have appeared plausible.
Firstly, Blumenberg stresses the disanalogies between Christian eschatology and the 
modern idea of progress.  These are such that the latter could not have been generated 
by means of the secularization of the former:
What signs are there that even suggest a likelihood that theological eschatology, with its idea of 
the ‘consummation’ of history by its discontinuance, could have provided the model for an idea of 
the forward movement of history according to which it was supposed for the first time to have 
gained stability and reliability through its consummation or its approach to its consummation? … 
Regarding the dependence of the idea of progress on Christian eschatology, there are differences 
that would have had to block any transposition of the one onto the other.  It is a formal, but for that 
reason a manifest, difference that an eschatology speaks of an event breaking into history, an event 
that transcends and is heterogeneous to it, while the idea of progress extrapolates from a structure 
present in every moment to a future that is immanent in history.  (The Legitimacy of the Modern 
Age, p. 30)
The disanalogies are three-fold:  The primary difference, as indicated above, is that 
eschatology relies upon divine intervention from outside history, whereas progress is 
supposed to be a dynamic internal to it.  Secondly, eschatology looks to the termination 
of history, whereas progress opens up the prospect of its infinite continuation.  Thirdly, 
eschatology usually involves terrible cataclysms prior to the looked for consummation, 
so occasions fear as much as hope, whereas progress is normally intended to promote 
optimism, both about the present and the future. 
Blumenberg’s exploitation of these differences is not as conclusive as he thinks.  For 
one thing, his argument against ‘the genetic nexus’ is somewhat similar to Löwith’s 
evaluative contrast of philosophical history with ‘genuine Christianity’.264  Both writers 
point to important differences between the two, which for the one serve to portray 
progressivism as a perversion of Christianity, but for the other are supposed to 
undermine the very supposition that it in any way derives from it.  Moreover, the very 
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features which Blumenberg invokes are ones mentioned by Löwith as part of his 
endeavour to paint philosophical history in as poor a light as possible:
A basic difference between Christianity and secular futurism is, however, that the pilgrim’s 
progress is not an indefinite advance toward an unattainable ideal but a definite choice in the face 
of an eternal reality and that the Christian hope in the Kingdom of God is bound up with fear of 
the Lord, while the secular hope for a “better world” looks forward without fear and trembling.  
They have in common, nonetheless, the eschatological viewpoint and outlook onto the future as 
such.  The idea of progress could become the leading principle for the understanding of history 
only within this primary horizon of the future as established by Jewish and Christian faith. 
(Meaning in History, p. 84, cf. also pp. 111, 112-113.)
The difficulty with Blumenberg’s argument from disanalogy is that it skates over all the 
intermediary ‘secularized’ forms of Christianity, ones which weaken and downplay the 
particular qualities of ‘genuine’ eschatology.  The genetic story advanced by 
secularization theorists will certainly look implausible if it attempts to move straight 
from austere other-worldly Christianity to the modern idea of progress.  As we have 
seen with Löwith, though, the process of secularization is one which, it can be shown, 
occurs within religion long before it happens to it, and indeed can only happen to it 
because it has already happened within it. Blumenberg is by no means unaware of this, 
but it seriously weakens the force of his assertion that eschatology and progressivism 
are poles apart.265  His response is to emphasize the non-Christian, Hellenistic character 
of the elements, such as the idea of Providence, which modern philosophical history 
took from theology.  This is all fair and well, but does not alter the fact that it was from 
Christian theology that it took them, even if this theology had drifted a long way from 
its Pauline origins.
The second part of Blumenberg’s argument is the flipside of the first: if the modern 
idea of progress does not derive from Christianity, where does it come from?  Here we 
are pointed, as one would expect, to ‘novel experiences’ in the early modern period 
which led to its generation: on the one hand, advances in the natural sciences and on the 
other hand, the slow emancipation of the arts from the dominance of classical models.266  
These developments only justified a modest and provisional conception of progress.  
For example, the status of artistic progress is always uncertain, and classicism took a 
long time to fade.  But, as Blumenberg points out, the advantage of ‘the aesthetic model 
of progress’ is that ‘here it is man, and man alone, who produces the realities in the 
                                                
265 See Lawrence Dickey, ‘Blumenberg and secularization: “Self-assertion” and the problem of self-
realizing teleology in history’, and also his Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of Spirit, 
1770–1807, pp. 12-32 and 40-57.
266 The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, p. 31.
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aesthetic sphere, and hence would also be the agent of any progress that might take 
place in it’.267
Having argued for the legitimacy of the modern idea of progress, Blumenberg turns, 
in the third stage of his overall argument, to address philosophical history.  What he 
needs to do is explain why it is that the secularization thesis can seem so plausible, if, as 
he has urged, it has no real basis.  Blumenberg’s answer is straightforward: modern 
philosophy felt obliged to occupy the theoretical space opened up and maintained by the 
Christian salvation story, and so over-inflated the idea of progress to fill it:
the modern age found it impossible to decline to answer questions about the totality of history.  To 
that extent, the philosophy of history is an attempt to answer a medieval question with the means 
available to a postmedieval age.  In this process, the idea of progress is driven to a level of 
generality that overextends its original, regionally circumscribed and objectively limited range as 
an assertion.  As one of the possible answers to the question of the totality of history, it is drawn 
into the function for consciousness that had been performed by the framework of the salvation 
story, with Creation at one end and Judgment at the other.  The fact that this explanatory 
accomplishment exceeded the powers of its characteristic rationality was not without historical 
consequences.  (The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, pp. 48-49)
Blumenberg sees this as part of a general pattern whereby new ideas get yoked to 
inherited and antiquated questions.  Philosophical history is thus a transitional form, a 
hybrid generated by modernity’s mistaken endeavour to engage with its predecessor on 
the latter’s own terrain.
The modern age’s readiness to inherit such a mortgage of prescribed questions and to accept as its 
own the obligation to pay it off goes a long way toward explaining its intellectual history.  There is 
an element of tragedy in the way in which this effort, as generous as it was hopeless, finally ends 
with the more or less explicit insinuation that the inheritance came about in a dishonest way … the 
process that is interpreted as secularization … should be described not as the transposition of 
authentically theological contents into secularized alienation from their origin but rather as the 
reoccupation of answer positions that had become vacant and whose corresponding questions 
could not be eliminated.  (The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, p. 65)
Blumenberg ultimately can seem to come very close to presenting a secularization thesis 
himself.  Philosophical history does derive from religion, but only in respect of its 
totalizing theoretical ambition.  The precise characterization he gives to the idea of 
secularization (‘the transposition of authentically theological contents into secularized 
alienation from their origin’, underlining added for emphasis) allows him to resist the 
description of the process he identifies as a secularization.  The approach then enables 
Blumenberg to rescue the ‘authentic rationality’ of the idea of progress from the 
wreckage of the projects of the philosophical historians, such as Hegel and Comte.  
(These two figure both for Löwith and Blumenberg as central purveyors of the genre.)
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The coherence of this third part of Blumenberg’s argument rests upon the proposition 
that the questions about the totality of human history to which modernity responded 
with its universal histories are ones which it should have ignored (and was ultimately 
able to).  The confidence with which the possibility of a genuine intellectual interest in 
history as a whole is dismissed here is surely troubling.268  It is possible to concur with 
Blumenberg in his skepticism regarding the existence of a fixed canon of philosophical
questions yet feel that philosophical history does more than simply respond to the 
challenge of outmoded theoretical schemes.  The very development in modernity of a 
distinctive understanding of historical temporality might be thought to be likely to 
prompt consideration about the course of history as a whole and the nature of human 
historicity.  On Blumenberg’s interpretation, it is difficult to understand why 
philosophical history became such an important issue in eighteenth–century Europe, as 
opposed to a vestigial hangover, if the intellectual needs which it engaged were as 
extraneous to the age as he claims.
Moreover, Blumenberg is in some difficulty in trying to pin onto Christianity a 
concern with the historical totality.  As Löwith makes clear (and even Blumenberg 
recognizes),269 ‘genuine Christianity’ is indifferent to the historical trajectory.  To be 
sure, it can point to a beginning, a middle and an end, but these serve to mark the 
transcendence of history rather than define a topic for theoretical inquiry.  In so far as 
theologians have inquired into the sense of history as a whole, it is much more 
plausible, as Blumenberg himself indicates, to see them as responding to and 
transforming questions and concepts inherited from Hellenistic thought rather than 
elaborating an essentially Christian concern.  This goes hand in hand, as Dickey has 
described, with the secularizing and teleological strand in Christianity which can be 
seen as leading to modern progressivism.  
Both Löwith and Blumenberg identify an intrinsically Christian component in 
philosophical history.  For the former, it is an underlying and enduring existential 
orientation, deriving from Christian religion.  For the latter, it is a transitional 
intellectual inheritance, coming from Christian theology.  The two approaches converge 
inasmuch as they both detect ‘faith’ lurking within philosophical history, but for Löwith 
the element of faith is basic, whereas for Blumenberg it is what is produced when the 
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idea of progress is over-extended – ‘the transformation of progress into a faith 
encompassing the future’.270
In the third and final part of this chapter, I would like to consider briefly how Kant’s 
philosophy of history stands up to the various criticisms which go under the heading of 
‘secularization’.271  Löwith’s primary objection to progressivist universal history is that 
it is oriented by the unfounded expectation that the future will be better than the past, an 
expectation it shares with and inherits from Christian eschatology.  The ‘hope for better 
times’ (‘Theory and Practice’, 8:309) is only possible because it exploits the fact that 
the future always remains unknown and so can serve as a space for utopian 
projections.272  There is clearly an element of this in Kant, but it is surely tempered by 
the attempt to base hope for the future on both a hard-nosed view of the past and the 
endeavours undertaken in the present to achieve a better future.  Expectation is thus not 
unfounded, or at least not completely so.  
It may seem, therefore, that Kant’s idea of progress, in being philosophical and 
historical, can resist the eschatological accusation.  What though of Löwith’s second 
objection, which engages with the ways in which philosophical history differs from 
genuine Christianity?  To the extent that we may think that Kant can rebuff the first 
charge, it would seem that he must be more exposed to the second.  I identified three 
criticisms as particularly significant for Löwith in his attempt to portray philosophical 
history as a ‘perversion’ of Christianity.  The first of these is that mundane conceptions 
of a future consummation cannot adequately answer to the desire for fulfilment which 
motivates them.  As stated, this begs the question, though the charge may nonetheless 
be applicable in some cases, namely those in which the motivating aspiration is for 
‘redemption from sin and death’.273  The most straightforward way in which to see that 
this is not true of Kant is simply to recognize that his version of ‘moral faith’ itself 
provides ways of answering these desires.  Philosophical history is thus not intended 
entirely to supplant more traditional religious beliefs, but rather to operate alongside 
them (once these have been suitably purified).  It therefore cannot be charged with 
attempting to satisfy all religious yearnings with secular substitutes.  Löwith’s second 
                                                
270 Ibid. p. 49.
271 Although both Löwith and Blumenberg mention Kant, neither deals with him in any detail.  It may be 
that for both his philosophical history is an awkward case.
272 More accurately, these should be termed uchronic projections, in line with the neologism coined by 
the nineteenth-century French neo-Kantian, Charles Renouvier.
273 Meaning in History, p. 189; cf. p. 156, n. 258 above.
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line of criticism is more effective when he appeals to a less religious standard for 
evaluating secular versions of the millennium, some of which can certainly be accused 
of succumbing to a hedonistic materialism.  But this charge likewise has no bearing on 
Kant; indeed, if anything, it is a problem for him that his conception of a future of 
endless striving is too bracing and sublime (cf. Chapter Five).
The second point Löwith raises is the anti-individualism of philosophical history.  
Kant articulates this concern even more sharply: for him, it is primarily the historical 
process, and not just the description of it, which poses the problem (cf. Chapter Six).  In 
registering the issue, Kant has already demonstrated that his perspective does not 
‘eliminate the Christian concern about persons’.274  Moreover, as I tried to show, ‘moral 
faith’ can itself assuage the perplexity that progress provokes.
The third criticism in this cluster is the claim that philosophical history inevitably 
falsifies the historical record, and that its constructions are therefore only sustained by 
the belief in the future which they are intended to sustain.  For Kant, it is true that his 
motivation to construct a universal history derives in part from the desire to provide ‘a 
comforting prospect of the future’ (‘Idea’, #9, 8:30).  But we should not therefore 
assume that this interest leads him to disregard or distort historical reality.  The decisive 
issue here is of course the question of the empirical plausibility of his account of 
history, something which I am not going to be able to address.  But it would certainly be 
very difficult for Löwith to accuse Kant of ‘wishful thinking’ in his account of the past.  
As we have seen, this is by no means a ‘rose-tinted’ view.  In so far as progress has 
taken place, it has been nearly always as a result of self-seeking and frequently violent 
behaviour, and its course has been slow and erratic.  At this point I imagine Löwith 
would switch to his opening C-type critique: the problem with Kant’s universal history 
is not that its depiction of the past is wishfully optimistic, for it isn’t, but rather the fact 
that as a result it fails to justify the optimism about the future which it is supposed to.  If 
the course of history really has been as Kant describes, then there isn’t much to look 
forward to.  Such optimism as Kant does provide seems to be simply pulled out of a hat, 
in typical eschatological style.
It is at this point that a Löwithian critique of Kant’s philosophy of history starts to 
bite.  As we have seen, Kant has two further points to make, but neither is likely to 
impress his opponent.  Firstly, Kant will appeal to the necessary practicality of the 
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demands of the moral law.  Löwith would no doubt detect in this an essentially 
eschatological appeal to a transcendent divinity.  Once again, therefore, the debate about 
progress devolves onto disagreements at a more fundamental level, consideration of 
which would take me beyond the scope of this thesis, except to say that the onus is on 
both parties to back up their positions.  Secondly, Kant will emphasize the particular 
grounds for optimism that the present affords, in particular the indications that the 
species has attained a kind of maturity which will enable it to start to make proper 
progress.  In this instance, Löwith would have reason to judge Kant guilty of at least a 
degree of wishful thinking.275  
The problem for Kant is the way in which he oscillates between predictive and 
prophetic kinds of expectation (to use the terms examined in the previous chapter).  
Challenged by a skeptic about the optimism of his ‘prophecy’, he refers to his 
‘prediction’ to back it up.  Unfortunately, the latter does not really match up to the
former, except in so far as Kant has surreptitiously allowed the inductively based 
expectation to be infected by the more eschatological outlook.  I referred earlier to the 
combination of prediction and prophecy as a ‘belt and braces’ approach (p. 142); 
however, it looks as if the discrepancy between the degrees of optimism they sustain 
means that whilst both devices can hold the metaphorical trousers up, only one of them 
is able to do so at the correct level.
Löwith’s general diagnosis of an eschatological wishfulness thus does have some 
applicability to Kant’s philosophical history.  Indeed, Kant’s double strategy, 
particularly in the writings from the 1790s, can be understood as in part motivated by an 
awareness of the vulnerability of his historical optimism to this charge.  Ultimately, 
though, this optimism relies upon a confidence in the realizability of reason which, even 
if it does not answer Löwith, at least blocks him.
For the purposes of this discussion, I am treating Blumenberg as a kind of 
secularization theorist, given that he tries to account for the development of modern 
philosophical history by appeal to questions and ambitions inherited from Christianity.  
Accordingly, he would want to detach Kant’s commitment to the idea of progress, 
construed as the self-assertion of the modern age, or ‘Enlightenment’, from its inflation 
into a universal history.  The initial problem with this strategy is its denial that the 
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which Kant is prone to interpret contemporary cultural and technological developments in the context 
of an ‘ages of man’ schema, such that he can talk of the ‘maturity’ of the species.  This is surely to 
exaggerate the status of ‘enlightenment’.
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questions and interests which motivate philosophical history are unworthy ones.   As we 
have seen, Kant would want to assert that there are perfectly good if not in fact 
necessary theoretical and theodicial questions which universal history attempts to 
answer.  In reply, Blumenberg might admit that the questions are prima facie 
reasonable, but go on to claim that they are in the end unanswerable and so ought to be 
given up.  This would be to emphasize the ambitions philosophical history took over 
from religion and theology, more than the questions themselves.  
Blumenberg’s diagnosis of theoretical hubris evidently presupposes that 
philosophical history of the kind under consideration inevitably fails.  Kant would 
disagree with this, and also demur the imputation of excessive ambition – his universal 
history is for the most part notable for the modesty with which it is presented.  One may 
suppose that one index of the failure of philosophical history from Blumenberg’s point 
of view would be its reliance upon discredited metaphysical and theological 
assumptions, such as the idea of Providence.  An interesting part of his case is the denial 
that this idea properly belongs to Christianity, and so is not something which can be 
said to have been illicitly appropriated from it.  However, whether authentically 
Christian or not (cf. my earlier quibble about this, p. 161), it is definitely a religious and
theological idea, and as such is vulnerable to the usual empiricist skepticism.   If I am 
right in thinking that Blumenberg would take exception to the way in which the idea of 
progress is inflated by being hitched to the idea of Providence, then once again we can 
establish a degree of common ground between him and those who criticize 
philosophical history for depending on discredited theological dogmas.
Similarly, for many contemporary readers, the real problem with Kant’s 
philosophical history is that it is insufficiently secularized.  In terms of my earlier 
schema, this would be to say that it is an A-type construct, still essentially continuous 
with religion, when it should be B-type, abstaining from religious devices altogether.  
This is particularly apparent in the embarrassment some commentators display when 
having to deal with Kant’s appeals to Nature and Providence.276  A related approach is to 
suppose that his theory of progress is in effect completely secularized as it is, and so 
stands quite independently of what all have to agree is Kant’s continuing commitment 
to religion.277  It is then often further argued that the philosophy of history can serve as a 
properly modern and secular replacement for the lingering residues of religiously-
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Secularization 168
inflected aspirations apparent in Kant’s texts.  This line of interpretation therefore takes 
the process of secularization to be one which amongst other things describes Kant’s 
own intellectual trajectory.  For example, Andrews Reath identifies the presence in 
Kant’s texts of incompatible ‘theological’ and ‘secular’ conceptions of the highest good, 
the latter describing ‘a state of affairs that can be achieved in this world, through human
activity’, ‘a social goal to be achieved in history’.  He then claims that ‘the theological 
one is predominant in the earlier works, such as the first and second Critiques, while the 
secular one is predominant in … the later works’, concluding that ‘historically, Kant’s 
thought about the highest good develops in the direction of the secular conception’.278  
I hope to have shown in this thesis that such views are mistaken.  Firstly, Kant’s idea 
of mundane progress, whilst obviously secular in its focus, is bound up with an appeal 
to a theistic creator.  Kant even goes so far as to enlist the belief in a divinely 
consummated end state on its behalf.  As I have argued, none of this should be taken to 
qualify the fact that progress is always something human beings have to achieve. 
Secondly, the idea of progress is not meant to be a substitute for other-worldly 
aspirations.  The best way to see this is to recognize the extent to which it itself gives 
rise to and is supported by such aspirations.  Kant’s continuing commitment to central 
transcendent elements of Christianity enables him to deflect some of the D-type 
objections put to philosophical history by Lotze, Löwith and others.  The immanent and 
transcendent, ‘theological’ and ‘secular’ approaches are best seen as complementary 
and not as rivals.279  (In this, we might suppose, Kant is remaining true to what some 
take to be an original duality in Christianity.)  The two points I am trying to make in this 
paragraph can be put like this.  On the one hand, secularization need not be, and is not
with Kant, a process which takes one out of the religious or theological domain.  On the 
other hand, secularization need not, and does not with Kant, exhaust the putative 
rational potential of religion.  The tendency to assume the opposite in both cases 
inevitably obscures the real character of his project.
I do not claim to have resolved all the issues raised in the debate about 
secularization, but hope at least to have mapped out some of the terrain.  To close, I 
would like to consider the phrase ‘religion of progress’, which critics such as Löwith are 
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prone to throw around in a hostile fashion.280  It is not sufficiently realized, I think, quite 
how apposite this phrase is in relation to Kant.  In Religion, he devotes much space to 
describing how the enlightened Christian church can serve as the vehicle for the growth 
of the ‘ethical community’, or ‘invisible church’.  But the church itself must progress as 
a church, by slowly shedding its dogmatic trappings.  Religion therefore has explicitly 
to become a religion of progress: ‘every church erected on statutory laws can be the true 
church only to the extent that it contains within itself a principle of constantly coming 
closer to the pure faith of religion’ (6:153).  Such a church does not worship progress,
but dynamically articulates and promotes the progressive vocation of humanity.  The 
development of the church in this direction will not be untroubled.  The passage from 
Religion continues:
By contrast the servants of a church who do not take this end into consideration but rather declare 
the maxim of constant approximation [continuirliche Annäherung] to it as damnable 
[verdamnlich], while depending on the historical [historischen] and statutory part of the church’s 
faith as alone salvific, can justly be accused of counterfeit service of the church or ethical 
community under the dominion of the good principle (which is represented through the church).  
(6:153)
The controversy about the idea of progress, which here Kant adverts to, is still with us.
                                                
280 See especially Meaning in History, p. 113, also p. 61, cited on p. 154 above.
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